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DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: BARGAINED-FOR
ZONING THAT IS NEITHER ILLEGAL CONTRACT NOR
CONDITIONAL ZONING
SHELBY
D. GREEN*

Historically, land development in North America meant the
subdividing of vast tracts of land into individual building lots that formed
cities and towns.' The two principal characteristics of this kind of
development were the grid layout of streets and "the dominance of the
house-the individual abode7'-as the central architectural element of the
city or town.2 The grid layout facilitated future sale, since rectangular lots
were easy to build on and could accommodate different uses.3 This
scheme contrasts with that "in European cities where churches, palaces and
government buildings dominate the urban landsca e," and cities are
"designed around these symbols of belief and power." ?
The North American developer is no longer free to decide alone what
development there should be. A developer must comply with a myriad of
both state and federal land use regulations and standards. As more
regulatory steps are required and as standards evolve, the process of
development has become more lengthy and encumbered. A development
may well involve obtaining scores of permits from almost as many
agencies.5 Still, in large measure, the role of the developer remains
dominant, beginning with the original concept and involving the
assemblage of the materials, professionals, and other participants, such as
lenders, investors, and community leaders, necessary for making the
concept a real it^.^ The developer may be the one to locate the site,
determine its suitability, articulate the development, negotiate with
governmental officials, and oversee implementation.'
Environmental laws, both federal and state, requiring either protective
or remedial measures in the case of sites contaminated with or exposed to
Copyright O 2004, Shelby D.Green.
*
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D. Georgetown
University Law Center. B.S. Towson State College.
GEORGE
LEFCOE,
REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS
987 (2d ed. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Donald G. Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use
Permits, 11 SW.U . L. REV. 545,546 (1979).
See id. at 987-88.
Id. at 988.
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hazardous wastes, may render a development project either prohibitively
expensive or illegal.' Property that once was an industrial site, a defense
installation, or even a farm may present such risks.
Most essentially, development must be in accord with existing land use
rules? Local governments use four basic mechanisms for land use
control.1° First, zoning ordinances "impose limits on size and location of
structures, the size and shape of lots and the use of land and structures.""
Second, "general plans" specify the goals of future development, including
a consideration of population density, infrastructure, transportation, and
housing.'?
Third, there are subdivision controls for residential
developments, in particular single-family developments, that establish
standards for the location and design of streets, major utility lines, and
other public infrastructure, and often dedication of land or payments for
off-site improvements such as roads, parks, and school^.'^ Finally,
"building codes" specify "building materials, structural elements,
minimum habitability standards and in some cases aesthetic elements of
new buildings."14
Zoning is an exercise of the police power-the
power of the
government to protect health, safety, welfare, and morals.15 Generally, the
police powers are said to reside originally in the state and are delegated to
local governments through enabling legislation.16 The adoption of a
zoning ordinance pursuant to an enabling act is accomplished by an elected
body, and the result is a legislative act generally entitled to a presumption

In the federal regime, the primary law is the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. $5 9601-9675,
under which a developer who purchases a contaminated site may bear responsibility 'for its
cleanup. Numerous other environmental regulatory laws limit uses on land, including the
Clean Air Act of 1977,42 U.S.C. $5 7401-7642; the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1990,
42 U.S.C. $5 7623-7624; the Clean Water Act of 1977 (covering wetlands and other bodies
of water), 33 U.S.C. $3 1252-1387; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. $8
1531-1544; and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. $$ 1451-1464, to
name a few.
LEFCOE,supra note 1, at 1039.
lo
JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL,PROPERTY
LAW AND POLICY:A
COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
898 (1998).
Id.
l2
Id.
l3
Id.
l4
Id. at 898-99.
IS
1 KENNETH
H. YOUNG,ANDERSON'S
AMERICAN
LAWOF ZONING$ 1.14 (4th ed.
1996).
1 id. $ 2.19.
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of validity." Many of the early zoning enabling acts were modeled after
the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, drafted and distributed by the United
States Department of Commerce in the 1920s.'~ While the goal of the
enabling acts was to allow for the enactment of ordinances aimed at
exercising the police powers,'9 the acts were process-oriented, providing
the authority for planning and specifying the role local agencies were to
play in the process of zoning." The standard act did not include
substantive planning policies, leaving these to be developed in the
process.21 However, the standard act did contemplate the establishment of
districts within the community by reference to "number, shape and area, as
may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of [a zoning] act, and
within such districts to regulate and restrict the erection, construction,
reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land."22
It prescribed that regulations governing uses of land be made with
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the
district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and "with a view to
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate
use of land" throughout the municipality.23
Although zoning in the United States is commonly thought to have
begun with the enactment of New York City's comprehensive zoning
ordinance in 1916, it was the 1926 Supreme Court decision in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty C O . , where
~ ~ the Court upheld the constitutionality
of municipal zoning regulations as incident to the police power when
enacted pursuant to valid1 im lemented land use plans that advance the
legitimate public interest,l 5 that prompted other states to adopt zoning
legislation. Since then, every state has enacted laws enabling or
requiring26municipalities to regulate land use via comprehensive plans.27
The result is that a landowner cannot simply choose to use land as he
l7

Durand v. Il)C Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359,364 (Mass. 2003).
1 YOUNG,supra note 15,s 2.21.
l9
This meant that limitations could be placed not only on uses of land, but also on
the density of the development in an area, the height of buildings, and their location on lots.
DANIELMANDELKER,
LANDUSELAW5 3.07 (5th ed. 2003).
20
Id. 3.05.
2'
Id.
22
Id. 4.17.
23
1 YOUNG,supra note 15, 2.24.
24
272 U.S.365 (1926).
25
Id. at 387,390,395-96.
26
See ROBERTC . ELLICKSON
& VICKIL. BEEN,LANDUSE CONTROLS,CASES&
MATERIALS67 (2d ed. 2000); 1 YOUNG,supra note 15, 8 2.19.
27
Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of
Bargaining in Land Use Conflicts, 7 HARV.
NEWT.L. REV. 337,343 (2002).
l8
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desires, but must obtain permission for a particular use from the local
government to ensure that the desired use is consistent with the
comprehensive plan and the health, safety, and welfare of the community.
Thus, a landowner may be required to obtain subdivision approval before
dividing a given parcel for development or a building permit before
initiating new construction.
The traditional zoning process consists of the adoption of a
comprehensive plan and the issuance of local zoning ordinances pursuant
to the plan.28 The adoption of local zoning ordinances is accomplished by
a hearing and public participation.29 Zoning ordinances are adopted for the
long-term, and amendments are typically allowed only where mistake is
shown in the original zoning or significant, unanticipated changes have
been made since the enactment of the last comprehensive rezoning plan in
a relatively well-defined area surrounding the property.30
"[Sltandard zoning enabling acts require that zoning ordinances apply
uniformly to all property within a district . . . .,931 Thus, characteristic of
the Euclidean model of zoning is the seemingly rigid division of the land
into discrete areas, each assigned a particular use-residential,
heavy
~
idea was that $rough mandatory
industrial, or a g r i c u l t ~ r a l . ~ The
See 1 Y o ~ G supra
,
note 15, 8 5.02. The elements of a comprehensive plan
include consideration of land use, transportation issues, environmental concerns, and
housing issues. MANDELKER,supra note 19, 5 3.10. A comprehensive plan will also
include a statement of the objectives of the municipality regarding the municipality's future
development, as well as short-and long-range implementation strategies. Id. Not all
enabling acts, though, required a comprehensive plan as a predicate for enacting zoning
legislation. 1 Y o ~ G supra
,
note 15, 5 5.04. Instead, some courts have held that all that is
required is that the land use controls be comprehensive. 1 id.
29
1 YOUNG,supra note 15, $5 2.25,4.11.
30
Mayor of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., 814 A.2d 469, 483 (Md. 2002); Bd. of
Alderman v. Conerly, 509 So. 2d 877, 883 (Miss. 1987). However, not all jurisdictions
impose this limitation on rezoning. MANDELKER,
supra note 19, 5 6.31. Otherwise,
judicial review of rezoning focuses on the consistency of the rezoning with the
comprehensive plan. Id. 8 6.32.
"
Ryan, supra note 27, at 352; see also 1 PAIUICK
J . ROHAN,ZONINGAND LAND
USECONTROLS
8 5.01[1] (2004).
"
1 ROHAN,supra note 31, §5.01[1]. Different uses still may occur within a single
district. See 1 YOUNG,supra note 15, 8 5.25. Different uses may be tolerated because of
the varying circumstances of the land or use of the property. See 1 id. Land in the same
district near a highway may be treated differently than land not near a highway. 1 id.
(citing Charter Township of Oshtemo v. Cent. Adver. Co., 336 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983)). In other words, "a zoning ordinance may be uniform in its application even
though some uses in a district do not comply with the restrictions imposed in such district
or incompatible uses are permitted in an adjacent [parcel]." 1 id. In addition, non(continued)
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separation of uses, each class of land would be protected from the negative
impacts of other types of uses.33 Euclidean zoning was also designed to
achieve stability and evenhandedness in land use planning on the
assumption that development would proceed in appropriate zones, and
minor adjustments would be made only as necessary in unanticipated cases
of hardship in which a variance34might be granted or a special use permit
or exception issued.35 Although land could be rezoned, this was not a
conforming uses must be tolerated by the municipality unless they constitute a nuisance, are
extended, are abandoned, or are extinguished by eminent domain. Pa. N.W. Distrib., Inc. v.
Zoning Hearing B d , 584 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. 1991); see also 1 YOUNG,
supra note 15,
6.05; MANDELKER,
supra note 19, $ 5.69.
33
See 1 ROHAN,supra note 3 1, 5.01[2].
A variance grants the landowner the authority to use property in a manner
prohibited by the zoning ordinance. See MANDELKER,
supra note 19, 6.41. It refers to
administrative relief from the zoning restrictions that may be granted where enforcement of
the restrictions would result in unnecessary hardship. Id. Unnecessary hardship may be
established by a showing that the zoning ordinance "renders the property unsuitable for any
purpose," Commons v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 1138, 1143 (N.J.
1980), and "that the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to the
general conditions of the neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the
zoning ordinance itself." Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939). But, selfinflicted hardship would not justify a variance. MANDELKER,
supra note 19, § 6.50. It must
also be shown that the variance would not be contrary to the public interest. Id. 6.41. A
variance may apply to uses, for example retail stores and single family homes; or area
requirements, such as density, height of buildings, and setbacks. Id. 6.42. Some states
also authorize variances upon a showing of "practical difficulties," but usually in the case
of area and opposed to use variances. Id. 6.48. The practical difficulties test includes a
consideration of "the significance of the economic injury, the magnitude of the variance
. . . , whether the difficulty [is] self-created, and whether other feasible alternatives could
avoid the difficulty," as well as the effect of the variance on the surrounding neighborhood.
Id. Often, zoning acts provide the standards the administrative agency must apply when
acting on request for variances, id.
6.41, and often provide for the imposition of
conditions in granting a variance, id. 6.51.
35
MANDELKER,
supra note 19, 8 6.39. A special or conditional use permit is an
exception to the existing zoning in a particular district, allowing a different use than is
expressly permitted as of right by the ordinance. Id.
6.39. It is approved by an
administrative board, or legislative body. 1 YOUNG,supra note 15, 9.17. The "device
interposes an administrative review of the probable effect of a proposed use at a specific
site and authorizes the imposition of conditions designed to protect adjacent land from the
foreseeable impact of the proposed use." 1 id. The standards for granting special use
permits are set out in the zoning act, allowing uses on a lot-by-lot, use-by-use basis. 1 id.
9.18. A special exception is an administrative device that allows additional uses, which are
conditionally compatible within each zone, but which should not be allowed unless specific
(continued)

"
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practical way of addressing changing uses and needs of landowners and the
community because of the cumbersome legislative process involved.
Later, floating zones36and planned unit developments,37which are special
statutory standards assuring compatibility are met by the landowner. 1 id. 5 9.17. A special
exception recognizes that "certain uses, considered . . . essential or desirable for the welfare
of the community . . . , are entirely appropriate and not essentially incompatible with the
basic uses" in a given district, but may not be appropriate at "every and any location . . . or
without conditions . . . , by reason of special problems the use presents." MANDELKER,
supra note 19, 5 6.54. Some zoning acts use special use permits interchangeably with
special exceptions. 1 YOUNG,supra note 15, 5 9.17. However, one treatise notes a
difference. See 1 id. The special exception, "is less versatile than the special use permit in
that the only question to be determined by the administrative body is whether the property
owner has established . . . facts which entitle him to the exception [and rleview of the
probable impact on the neighborhood," is not often done. 1 id. And, with a special
exception, no authority to impose conditions is usually present. 1 id. While the standards
for granting or denying a request for special uses and exceptions are contained in the zoning
ordinances, they are generally quite vague and broad. For example, some use language
such as "in the 'pubic interest,' serve the 'public welfare,' [or] consistent with the 'spirit
and intent' of the zoning ordinance." MANDELKER,
supra note 19, $ 6.53 (discussing
zoning standards, noting that some courts have struck down such standards as too vague to
meet the constitutional delegation of legislative power).
36
MANDELKER,
supra note 19, 5 6.61. A floating zone is a zoning district usable for
a specific purpose or class of purposes. Id. The zoning authority does not assign a floating
zone district a place on the zoning map, and it is later established by amendment to the
zoning ordinance. Id. $ 6.61. The floating zone ordinance will contain "standards for the
approval of [such a] zone, such as density and site development standards." Id. With a
floating zone, the municipality may determine allowable uses as conditions dictate and may
enable the municipality to impose more limitations on development than under the general
zoning ordinance. Id. Floating zones are discussed further infra at text accompanying
notes 213 to 2 18.
37
MANDELKER,
supra note 19, 5 9.24. A planned unit development (PUD) is a
zoning device allowing a mix of uses within the same district, often including residential,
commercial, and even industrial uses. Id. Because development is planned and viewed as
an entity, the developer is benefited, for example, by being able to achieve site planning by
varying lot sizes, setbacks, and other site development requirements, as well as by building
at higher densities in some parts of the development. Id. The municipality is benefited, for
example, by the developer's commitment to the preservation of open and natural areas
elsewhere. Id. A PUD is contained in the zoning ordinance. Id. 9.25. The zoning
ordinance may require the goveming body to adopt a new PUD zoning district for a
proposed PUD before it can be reviewed and approved by an agency with delegated
authority on matters of approval. Id. The goveming body may adopt it as a floating zone
or as a special exception. See id. This Article discusses PUDs further infra at text
accompanying notes 31 1 to 336.
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and more flexible zoning devices, developed.
This rigidity of Euclidean zoning came at the expense of flexibility,
allowing for little modification or adoption of regulations to particular uses
within zones. Moreover, the assumptions underlying Euclidean zoning
were incorrect. Euclidean zoning underestimated the effects of the
dynamism of a growing economy and rapidly changing technologies in
private preferences and municipal needs, and it overestimated the ability of
officials to anticipate market demand for new uses. Euclidean zoning was
also nalve as to the vulnerability of zoning and government regulations to
market demand and political pressure. These changes in the economy and
urban and suburban demographics forced local governments to regularly
adjust the zoning scheme, raising the question of whether "changes in
zoning would be the product of rational, comprehensive planning or the
result of ad hoc bargaining."38 It seems that nearly a century of zoning
experience shows a very different practice than first contemplated by the
standard act,39such that current zoning practice little resembles the early
notion of planned development. Today, numerous different uses may be
permissible within a particular district, and the special-use process
frequently provides only very generalized standards for issuance of a
permit, and it operates ineffectively as a limiting tool. Rather than rigid
adherence to the zoning map, the current model for land use control is
through bargaining, making particularized decisions regarding the
suitability of a proposed use, and thus in effect administering land
development on a case-bycase basis.@ Bargaining takes place over
variances, conditional use permits, amendments to the zoning ordinance,
and development agreement^.^' Each of these devices offer not only
flexibility, but also the opportunity for the bargaining municipality to
demand exactions42or make concession^.^^
38

DWYER
& MENELL,supra note 10, at 1010.
Ryan, supra note 27, at 348; see also 1 ROHAN,supra note 31, 8 5.01.
40
See Ryan, supra note 27, at 349; Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2000) (recognizing the
bargaining environment generated by modem zoning models); Carol M. Rose, Planning
and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Use Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL.L.
REV. 837, 849 (1983); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table:
Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of
Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV.957,960 (1987).
41
Ryan, supra note 27, at 350.
42
The extent to which a municipality may demand exactions is limited to those
bearing a rational nexus between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition
exacted by the government, Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
(1987), and to those having a rough proportionality between the exaction and the impact of
the development, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994).
39
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Even when the existing zoning permits a proposed project, the
development project that is only proposed may vanish with unanticipated
changes in political and market conditions or in the land use regulatory
scheme. These kinds of changes are risks that are difficult to antic1 ate
and control. In most jurisdictions, absent a vested right to develop, the
local land use regulatory body retains the right to alter and apply newly
enacted zoning or other land use requirements at any time to a proposed
development. The right to alter remains until quite late in the development
The
process, indeed even up to the commencement of constr~ction.~~

J

43

The extent to which a municipality can make concessions is limited by the
reserved powers doctrine, discussed infra Part 1II.A.
The "vested rights" doctrine enables a developer to complete development in
accordance with rules in place at a certain point in the development process. Teny D.
Morgan, Vested Rights Legislation, 34 Urn. LAW. 131, 131 (2002). It is premised on
notions of estoppel. Id. However, the point at which a right to develop arises varies
considerably among the jurisdictions. See id. at 132-33. In some jurisdictions, the right to
develop arises at the filing of an application for a building permit. See id. Other
jurisdictions require the commitment of substantial resources toward development. See id.
Two somewhat discernible rules exist for determining the point of vesting: the "last
discretionary approval rule," under which, as the name suggests, a developer acquires a
vested right to complete a project that is substantially commenced upon acquiring the last
discretionary approval necessary for its completion, and the "building permit rule," under
which a developer acquires vested rights upon obtaining a building permit and incumng
substantial liability in good faith reliance on the permit. Brad K. Schwartz, Note,
Development Agreements: Contracting for Vesting Rights, 28 B.C. ENVTL.AFF. L. REV.
719, 723-24 (2001); see also GROWINGSMARTLEGISLATIVE
GUIDEBOOK
(Stuart Meck ed.,
2002); Barry R. Knight & Susan P. Schoettle, Current Issues Related to Vested Rights and
Development Agreements, 25 Urn. LAW.779, 780-81 (1993) (identifying four sources for
vested rights as equitable estoppel, the Constitution, legislation, and contract development
agreements); Ralph D. Renaldi, Virginia's Vested Property Rights Rule: Legal and
Economic Considerations, 2 GEO. MASONL. REV. 77 (1994).
45
See, e.g., Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546,
551 (1976). In Avco Community Developers, Inc., under the authority of pertinent permits,
the developer had undertaken studies for the development of the tract, proceeded to
subdivide and grade it, completed or was in the process of constructing storm drains,
culverts, street improvements, utilities, and similar facilities for the tract, and had spent
more than $2 million and incurred liability of nearly $750,000 before being able to apply
for a development permit from the Coastal Commission. Id. at 549. The Coastal
Commission refused to issue a development permit, and no building permit could be issued
until a development permit was obtained. Id. at 548-49. The California Supreme Court
ruled that the developer had acquired no vested rights entitling it to proceed with actual
construction. Id. at 554. The rationale was that by requiring a building permit as a
prerequisite to obtaining a vested right to actually build, the court was preserving for
(continued)
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possibility of such changes can make the development process appear ad
hoc and precarious, and reliance on the traditional zoning adjustments,
such as variances or special use permits under criteria that are less than
concrete, does little to minimize the risks to a developer.
This Article explores the new model of land use decision-making that
is based upon bargaining with the landowner. The fact of a bargain raises
the issue of whether such bargaining amounts to "contract zoning" based
upon a bilateral contract between the municipality and the landowner,
which is largely held to be illegal, or a related form of bargaining, not
involving an exchange of promises in the context of a bilateral
agreement-"conditional
zoning." Part I1 of this Article discusses the
emergence of the development agreement, which involves a contract with a
municipality and the developer under which the developer is assured that
new zoning ordinances adopted after the date of the agreement will not
apply to the development. Part 111 considers the effect of the reserved
powers doctrine on the ability of governments to contract and the issue of
transparency in making zoning decisions. It further offers an in-depth
consideration of the murky concepts of contract and conditional rezoning
and reviews why the courts look at these concepts with such suspicion.
This section analyzes significant rulings from the courts in the jurisdictions
that most often considered the question. Part IV considers contract zoning
compared to conditional zoning. Part V shows how conditional zoning,
once maligned, has gained acceptance by the courts. Part VI discusses the
conditional use zoning device in North Carolina. Part VII briefly mentions
the use of concomitant agreements employed in a few jurisdictions, under
localities regulatory flexibility in the development process to meet changing circumstances
and needs. Id. Otherwise, there would be "a serious impairment of the government's right
to control land use policy." Id. This decision was the impetus for the enactment of the
California development agreement statute, discussed later. See Hermosa Beach Stop Oil
Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach, 86 Cal. App. 4th 534,553 (2001) (upholding repeal of
exemption for oil drilling effectively nullifying leases for exploration and development
where all costs were "soft costs," such as for engineering, consultants, and lawyers). For an
overview of vested rights and estoppel claims, see 4 EDWARDH. ZIEGLERJR., RATHKOPF'S
THE LAW OF ZONINGAND PLANNINGch. 70 (2004). Depending upon the particular
circumstances of the case, a governmental action that essentially destroys the landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations could result in a taking, compensable under the
Fifth Amendment. For a discussion of regulatory takings, see generally John J. Delaney &
Emily J. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights as Protected Property in Fifrh
Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 WASH.U . J. URB.& CONTEMP.
L. 27, 38
(1996); Steven J. Eagle, The Supreme Court's Evolving Takings Jurisprudence: A First
Look at Tahoe-Sierra, PROB.& PROP.,Nov./Dec. 2002, at 5; Gregory M. Stein, Who Gets
the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use Law, Pre-Enactment Owners, and Post
Enactment Buyers, 61 OHIOST. L.J. 89 (2000).
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which a municipality has the power to enter into an agreement with a
developer as to zoning in exchange for the developer's promise to develop
in a certain way. Part VIII then returns to some theoretical questions posed
earlier. Part IX considers whether development agreements can be upheld
against a challenge that they amount to contract or conditional zoning and
explains why development agreements can and should be encouraged.
Finally, Part X offers some conclusions about the future of land use
planning.

11. THEDEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT
AS AN IMPORTANT
BARGAINING
DEVICE, MOVING
AWAYFROM TRADITIONAL EUCLIDIAN
ZONING
In recent years, "land use decision-making has shifted significantly
from the planned toward the particularized, affording more ad hoc
responses to individual development proposals.'~ In a fluid society,
adherence to the rigid Euclidean model for zoning, which consists of the
division of land into zones with identical uses within each zone, has been
found to be inadequate for achieving a rational and effective land use plan
since it precludes the zoning authority from considering particular and
perhaps beneficial uses for a parcel within the zone. Municipal land use
bargaining is rapidly becoming "the universal language of land use
planning," as public and private parties to land use disputes adopt the
bargaining model to obtain mutually agreeable solutions based on mutually
beneficial exchange.47 Under the bargaining model, the emphasis is placed
on flexibility and change through the use of variance^:^ special use
permits and exceptions:9 incentive and bonus zoning,50 conditional
zoning:' floating zones:2 planned unit developments:3 and development
agreements." With these devices, zoning determinations are often made
administratively based on actual uses discerned from concrete proposals
that allow municipalities to assess the potential impact of uses in a

46

Ryan, supra note 27, at 349; see also Rose, supra note 40; Wegner, supra note

40.
47

Ryan, supra note 27, at 338.
48
See supra note 34.
49
See supra note 35.
'O
Incentive and bonus zoning allow for exceptions to the zoning regulations in a
particular district, typically allowing greater density or relaxing height restrictions on
buildings constructed in the district. See 2 ROHAN,supra note 31, 5 8.01.
See discussion infra Parts IU-VI, VIII-X.
52
See 2 ROHAN,supra note 31, 5 8.01.
53
See supra note 37.
Development agreements limit the power of the government to apply new
ordinances to ongoing developments. 2 ROHAN,supra note 31.5 9A.01.

"

"
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concrete situation."
The model also provides municipalities with
significant leverage over potential development in order to obtain
concessions from developers.56
Though zoning ordinances contain standards for granting variances
and special use permits and exceptions, these devices retain an ad hoc
flavor and their application is not entirely predictable."
As such,
municipalities and developers have sought more formal and predictable
ways to achieve particular results from land use decision-making, such as
A growing number of states have enacted
in development agreerner~ts.~~
legislation authorizing the making of land use decisions through this
device.59 Development agreements between developers and municipal
governments respond to the uncertainties inherent in the use of the minor
adjustment mechanisms found in Euclidean zoning and in vested rights.60
They are negotiated agreements between a developer and the local
government under which the local government agrees to apply the land use
rules, regulations, and policies in effect on the date of the agreement in
exchange for the developer's promise to develop in a certain way.61

''

Ryan, supra note 27, at 349 (citing Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts
of lnterest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REV.161, 166-67 (1989)).
56
Id. (citing Cordes, supra note 55, at 167).
Id. at 349.
See 2 ROHAN,supra note 31, 5 9A.01. In 1515-1519 Lakeview Boulevard
CondominiumAss'n v. Apartment Sales Colp., 43 P.3d 1233 (Wash. 2002). the Washington
Supreme Court ruled that "a local government and a property owner may reach an arms
length, bargained-for agreement which may include waivers of liability for risks created by
[a] proposed use of property because of the shape, composition, location or other
characteristic unique to the property sought to be developed." Id. at 1237. In that case, the
city contended that

''

innovative land use instruments, such as exculpatory covenants, should
be encouraged because the Growth Management Act, chapter 36.70A
RCW, [was] channeling development onto more and more marginal
lots[;] that property owners of land marginal for development because
of the composition, topography, location, or other characteristic of the
property, should be free to propose creative solutions, and accept the
risks of development.

Id.
59

See inji-a note 65 and accompanying text.
Schwartz, supra note 44, at 720.
See Michael H. Crew, Development Agreement After Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB.LAW. 23, 28 (1990); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. &
Scott A. Edelstein, Development Agreement Practice in California and Other States, 22
(continued)

Heinonline - - 3 3 Cap. U. L. Rev. 393 2004-2005

394

CAPITAL UNIVERSlTY LAW REVIEW

[33:383

Development agreements may also involve zoning changes or amendments
to the comprehensive plan.62

A. The Benefits to the Developer and the Municipality
Under the development agreement model of land use controls, the
developer gains the following: (1) certainty as to the governing regulations
for the development project; (2) the ability to bargain for support and the
coordination of approvals; (3) easier and less-costly financing because of
the reduction of the risk of non-approval; (4) the ability to negotiate the
right to freeze regulations as to changes in the project; (5) predictability in
scheduling the phases of the development; and (6) a change in the
dynamics of the development process from confrontation to cooperation.
The municipality gains the following: (1) the facilitation of
comprehensive planning and long-range planning goals; (2) commitments
for public facilities and off-site infrastructure; (3) public benefits otherwise
not obtainable under regulatory takings doctrine; and (4) the avoidance of
administrative and litigation costs and expenditures.
Development agreements thus offer both flexibility and certaintyflexibility to the local government by incorporating terms and conditions in
the agreements that may be different from those expressed in the land use
regulations, and certainty to the developer by setting the governing
standards and rules for the duration of the development project. Recently,
a California court of appeals ruled that a development agreement statute
applied equally to the planning stage of development and to projects that
Such a construction of the
have been approved for actual constr~ction.~~
statute, the court said, was entirely consistent with the overall purposes of
the statute to "encourage[] the creation of rights and obligations early in a
project in order to promote public and private participation during
planning, especially when the scope of the project requires a lengthy
process of obtaining regulatory approvals."64
STETSONL. REV. 761,762 (1993); Knight & Schoettle, supra note 44, at 787-88; Schwartz,
supra note 44, at 720.
62
See CAL.GOV'TCODE5 65864(b) (West 1997).
63
Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County Bd. of
Supervisors, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740,745 (2000).
64
Id. In that case, the development agreement pertained to the planning of the
development project that met the requirements of the statute, though the county had not
approved an actual development, but had "establishe[d] the scope of the [plroject and
precise parameters for future construction as well as a procedure to process [plroject
approvals." Id. The agreement also provided for public use improvements that the
developer may not have offered if the county failed to make corresponding commitments as
outlined in the agreement. Id. It was nonetheless necessary for the court to construe the
agreement as an approval of the project because it "committe[d] the parties to a definite
(continued)
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Though they are local in nature, development agreements usually are
entered into pursuant to state enabling legislation. California was the first
state to enact such legislation in 1980, and thirteen states have followed.65
Development agreements are said to require enabling legislation because
of their effect upon the powers of local governments, both confemng and
limiting. Nonetheless, because development agreements potentially
empower local officials to control land use in more effective ways than
course of action aimed at assuring construction of the project, provided certain
contingencies [were] met." Id. "While further agreement and discretionary approvals
[were] necessary, every approval or denial permitted by the Agreement [was] designed to
advance the project in accordance with the standards for . . . development adopted by the
County in the . . . Area Plan." Id. at 745-46. The court pointed out that though the statute
was limited to actual projects, the statute did not require that the parties defer development
agreements until the beginning of constructions, and it did not require, as a prerequisite, any
particular stage of project approval. Id. at 746. "In fact, by permitting conditional
development agreements when property is subject to future annexation, [the statute]
expressly permitted local governments to freeze zoning and other land use regulation before
a project was finalized." Id. (citing Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. County of
Riverside, 50 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1996)). In the court's view, nothing "lirnite[d] the statute to
development agreements which create[d] 'vested rights' to complete construction of a
project according to completed plans." Id.
ARIZ.REV. STAT.ANN. 5 9-500.05 (West Supp. 2004-05); CAL. GOV'TCODE 5
65864 (West 1997); COLO.REV.STAT.3 24-68-102 (2003); FLA. STAT.ANN. 5 163.3220
(West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 46-121 (1993); IDAHOCODE 5 67-6511 (Michie Supp.
2004); LA. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 33:4780.21 (West 2002); MD. ANN.CODEart. 66B, 13.01
(1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 278.0201 (Michie 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 40:55D-45
(West 1991); OR. REV. STAT.5 94.504 (2003); S.C. CODEANN.5 6-31-10 (West 2004); VA.
CODEANN. 5 15.2-2303.1, -2297 (Michie 2003); WASH.REV. CODEANN. 5 36.70B.170
(West 2003); see also Azalea Lakes P'ship v. Parish of St. Tarnmany, 859 So. 2d 57,61-63
(La. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding the validity of a development agreement statute against a
charge of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Save Our Springs Alliance &
Circle C Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Austin, No. 03-03-00312-CV, 2004 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4060, at *14-15 (Tex. App. May 6, 2004) (upholding a development agreement
entered into pursuant to a statute as a validly enacted amendment to a zoning ordinance,
entitling the developer to rely on that change in requesting a development permit); City of
Richland v. Franklin Tiegs, No. 20821-4-111,2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 108 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 28, 2003) (upholding development agreement statute); R. Alan Haywood & David
Hartman, Legal Basics for Development Agreements, 32 TEX.TECH.L. REV. 955 (2001)
(discussing ways to enter into valid development agreement under discrete sections of the
Texas Local Government Code). See generally Janice C. Griffith, Local Government
Contracts: Escaping from the GovernmentaVProprietary Maze, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 277
(1990); Wegner, supra note 40, at 995; Comment, Development Agreement Legislation in
Hawaii: An Answer to the Vested Rights Uncertainry, 7 U . HAW.L. REV. 173 (1985).
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under zoning ordinances, their use has been sanctioned, even in states with
no statutory enabling law, as an exercise of their auxiliary and implied
powers under the zoning laws.66
A practical and legal limitation on development agreements is that they
only bind the contracting parties-the developer and the municipality
signing the agreement. Projects that require approval from other
governmental entities (such as the local coastal commission or
environmental protection agency) remain at risk. However, this can be
addressed by a multi-party development agreement.
396

1 . Common provisions in the development agreement enabling
statutes

a. Municipality's authority to act
The municipality may be required to first pass an enabling ordinance
or resolution establishing the details of development agreement procedures
and re uirements that the executive branch of the governmental unit must
follow.$7
b. Goals
Most statutes identify the purposes and goals of such agreements, such
as:
a) to bring increased "certainty" and "assurance" to
the development process, which in turn will "strengthen
the public planning process, encourage private
participation in comprehensive planning, and reduce the
economic costs of development,"68
b) to achieve predictability, and public
including "affordable housing, design standards, and on
66

See Bollech v. Charles County, 166 F. Supp. 2d 443, 452-54 (D. Md. 2001)
(upholding a development agreement against a charge of abdication of police powers where
the agreement itself stated that the development would be subject to any changes in state or
federal law and that it did not require absolute deference to the existing zoning); Giger v.
City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 192-93 (Neb. 1989) (upholding a development agreement
against challenge that municipality bargained away its police powers). See generally
Jennifer G. Brown, Concomitant Agreement Zoning: An Economic Analysis, 1985 U . ILL. L.
REV.89.
15'
ARIZ.REV. STAT.ANN. 8 9-500.05(A) (West Supp. 2004); CAL.GOV'TCODE5
65865(c) (West 1997); HAW.REV. STAT.5 46-124 (1993); FLA.STAT.ANN. 5 163-3223
(West 2000).
CAL.GOV'TCODE8 65864(b) (West Supp. 2004).
69
HAW.REV. STAT.5 46-121 (1993).
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and off-site infra~tructure,"'~
c) for the vesting of development rights as solutions to
the problems caused by the lack of certainty in the
development process.71

c . Minimum provisions
The statutes typically require that a development agreement specify
certain substantive terms, including the following:
a) a description of the land subject to the agreement;
b) a statement of the permitted uses, including density,
intensity, maximum height, and size of the proposed
buildings;
C) provisions for reservations or dedications of land
for public purposes;
d) conditions, terms, restrictions, and requirements for
public infrastructure;
e) the phasing or time of constr~ction.~~
d. Conformance with comprehensive plans

70

S.C. CODEANN. 8 6-3 1-10(B)(4)(West 2004).
HAW.REV.STAT.§ 46-121 (1993); LA. REV.STAT.ANN. 8 33-4780.21(1) (West
2002) ("The lack of certainty in the development approval process can result in a waste of
resources, escalate the cost of housing and other development to the consumer, and
discourage investment in and commitment to comprehensive planning," which would make
"maximum efficient utilization of resources at the least economic cost to the public."); S.C.
CODEANN. 5 6-31-10(B)(4) (West 2004).
72
CAL.GOV'T CODE5 65865.2 (West 1997); FLA.STAT.ANN. § 163.3227(d), (f),
(h) (West 2000) (requiring also that the agreement contain a description of the public
facilities that will service the development; a description of local development permits
approved or needed to be approved; and a description of any conditions, terms, restrictions,
or other requirements determined to be necessary by the local government for public health,
safety, or welfare of its citizens); HAW.REV. STAT.8 46-126 (1993); MD. ANN. CODEart.
66B, 5 13.01(f) (Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT.ANN. 278.0201(1) (Michie 2002); N.J.
STAT.ANN. § 40:55D-45.2(A) (West 1991); OR.REV.STAT.5 94.504(2) (2003); S.C. CODE
ANN. 5 6-31-60 (West 2004). The Arizona statute provides that the development agreement
may also specify such things as density and intensity of use, and maximum height and size
of proposed buildings. ARE. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 9-500.05(G)(l)(c) (West 1996). The
Louisiana statute provides that the statute shall specify such things. LA.REV.STAT.ANN. 5
33:4780.24 (West 2002); see also VA. CODEANN. 8 15.2-2303.1(B) (Michie 2003); OR.
REV.STAT.5 94-518 (2003); WASH.REV.CODEANN. 36.70B.170(3) (West 2003) (setting
forth development standards that apply).
"
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As a condition of enforceability, most statutes require development
agreements to comply with local comprehensive plans.73
e. Duration
Some statutes limit the duration of a development agreement to a
specific number of years, although extensions by mutual agreement
following a public hearing may be obtained.74 Others provide that a
development agreement may include commencement dates for
con~truction~~
or the duration of the agreement.76

f. Amendment, cancellations, exceptions
As with any contract, amendments can be accomplished by mutual
agreement.77 However, under all the statutes, despite the terms of the
agreement, the municipality reserves the power to cancel the agreement
unilaterally when required to ensure public health, safety, or welfare.78
73

ARE. REV.STAT.ANN. 5 9-500.05(B) (West 1996); CAL.GOV'TCODE 65867.5
(West 1997); FLA.STAT.ANN. 5 163.3231 (West 2000); HAW.REV.STAT.5 46-129 (1993);
NEV.REV. STAT.ANN. 278.0203 (Michie 2002); S.C. CODEANN. 6-31-70 (West 2004);
VA.CODEANN. 15.2-2303.1(B) (Michie 2003); WASH.REV.CODEANN. § 36.70B. 170(1)
(West 2003).
74
FLA.STAT.ANN. 5 163.3229 (West 2000) (ten years); MD. ANN. CODEart. 66B, $
13.01(g) (Supp. 1997) (five years).
75
CAL.GOV.'T CODE$ 65865.2 (West 1997); FLA.STAT.ANN. $ 163.3227(2) (West
2000); HAW.REV.STAT.§ 46-126 (1993); NEv. REV.
STAT.ANN.278.0201 (Michie 2002).
76
LA. REV.STAT.ANN. 5 33:4780.24 (West 2002).
77
See, e.g., ARE. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 9-500.05C (West Supp. 2004); LA. REV.STAT.
5 33:4780.30 (West 2002); MD. ANN.CODEart. 66B, 13.01(h) (Supp. 1997); OR. REV.
STAT.3 94-522 (2003); S.C. CODEANN. 5 6-31-100 (West 2004). But in Hawaii, if the
county determines that a proposed amendment would "substantially alter" the original
agreement, a public hearing must be held. HAW.REV. STAT.$ 46-130 (1993); see also FLA.
STAT.ANN..§ 163.3225 (West 2000) (requiring a hearing upon entering into, amending, and
revoking an agreement).
78
See, e.g., CAL.GOV.'T CODE$ 65865.3 (West 1997); HAW.REV.STAT. 46-127
(1993). In Louisiana, this is so in the case of newly incorporated municipalities as to
development agreements entered into prior to incorporation. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
33:4780.25 (West 2002). In Hawaii, the current (and later enacted) laws may be applied if
necessary to rectify a condition "perilous" to residents' health and safety. HAW.REV.STAT.
5 46-127@) (1993); see also LA. REV.STAT.ANN. 5 33:4780.24 (West 2002); MD. ANN.
CODEart. 66B, § 13.01(i) (Supp. 1997); VA. CODEANN. 5 15.2-2303.1A (2003). The
Louisiana statute also provides for modification or suspension of provisions of the
development agreement where necessary to comply with subsequently enacted state and
federal laws and regulations. LA. REV.STAT.ANN. $ 33:4780.32; see also S.C. CODEANN.
5 6-31-130 (West 2004).
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with the agreement and authorizes it to terminate or modify the agreement
~ ~ Nevada statute requires review
upon a finding of noncom l i a n ~ e .The
only once every two years.
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g. Approval and adoption
The mechanisms for obtaining approval vary. In Hawaii, the mayor is
the designated negotiator, but the final agreement must be approved by the
In California, a development
city council and then adopted by resoluti~n.~'
agreement must be approved by resolution or o r d i n a n ~ e . ~In~ several
states, a public hearing must be held prior to adoption of the development
agreement.83 Whether a development agreement is considered a legislative
or an administrative act affects the mechanism and procedure for approval.
If it is a legislative act, a referendum may nullify the agreement.84 In
California, a developer's rights do not vest under a development agreement
until the referendum period expires, and if other conforming enactments
(for example, a general plan amendment or re-zoning) are necessary under
the agreement, vesting is deferred until the referendum period expires on
those as well.85 In Hawaii, development agreements are administrative
acts, precluding repeal by r e f e r e n d ~ m . ~ ~

''

CAL. GOV'T CODE 65865.1 (West 1997); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. 5
161.053l(5) (requiring review every twelve months).
NEV.REV. STAT.ANN. 278.0205 (West 1996). The Louisiana statute requires
periodic review at least every twelve months, at which time the developer must demonstrate
good faith compliance with the terms of the agreement or face termination or modification.
LA.REV. STAT.ANN. 5 33:4780.23 (West 2002); see also S.C. CODEANN.5 6-31-90 (West
2004).
HAW.REV. STAT. 5 46-123-46.124 (1993); S.C. CODEANN. 5 6-31-30 (West
2004).
82
CAL. GOV'T CODE5 65867.5 (West 1997); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
33:4780.28 (West 2002) (stating that after a public hearing, a development agreement must
be approved by ordinance of the governing authority of the municipality).
83
CAL. GOV'T CODE5 65867 (West 1997); FLA. STAT.ANN. 3 163.3225 (West
2000) (requiring at least two public hearings); HAW.REV.STAT.3 46-128 (1993); LA. REV.
STAT.ANN. 5 33:4780.28 (West 2002); MD. ANN. CODEart. 66B, 5 13.01(d) (Supp. 1998);
OR.REV.STAT.3 94.508, .513 (2003); S.C. CODEANN.$ 6-31-50 (West 2002); WASH.REV.
CODEANN.5 36.70B.200 (West 2003).
84
See, e.g.,COLO.REV.STAT.5 24-68-104(2) (2003). The Colorado statute provides
that development agreements "shall be adopted as legislative acts subject to referendum."
Id.
85
Midway Orchards v. County of Butte, 269 Cal. Rptr. 796, 805 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
HAW.REV.STAT.g 46-131 (1993).

''
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h. Effect of the agreement
The statutes variously provide that the effect of the agreement is that
the rules, regulations, and official policies governing permitted uses of the
land are those in force at the time of execution of the agreement.87 Under
the Florida statute, subsequently enacted laws and policies are applicable
only to the extent consistent with those previously in effect or necessary to
protect health, safety, or welfare; that "are specifically anticipated and
provided for by the development agreement"; where "[tlhe local
government demonstrates that substantial changes have occurred in the
pertinent conditions, existing at the time of approval of the development
agreement"; or the "development agreement [was] based upon
substantially inaccurate information supplied by the developer."88

m.TWO ISSUESREGARDING CONTRACT
AND CONDITIONAL
ZONING:
.THE RESERVED POWERS
DOCTRINE
AND TRANSPARENCY

Two key problems are raised in connection with any agreement
entered into between a municipality and a developer regarding the use of
land. The first question concerns whether such an agreement is
enforceable under the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, and whether
such an agreement is void ab initio as violative of the reserved powers
doctrine. The second question concerns the lack of transparency where
conditions agreed upon and essential to the land use decision are not
contained in the ordinance, but are implemented through private
negotiations and agreements.
A. The Contracts Clause and the Reserved Powers Doctrine

The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution provides in part
that "[nlo state shall . . . pass any . . . [llaw impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.'' 89 However, it is well-settled that the Contracts Clause is not to
be applied literally, that is, to forbid all impairments of contract^.^ Early
13'

ARE. REV.STAT.ANN. 5 9-500.05(B) (West 1996); CAL.GOV'TCODE8 65866
(West 1997); HAW.REV. STAT. ANN. 8 46-127(b) (1993); LA. REV. STAT.ANN. 8
33:4780.27 (West 2002) (except that subsequently enacted rules, regulations, and policies
that do not conflict with those in effect at the time of the signing of the agreement may
apply); MD. ANN. CODEart. 66B, 8 13.016) (Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
278.0201(2)(3) (Michie 2002); OR.REV. STAT.$94.518 (2003); S.C. CODEANN.
8 6-31-80
(West 2004); VA.CODEANN. § 15.2-2303.1(B) (Michie 2003); WASH.REV.CODEANN. $
36.70B.180 (West 2003).
13'
FLA.STAT.ANN. § 163.3233(a)-(e)(West 2000).
13'
U.S. CONST.
art. I, 5 10, cl. 1.
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410
(1983); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977).
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courts realized that the Contracts Clause, if applied literally, "[w]ould
become a [serious] threat to the sovereign responsibilities of state
governments."9' One solution was the development of the reserved powers
doctrine that forbid the contracting away of certain sovereign powers.92
The reserved powers doctrine holds that "the power of governing is a trust
committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be
granted away." 93 Sovereign powers over certain matters are inalienable
because they may require continuing governmental supervision to address
changing circumstance^.^^ This means that the prohibitions against
abridgement of contracts by state legislatures must yield to the interests of
the state in the exercise of its police powers to safeguard and promote the
public interest, safety, health, and welfare.g5 All rights granted from
government are held subject to the police powers of the state.96 An
agreement between a developer and the municipality, in which the
municipality purports to bargain away its reserved powers, therefore is
void ab initio and not entitled to protection under the Contracts Clause?'
Thus, the reserved powers doctrine is a limitation on the scope of the
Contracts la use?^
9'

United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,874 (1996).
See generally West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848) (providing that
states' contracts do not surrender eminent domain power).
93
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879).
94
See id. at 819. The Court stated as follows:
92

The supervision of both these subjects [public health and public morals]
of governmental power is continuing in its nature, and they are to be
dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require.
Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot
divest itself of the power to provide for them.
95

See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934) (stating that "the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order").
%
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877); see also Exxon Corp. v.
Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176,190-91 (1983).
97
See Beer Co., 97 U.S. at 33.
98
See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977); Pennsylvania
Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23 (1917); Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563, 571
(1910) (holding that the Contract Clause does not protect contracts that are prohibited by
law or against public policy). In Pennsylvania Hospital, the Court held that
the states cannot by virtue of the contract clause be held to have
divested themselves by contract of the right to exert their governmental
(continued)
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In determining whether a government has bargained away its powers,
the Supreme Court has made a distinction between police powers on the
one hand and taxing and spending powers on the other, with the reserved
powers doctrine only covering the former.99 "Such formalistic distinctions
perhaps cannot be dispositive, but they contain an important element of
truth."loO
Even if no surrender of police powers initially occurs, but the state
later seeks to abrogate a contract with a private party, the Contract Clause
does not require a state to adhere to a contract if such abrogation is
necessary in protection of the public interest.''' In other words, any rights
created by government contract "are subject to such rules and regulations
as may from time to time be ordained and established for the preservation
of health and morality.,9102 This means that an agreement between a
municipality and a landowner may be justifiedly impaired by the
government and such impairment is not unconstitutional if it is "reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose.9,103 Every contract
made with a governmental entity is in some degree subject to the
subsequent exercise of that government's police powers.104
Otherwise, the Contracts Clause of the Constitution may prevent a
authority in matters which from their very nature so concern that
authority that to restrain its exercise by contract would be a
renunciation of power to legislate for the preservation of society or to
secure the performance of essential governmental duties.
Pennsylvania Hosp., 245 U.S. at 23.
99
See, e.g., Stone, 101 U.S. at 820; Momson Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton,
130 Cal. Rptr. 196, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the resewed powers doctrine
voids "only a contract which amounts to a city's 'surrender' or 'abnegation' of its control
of a properly municipal function," and the annexation agreements were "just, reasonable,
fair and equitable" even though some of the executory features might have extended
beyond the terms of current legislative body members).
I"
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 24. "If a state could reduce its financial
obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what is regarded as an important
public purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all." Id. at 26.
lo'
See id. at 23.
IM
Stone, 101 U.S. at 820. See generally David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf,
Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution:
Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 663
(2001).
Io3
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25; see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 243 (1978). See generally Janice C. Griffith, Local Government
Contracts: Escaping from the GovemmentaVProprietary Maze, 75 IOWAL. REV. 277
(1990).
lo4
See Stone, 101 U.S. at 820; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25,32 (1877).
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municipality from abrogating an agreement once entered into with a
landowner. That is to say, if the municipality uses its legislative authority
to impair an otherwise enforceable contract, it may incur liability to the
landowner.
An impairment of a contract addressable under the
Constitution should be distinguished from a breach of contract under
common law.'05 An impairment of contract occurs if a governmental entity
acts in a way that makes performance of the contract illegal or
impossible.'06 The illegality or impossibility provides a defense to the
developer in a breach of contract action for damages or for other relief
brought by the municipality, the non-government party now unable to
fulfill its contractual obligation.lo7 On the other hand, when the
government merely refuses or omits to perform its contractual obligation,
an adequate remedy in damages ordinarily exists, such that the government
action is characterized as a breach of contract that does not rise to the level
of a contractual impairment.'08
The Court has indicated that state actions purporting to impair
contracts are evaluated according to varying levels of scrutiny in
determining whether the impairment, if established, rises to the level of an
actionable unconstitutional impairment.lW The level of scrutiny varies
with the degree of impairment, being more strict where the impairment is
more substantial.ll0
1 . Contract zoning as bargaining away of police powers

"[Clontract zoning [is] defined as a 'process by which a local
government enters into an agreement with a developer whereby the
lo5

E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 677, 679 (7th Cir.

1980).
Id. at 679.
Id.
lox
Id.
log
Energy Reserves Group v. Kan. Power & Light Co, 459 U.S. 400,410 (1983).
"O
Id.; United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27 (1977); Rue-Ell
Enters., Inc. v. City of Berkeley, 194 Cal. Rptr. 919, 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). In Rue-Ell
Enterprises, the court set out the following three-step analysis for determining whether a
contract has been impaired: (1) whether the state law has substantially impaired the
contractual relationship; (2) if substantially impaired, whether the impairment was justified
by a significant public purpose behind the regulation, such as remedying a broad and
general social or economic problem; and (3) if there is a legitimate public purpose, whether
the adjustment of the rights and duties of the contracting parties was reasonable and
appropriate to the public purpose justifying the law. Id. The California Supreme Court has
also stated that any such modification must be reasonable, and, when resulting in
disadvantage to a private-sector party, must be accompanied by comparable new
advantages.
Io6
lo'
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government extracts a performance or promise from a developer in
,'>ill
It
exchange for [the government's] agreement to rezone the property.
is said to violate the reserved powers doctrine because it involves a deal
that creates binding reciprocal obligations between a private interest and a
government entity.l12 It is defined as the required exercise of the zoning
power pursuant to an express bilateral contract between the property owner
and the zoning authority and an agreement to rezone that lacks a valid
basis independent of the contract on which to justify the zoning
amendment.ll3 Thus, the problem with a deal arising under contract
zoning is that it would bind the government to specific terms of the
contract that may ultimately prevent it from carrying out its public duties,
while confemng on private parties special rights different from other
landowners within the same zone. l4
McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Mass. App.
(quoting 3 RATHKOPF,ZONING& PLANNING
8 44: 11 (Zeigler rev. ed. 2001)).
Id.
See Morin v. Foster, 380 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 1978); Almor Assoc. v. Town of
Skaneateles, 647 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Quigley v. City of Oswego, 419
N.Y.S.2d 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa.
1982); Larkin v. City of Burlington, 772 A.2d 553 (Vt. 2001). But see AFUZ.REV.STAT.
ANN. 3 11-832 (West 1999) (authorizing contract zoning); ME. ZONINGORDINANCE8
II(I)(l) (2004) (specifically authorizing "contract zoning" for zoning map changes "when
the Town Council, exercising its sole and exclusive judgment . . . determines that it is
appropriate to modify the zoning district regulations applicable to a parcel of land [to] allow
reasonable uses of the land . . . which remain consistent with the Town['s ] Comprehensive
Plan"); R.I. GEN. LAWS5 45-24-53(h) (1990) (authorizing contract zoning); Crispin v.
Town of Scarborough, 736 A.2d 241, 245-46 (Me. 1999) (upholding a contract zoning
agreement under statute); Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, 1281 (R.I.
1976) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute authorizing conditional zoning by city
council).
'I4
See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 9 3 So. 2d 86 (Ha. 1956); Chung v. Sarasota County,
686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791,
796 (111. 1969) (asserting that zoning ordinances should not be subject to bargaining or
contract, and that when zoning is conditioned upon collateral agreements or other
incentives supplied by a property owner, zoning officials are placed "in questionable
position of bartering their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no bearing on the
requested amendment"). Another form of zoning that is often challenged as illegal,
although not under the resewed powers doctrine, is spot zoning. See Mayor of Rockville v.
Rylyns Enters., 814 A.2d 469, 488 (Md. 2002); Galuska v. Racine County, No. 87-0151,
1988 W L 78384, *2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 25, 1988) (citing Cushman v. City of Racine, 159
N.W.2d 67,69 (Wis. 1968)). Spot zoning involves the singling out of a small parcel of land
for a use classification entirely different from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of
the owner of such property and to the detriment of other owners. Mayor of Rockville, 814
(continued)
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"The process is suspect because of the concern that a municipality will
contract away its police power to regulate land use on behalf of the public
in return for contractual benefits offered b a landowner whose interest is
principally served by the zoning action."" it is thus said to be "an ultra
vires act bargaining away the police power, [since] [zloning must be
governed b the public interest and not by benefit to a particular
landowner. Y16
99

A.2d at 488. In other words, spot zoning occurs when a single lot or area is granted
privileges that are not granted or extended to other land in the vicinity in the same use
district. Id. It is usually understood to be zoning "by which a small area situated in a larger
zone is purportedly devoted to a use inconsistent with the use to which the larger area is
restricted." State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533,539 (Wis. 1970) (quoting
Higbee v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 292 N. W. 320 (Wis. 1940)). Spot zoning is invalid
where some or all of the following factors are present: (1) a small parcel of land is singled
out for special and privileged treatment; (2) the singling out is not in the public interest, but
only for the benefit of the landowner; and (3) the action is not in accord with a
comprehensive plan. Mayor of Rockville, 814 A.2d at 488; Howard v. Village of Elm
Grove, 257 N.W.2d 850 (Wis. 1977); Rodgers v. Menomonee Falls, 201 N.W.2d 29 (Wis.
1972); State ex rel. Zupancic, 174 N.W.2d at 539 (citing Boerschinger v. Elkay Enters.,
Inc., 145 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1966)); Cushman, 159 N.W.2d at 69-70. However, spot zoning
is not regarded as illegal per se, and courts do not consider rezoning in this way to be illegal
spot zoning where it is in the public interest and not solely for the benefit of the developer.
Cushman, 159 N.W.2d at 69. It is illegal only when a change exists that is otherwise than
part of a "well-considered and comprehensive plan calculated to serve the general welfare
of the community." Collard v. Inc. Village of Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818, 821 (N.Y.
1981). Nonetheless, the attitudes of courts and commentators toward spot zoning have
differed. Spot zoning has been characterized both as a necessary device to provide
flexibility to comprehensive zoning ordinances. 2 ROBERT
M. ANDERSON,
AMWCANLAW
OFZONING
5 9.17 (2d ed. 1976). and as "the very antithesis of planned zoning." 1 NORMAN
AMERICAN
LANDPLANNING
LAW5 27.01 (1988). In any
WILLIAMS,
JR. &JOHNM. TAYLOR,
case, it is a form of rezoning and "should only be indulged in where it is in the public
interest and not solely for the benefit of the property owner who requests rezoning."
Howard, 257 N.W.2d at 854 (quoting Buhler v. Racine County, 146 N.W.2d 403, 410
(1966) (Cume, C.J., concumng)).
McLean, 778 N.E.2d at 1020 (citing Rando v. North Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d
544 (Mass. 1998)).
116
Pima Gro Sys. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 52 Va. Cir. 241, 244 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)
(citing 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning 5 46) (emphasis added). In Derrenger v. City
of Billings, 691 P.2d 1379 (Mont. 1984), landowner, Derrenger, purchased a parcel of land
comprised of three tracts. Id. at 1380. One tract was zoned for single-family residences.
Id. The remaining two tracts were zoned Agriculture Open Space. Id. Thereafter, the City
of Billings and the landowner entered into a written agreement entitled "Waiver of Right to
Protest Annexation and Agreement on Non-conforming Use." Id. The two tracts were
(continued)
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In contrast to contract zoning, conditional zoning117is defined as
rezoning subject to conditions, which are not applicable to other property
in the same zone, where the municipality makes no promise to the
landowner to rezone but does rezone upon the imposition of conditions,
covenants, and restrictions on use of the rezoned land."'
Under
conditional zoning, the landowner covenants to perform certain conditions
if the rezoning is granted.'19 Conditional zoning "allows municipalities

annexed and rezoned R-96. Id. at 1381. Later, a subsequent owner of the tract proposed to
build a multi-family residential unit on his property, all portions of which were then zoned
R-96. Id. His plans were objected to, and he sued for construction on the meaning of the
restriction on use in the annexation agreement. Id. The trial court found that the subject
agreement was clear on its face and did not constitute contract zoning. Id. The appellate
court reversed, holding the issue reduced to simplest terms was "whether 'residential
purposes' [was] so clear on its face as to preclude multi-family residential purposes." Id. at
1382. The court thought not. Id.
[Tlhere is a fact question about what was intended. The parties may
have intended to assure additional future uses in return for agreeing to
annexation. They may not have fully understood the limitations on
contract zoning. Surely, they must have intended to receive some
consideration for not protesting annexation. These questions should be
resolved by the trier of fact.
Id. The dissent thought that the trial court's interpretation of the agreement to involve only
conforming uses so as to avoid the contract zoning charge unsupported by a fair reading of
the agreement. Id. at 1383 (Gulbrandson, J., dissenting). The dissent would have found
contract zoning, stating that
the parcel of land . . . located within the City of Billings and having
been zoned [for single-family residence] long before the date of the
agreement, but bearing a non-residential non-conforming use could not
legally be the subject of an agreement whereby the City would agree to
grant a residential multi-family use variance. Such an agreement, in my
view, would constitute contract zoning.
Id. The dissent went on to state that "[a] contract made by the zoning authorities to zone or
rezone for the benefit of a private landowner is illegal and is denounced by the courts as
'contract zoning' and as an ultra vires bargaining away of the police power." Id.
(emphasis in original). "The parties may have intended to assure additional future uses in
return for agreeing to annexation," but in the dissent's view, "such an additional future
residential use would constitute illegal contract zoning." Id.
'I7
This concept is discussed in depth infra at text accompanying notes 336 to 339.
See 2 YOUNG,
supra note 15, 5 9.20.
'I9
2id.
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and developers essentially to negotiate the terms of a de~elopment."'~~
Under an agreement, the developer obtains the certainty that the
development project will proceed, thus making financing easier to obtain,
and tenants more likely to sign leases.12' At the same time, the
municipality is able to set definite conditions that govern the process of
development, thus limiting the potential negative im acts from the
development on neighboring land and the community.R 2 Conditional
zoning is said not to violate the reserved powers doctrine because the
promise by the developer is unilateral and the municipality does not
promise to rezone based on the developer's promises, but does so in the
public interest.'23 Nevertheless, some have argued that
[wlhere the imposition of conditions on land development
is desirable, it might better be done by uniform ordinances
providing for special uses, special exceptions, and overlaid
districts. . . . "Conditions imposed in such cases have a
sounder legal basis because [they are transparent, where]
guidelines for their imposition are spelled out in the
ordinance.,9124
But, the process of conditional zoning at times seems almost
indistinguishable from the process of "contract zoning," meaning
negotiating a contract where there is an exchange of promises between a
developer and the municipality.125 The closeness of these devices in
definition and application has led to murky and overlapping discussions in
cases. Therefore, several theoretical questions arise such as the following:
(1) is lawful conditional zoning the same as illegal contract zoning? (2)
does conditional zoning extinguish or nullify the concept of contract
zoning? (3) is the result that conditional zoning is illegal if contract zoning
is illegal? Or the converse, (4) if conditional zoning is legal, then should
contract zoning be legal?
2. When an agreement between a municipality and a developer is
subject to challenge
By bargaining away the police powers, the courts cannot mean that
the current legislature must refrain from entering into binding contracts or
lZ0

1 ROHAN,
supra note 3 1, 5 5.01 [2].
1 id.
'22
1 id.
1 id.
lZ4
State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Wis. 1970) (quoting
LAWAND PRACTICE
IN WISCONSIN8, at 27 (1967)).
CUTLER,
ZONING
lZ5
1 ROHAN,
supra note 3 1 , § 5.01[2].

"'
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other obligations whose terms extend beyond the terms of the current
body. Such an interpretation would almost nullify the municipality's
power to contract and its power to be sued if every time, when things
looked different, it could claim that the act was outside its power.126What
126

In Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Bnmetti, 207 A.2d 522 (N.J. 1965). a New Jersey
court enforced an agreement against the municipality finding that such an obligation did not
constitute a contracting away of the police power. Id. at 533. The landowners had an
agreement with the borough that no building could be erected in the area exceeding 35 feet
in order to preserve the beauty of the area. Id. at 531. The borough subsequently amended
the zoning ordinance to allow the developer to construct a tower in excess of thirty-five
feet. Id. The developer contended that the borough "[did] not have the power to restrict the
use of privately owned property pursuant to an agreement with [the landowners] or to agree
to insure the integrity of the skyline of the Palisades through its power of zoning. Such
action, [the developer] argue[d], would be invalid as 'contract zoning."' Id. at 532. The
court agreed with the general proposition that "a municipality may not contract away its
legislative or governmental powers." Id. at 533. However, the court mled that a city has
not only such rights as the legislature grants in express terms, but also "such other powers
as 'arise by necessary or fair implication, or are incident to the powers expressly conferred,
or are essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality."'
Id.
Accordingly, the general proposition "is subject to the limitation that where a municipality
has incurred an obligation which it has the power to incur it cannot escape that obligation
by asserting that it is merely exercising the police power delegated to it. Such an exception
is necessarily appended to every such municipal contract." Id. The court went on to hold
that
the municipality, by virtue of [the statute], had the express statutory
power to execute the [earlier] contract imposing the restrictive
covenants. The purpose of that agreement was not to restrict the
municipality from further zoning. The sole objective was the
imposition of restrictive covenants on specifically described parcels of
land. From that contract flowed the same duty and obligation that
would be incurred by individuals and private corporations under similar
circumstances, i.e., the duty not to take any affirmative action which
would destroy the fruits thereof. Under such circumstances, barring
[the borough] from taking &rmative governmental or legislative
action which would constitute a breach of its agreement is not to be
regarded as the proscribed contracting away of such powers. [The
borough] could not escape the obligations incurred by the [earlier]
agreement under the guise of police power. [The landowners] and the
Commission were therefore entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief
against this "inequitable conduct"
because the borough "violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" in its
agreement with the landowners when it amended the zoning ordinance. Id. at 532-33
(continued)
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seems to be the meaning given to the phrase by the courts goes largely to
the process of decision-making in the particular rezoning at issue. Did the
municipality, through its zoning authority, arrive at the decision based
upon its own assessment of what best serves the public health, safety, and
welfare,127and did it provide the public an opportunity to participate in the
zoning procedure before it acted to rezone?128 Substantively, did the
municipality purport to surrender all power to act in the future to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare? Where the answer to the first
question is in the affirmative and the second in the negative, an agreement
between a municipality and a private landowner should be enforceable.
This means that not all agreements between the municipality and a
developer amount to contract zoning. Instead, the courts have said that
"contract zoning properly connotes a transaction wherein both the
landowner who is seeking a certain zoning action and the zoning authority
itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral
contract.,9129 r c In short, a 'meetin of the minds' must occur; [and] mutual
assurances must be exchanged."13fj Thus, the central issue in many of these
(citations omitted); see also Gladwyne Colony, Inc. v. Township of Lower Merion, 187
A.2d 549, 550 (Pa. 1963) (holding an agreement valid where the owner agreed to grant the
town a right of way, an access road, and to convey a site if demanded by the city).
lZ7
See Alderman v. Chatham County, 366 S.E.2d 885, 890-91 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that the rezoning in this case was accomplished as a direct consequence of the
conditions regarding density of land use agreed to by the applicant, rather than as a valid
exercise of the county's legislative discretion).
Iz8
See State ex rel. Zupanic, 174 N.W.2d at 537 (stating that "[clontract zoning is
illegal not because of the result but because of the method).
Iz9
Chrismon v. Guilford County, 370 S.E.2d 579, 593 (1988) (distinguishing
contract zoning from conditional zoning based upon whether there were bilateral or
unilateral promises); see also Graham v. City of Raleigh, 284 S.E.2d 742, 746 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that absence in the record of any representation by the developers as to
their specific plans for development of the subject property meant there was no unlawful
contract zoning involved in the adoption of the challenged ordinance).
I3O
Hall v. City of Durham, 372 S.E.2d 564, 568 (N.C. 1988). In Hall, although the
landowner made representations and offered assurances to the city council regarding the
acreage to be deeded to a community association and a promise for the reversion of the land
to its prior zoning class, in this case the landowner did not use land as represented. Id. No
evidence demonstrated that the city council made assurances in return, no meeting of minds
took place, and nothing demonstrated that the city council undertook to obligate itself in
any way. Id. Therefore contract zoning did not exist. Id. However, the rezoning
ordinance was invalid because in
rezoning property from one general use district with fixed permitted
uses to another general use district with fixed permitted uses, a city
(continued)
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cases is whether bilateral negotiations took place between the landowner
and the municipality resulting in an agreement that consisted of mutual
covenants (that is, mutual promises with consideration running to one party
from the other, as opposed to the unilateral imposition of conditions by the
municipality).'31
In accordance with this definition, in evaluating a charge of contract
zoning, courts have undertaken the seemingly impossible task of
distinguishing those agreements involving bilateral exchanges from those
involving unilateral promises from the landowner. Courts look to see if
governmental power has been used as a bargaining chip and if rezoning
occurs not based on the merits of the zoning chan e request, nor on the
public interest, but because a deal had been struck.h2 On the other hand,
where a developer makes promises regarding the use of the land, but the
municipality makes no reciprocating promises, the rezoning that follows is
not regarded as contract zoning. If all that is alleged is that "a reciprocal
understanding resulted in a tacit agreement" based upon the landowner's
assurance to the zoning authorities that the property would be used only for
a particular purpose, no contract zoning is found based upon the
assumption that this was the use to which the property would be subjected
under the rezoning.133Courts have explained that
council [was required to] determine that the property is suitable for all
uses permitted in the new general use district, even where it has
additional authority . . . to require any submitted site plan to conform
therewith.
Id. at 572. The court further stated that "[rlezoning on consideration of assurances that a
particular tract or parcel [would] be developed in accordance with restricted approved plans
[was] not a permissible ground for placing the property in a zone where restrictions of the
nature prescribed are not otherwise required or contemplated." Id. at 571. In other words, a
rezoning must be a true rezoning, with all lands open for use for all permitted uses in the
new zone, but a rezoning should not be applied only to a particular parcel.
13'
O'Dell v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 910 S.W.2d 438, 440-41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that the proof showed no evidence of a bilateral agreement, the landowner
followed the customary procedure in an attempt to have its property rezoned, no evidence
of negotiations between the parties existed, and no quid pro quo, only unilateral conditions
requiring that necessary improvements be made).
13'
Id. at 441.
133
Dale v. Town of Columbus, 399 S.E.2d 350, 353 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). There, a
small tract was rezoned Highway Commercial from an R-2 Residential district. Id. at 352.
The parcel faced a major highway to its south and across that road, the land was zoned
Public Service. Id. At its southwest corner, the tract touched a Highway Commercial
district and a city boundary. Id. Across that boundary was a county Highway Commercial
district. Id.
(continued)
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[tlhe illegal aspect of contract zoning occurs when a
zoning authority binds itself to enact a zoning amendment
and agrees not to alter the zoning change for a specified
period of time. When a zoning authority takes such a step
and curtails its independent legislative power, it has acted
ultra vires and the rezoning is therefore a nullity.'34

The record [was] clear that the [planning] Board discussed the negative
effects of highway traffic on any residential property along the road.
The Board reviewed the commercial nature of the remainder of
Highway 108 and the town's comprehensive plan of commercial
development along the highway. It also discussed the possible benefits
of increasing the town's tax base and providing more jobs through the
establishment of more commercial enterprises.
Id. The appellate court found no showing of illegal contract zoning, which "properly
connotes a transaction wherein both the landowner who is seeking a certain zoning action
and the zoning authority itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral
contract." Id. (quoting Chrismon, 370 S.E.2d at 593) (emphasis in original). Nothing
indicated that the decision-making procedures were employed to cover up a hidden
agreement between the landowner and the zoning authority. Id. at 353. But see Carole
Highlands Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 158 A.2d 663, 664-66 (Md.
1960) (striking down conditional use zoning, finding that impermissible influence need not
be explicit where the record shows that the zoning action would not have taken place but
for the understanding that an impermissible condition would be in operation).
Dale, 399 S.E.2d at 353 (citations omitted).
[The court] found no evidence of any reciprocal agreement made
between the Board and the current owner, the applicant who filed for
rezoning, or with anyone else concerning the property. The transcript
[was] unequivocal that the Board understood that if the property was
rezoned, the owner was not bound to operate an automobile dealership
or any other specific establishment on the tract. The record [was] also
clear that the board was advised of all the possible uses that could be
made in a Highway Commercial district and of the possible uses if the
property remained R-2 Residential.
After comparing the two
alternatives, the Board made the decision to rezone.
Id. The court then concluded as follows:
Furthermore, all the proper rezoning procedures were followed in this
case. Initially, the proposed change was referred to the Town Planning
and Zoning Board, which endorsed the change. A public hearing was
held, and at a separate public meeting, the Board unanimously adopted
(continued)
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Short of such act, however, the rezoning of land should raise no contract
zoning issue.135 However, mere allegations of improper motive by the
legislative body absent evidence of fraud or deceit are not sufficient to
overturn an ordinance. Courts will not investigate the wisdom or motives
of the legislative branch to invalidate zoning ordinance^.'^^
3. Per se illegality of agreements
Some jurisdictions have declared agreements amounting to contract
zoning invalid per se,13' the reasoning being that the police "power may
the zoning change. There [was] no indication that the Board's decision
was a foregone conclusion or that the decision-making procedures were
a ploy to cover up a hidden agreement between the landowner and the
zoning authority. Plaintiffs' argument that the Board's knowledge of
the landowner's intended use may have influenced their decision [was]
not sufficient to support an allegation that contract zoning occurred.
Id. (citations omitted).
13'
Alabama courts have also looked for a binding mutual agreement between the
city and the developer before finding contract zoning. Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527
So. 2d 1303, 1306 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988). In Bradley, the city gave a right of way to the
property owner through park land for a road to facilitate the development of newly annexed
adjoining land, which the city rezoned. Id. at 1304. The court found no evidence of an
agreement between the city and developer to rezone. Id. at 1306. Rather, the agreement
was that if the Zoning and Planning Commission did not rezone the property to the
classification sought and there appeared to be no assurance that it would, then the city
would agree to de-annex the property. Id. Moreover, the court found the city did not
abdicate its legislative responsibility with regard to annexing and rezoning of the property.
Id. On the contrary, the evidence indicated that "the City was extensively involved in the
development of the subdivision. There was apparently much negotiating between the City
and the developer both as to the type of residential subdivision that would be built and the
type of road that would be laid through the park." Id. Also, public hearings were held on
the developer's-petition to rezone. Id.; see also Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 120 N.W.2d
270, 276-77 (Neb. 1963) (upholding a zoning ordinance where it was enacted with
protective covenants including a buffer zone between the proposed shopping center
abutting the residential area, there was no evidence of a bargain or agreement between the
developer and the city, the only representations made by the developer to the city were in
the developer's rezoning application, the effect of the protective covenant was to give some
further assurance to the city, and the representations of the applicant were made in good
faith, giving the city greater control over development of the property rezoned).
136
Rutland Envtl. Prot. Ass'n v. Kane County, 334 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975).
13'
In Wilmington Sixth District Community Commission v. Pettinaro Enters., No.
8668, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1988), defendants sought to have a
(continued)
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not be exerted to serve rivate interests merely, nor may the principle be
subverted to that end."'$ Still, it is not at all dear from a reading of the
cases when contract zoning occurs. Additionally, not all zoning actions
former hospital site rezoned to permit residential development and use. Id. at *2.
Defendants negotiated for the possible purchase of the site, which required rezoning. Id.
An ordinance was subsequently introduced providing for the rezoning of the site for
residential use. Id. at *3. "Shortly thereafter, defendants met with representatives of [the]
Committee to assuage the expressed concerns over the possibility of the renting of the units
erected on the site, the lack of adequate parking and the increased congestion which would
follow in the neighborhood if the rezoning occurred." Id. Defendants assured the
Committee and represented at a public hearing that all housing units would be offered for
sale with no rentals, that ample parking would be provided, and that they would ask the
seller to place restrictions in the deed of conveyance to that effect. Id. at *3-4. The
application for rezoning received unanimous approval from the Planning Commission. Id.
at *3. However, the deed did not contain any such restrictions, and the defendants changed
their plans, deciding on three story townhouses establishing a lease payment arrangement
whereby a prospective purchaser could lease a unit for a time. Id. at *5. Plaintiffs filed an
action seeking specific performance of defendants' representations to the Council. Id. at
*6. Defendants asserted the following two arguments: (1) that the representations made to
the Council did not as a matter of law create an enforceable contract, the performance of
which could be specifically enforced, because it would amount to contract zoning; and (2)
that Plaintiffs claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at *7. The court stated:
Even assuming, arguendo, that the necessary prerequisites for a contract
arose [by the defendant's representations to Council,] contracts between
a municipality and a developer to rezone in accordance with mutual
promises are apparently per se invalid in Delaware [as] the legislative
function may not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its exercise
controlled by the consideration which enter into the law of contracts.
Id. The court noted that "[tlhis rule is contrary to the holdings of some other courts which
have upheld contract zoning if reasonable, non-discriminating and serving the public
welfare." Id. at *8. The court went on to distinguish contract zoning (involving a bilateral
agreement) from conditional zoning (where the government does not agree to rezone but
merely decides to impose conditions that would otherwise not be applicable to the land),
but found the rezoning here was not conditional zoning because "the Council approved the
ordinance without written conditions, and there were no recorded covenants, agreements,
etc. which could show the existence of conditional zoning." Id. at *9-10; see also Hartnett
v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Ha. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429 (Md.
1959) (considering an agreement that provided "in consideration of the rezoning, the
owners would develop and maintain property as a funeral home only"); Allred v. City of
Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432,440-41 (N.C. 1971).
Wilmington Sixth Dist. Cmty. Comm., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142, at *7-8 (quoting
Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694,699-700 (Del. Ch. 1983)).
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decided by agreement with an affected landowner are unlawful, as the
existence of an agreement per se does not invalidate related zoning
actions.'39 Instead, in most jurisdictions, it is the nature of the agreementwhether the municipality promises to rezone without regard to the merits
of the rezoning application and whether the rezoning serves the public
interest-that determines whether an agreement amounts to contract
zoning.14' Where the evidence shows that the municipality entered into an
agreement with a landowner, was involved in the development process,
and refrained from simply acting to rezone at the request of the developer,
a finding of contract zoning is not required.14'
McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2002).
140
Id.
14'
See City of Orange Beach v. Peridio Pass Dev. Inc., 631 So. 2d 850, 854 (Ala.
1993). In that case, the developer proposed development of an island, which, at the time
the developer purchased it, was outside the boundaries of any municipality. Id. at 852. The
developer met with the mayor of the City of Orange Beach and discussed an annexation of
the island to the city. Id. The developer wrote a letter to the city attorney requesting
Planned Unit Development zoning to allow various types of development and mixed uses
within the area. Id. '"The city attorney amended the letter by adding a request for the least
restrictive zoning and a statement that zoning would occur at the time of annexation." Id. at
852. The mayor and the developer "also discussed the idea that the annexation was
conditional upon receiving the zoning." Id. at 852-53. The developer then submitted an
annexation-zoning letter to the City of Orange Beach, which agreed to support the project.
Id. at 853. The developer wrote the town council, stating that the development would occur
in several phases and that the number of lots were reduced. Id. The town council then
reaffirmed its approval of the project, and the city annexed the island. Id. The developer
sold the island to Peridio Pass Development, Inc., which "began to plan its development in
reliance upon receiving proper development zoning." Id. At a town council meeting,
several members of the community began to express concerns for the impact on the coastal
development. Id. 'The council then voted to deny the developer's request for PUD
zoning." Id. The developer brought a breach of contract action against the town. Id. In
defense, among other things, the Town Council claimed that the implementation of "the
agreement would amount to unlawful contract zoning by a municipality that is legislative in
nature." Id. at 854. However, the court rejected that argument, stating that "an annexation
and zoning agreement is permissible if the city does not abdicate its legislative
responsibility and the city is extensively involved in the development of the property," as
the evidence showed the city was here. Id. (citing Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527 So. 2d
1303 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)); see also Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527 So. 2d 1303, 1306
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (involving a situation where "the city was extensively involved in the
development of the subdivision and there was apparently much negotiating between the city
and the developer both as to the type of residential subdivision that would be built and type
of road that would be laid through the park"). But see Hale v. Osborn Coal Enters., Inc.,
(continued)
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Some courts have specifically upheld contract zoning or have declined
In Alaska, contract zoning
to declare it illegal under all cir~urnstances.~~~
. l ~ court
~
found an
was soundly upheld in City of Homer v. ~ a m ~ b e l 1The
interest in a zoning contract to be a property right, the deprivation of which
is subject to due process.'44
Indiana courts have declined to rule on the question of whether
~ ~ court
contract zoning is illegal. In Prock v. Town of ~ a n v i l l e , 'the

729 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (considering a case where the city was involved
in development only to the extent of obtaining promised payment from landowner in
exchange for rezoning).
'41
See, e.g., Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 101 S.W.3d 221 (Ark. 2003). In
Murphy, a company wanted to sell fireworks within the city. Id. at 222-23. Another
company was permitted to sell fireworks only because it was grandfathered into the city
limits. Id. at 223. The company filed a federal action against the city. Id. At public
hearings, the company agreed to dismiss the suit if the city voted in favor of an ordinance
allowing the sale of fireworks from a specific location. Id. The city passed several zoning
ordinances to allow this. Id. at 223-24. The ordinances were challenged as contract zoning.
Id. at 224. The trial court determined that the only reason the city relented to the
company's demands was to settle the suit. Id. But, such settlement could be upheld as long
as the city went through a bona fide procedure in the zoning process. Id. The supreme
court found that the trial court was correct in finding that the company and the city had not
entered into any type of binding agreement to settle until the city council meeting, and the
agreement was only finalized after the city council passed the challenged ordinance, not
before. Id. at 226. The court otherwise found none of the circumstances that traditionally
give rise to a finding of contract zoning. Id. Therefore, the question of the legality of
contract zoning in the State of Arkansas was not an issue to be addressed by the court on
that appeal. Id. The legality of contract zoning was otherwise an issue of first impression
in the state, the court specifically noting that not all jurisdictions that had examined the
issue had found contract zoning to be prohibited. Id.; see also Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso,
845 P.2d 793,797 (N.M. 1992) (declining to adopt a per se rule).
'43
719 P.2d 683, 685 (Alaska 1986) In City of Homer, the court found that the
landowners had a proprietary interest in the business that was protected by due process
when concurrent with a zoning amendment. Id. The landowners entered into a contract
with the city enabling them to operate a fish processing plant, and later the city sought to
terminate the contract. Id.
Id. at 685.
'41
655 N.E.2d 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). There, the landowner requested that the
town annex certain property the landowner owned and zone it for use as a landfill. Id. at
554. The town did annex the property and zoned it as requested. Id. Thereafter, the
landowner and the town entered into an agreement that provided, among other things, that
the landowner would
(continued)
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declared that "Indiana courts have not yet addressed the issue of whether a
contract for zoning is illegal. However, several courts in our sister states
have considered the issue and, in general, they hold that contract zoning is
illegal."146 The Prock court went on to discuss Dacy v. Village of
~uidoso,'~'
a case from the New Mexico Supreme Court.'48 Dacy defined
contract zoning as "an agreement between a municipality and another party
in which the municipality's consideration consists of either a promise to
zone the property in a requested manner or the actual act of zoning the
property in that manner."'49 However, the Dacy court refused to subscribe
to a per se rule against contract zoning, but recognized that numerous
courts had in fact declared contract zoning invalid per se because it is "an
illegal bargaining away or abrogation of the police power."150 The Dacy
court explained further that a contract in which a municipality promises to
zone property in a specified manner is illegal because in making such a
promise, a municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to zone
the property according to prescribed legislative procedures, including
notice and a public hearing prior to passage and a right of citizens to be
heard at the hearing.'5' "By making a promise to rezone before a zoning
hearing occurs, a municipality denigrates the statutory process because it
1) reserve space in its landfill to dispose of waste materials generated in
the town for the next 26 years; 2) abide by various limitations on the
operation of the landfill and permit inspections; 3) maintain roads to the
front gate of the landfill; 4) cooperate in the development of plans for
recreational facilities on the property; 5) pay the Town certain fees per
ton of waste received at the landfill; and 6) make three annual payments
of $50,000 to the [local chamber of commerce] to be used to promote
economic development.

Id. at 554-55. In exchange for these promises, the town agreed "to actively support the use
of the landfill and to support [the landownerl's future attempts to secure permits for
expanding the landfill" and also to provide municipal water and sewage services. Id. at
555.
Id. at 559 (citing Ford Leasing Dev. Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 528 P.2d
237, 240 (Colo. 1974) (recognizing that the general rule in most states is that contract
zoning is illegal as an ultra vires bargaining away of the police power); Hedrich v. Village
of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (holding that zoning ordinances should
not be subject to bargaining or contract)).
'41
845 P.2d at 796.
'41
Prock, 655 N.E.2d at 559.
14'
Dacy, 845 P.2d at 796.
150
Id. at 797; see also Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694,699-700 @el. Ch. 1983);
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956).
Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797.
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purports to commit itself to certain action before listening to the public's
comments on that action.3,152 However, in Dacy, the court pointed out that
the analysis implies that one form of contract zoning is legal: a unilateral
contract in which a party makes a promise in return for a municipality's act
of rezoning. lS3

In this situation, the municipality makes no promise and
there is no enforceable contract until the municipality acts
to rezone the property. Because the municipality does not
commit itself to any specified action before the zoning
hearing, it does not circumvent statutory procedures or
compromise the rights of affected persons.154
The court pointed out that "[s]ome courts have nonetheless condemned this
form of contract zoning on the ground that the contracting party's promise
provides improper motivation for the municipality's rezoning action."'s5
The court did not find this reasoning persuasive because "private interests
are inherently involved in any zoning matter."lS6 Moreover, if the zoning
authority's action is improper, judicial review may correct potential
misconduct occurring through unilateral contract zoning.157 The Dacy
court implied that the agreement that results after the zoning hearing would
be enforceable against the city-that it is the accord before consideration
of relevant factors that makes the agreement illegal.'ss
In Prock, the court failed to find contract zoning because the town did
not promise to rezone the land in a certain way.lS9 Instead, the agreement
provided as follows:

In consideration of the payment of the [fee], the Town
agrees to actively support [the developer's proposed]
operation [of a landfill] within the annexed area and [the
developer's] attempts to secure all permits and approvals
for [expanding] the area. Such support may include
without limitation the submission of whatever reasonable
documentation is required to establish the Town's need for
the expansion of the [operation] upon receiving a request

lS2
lS3

'"
lSs
lS6

lS7
lS8

lS9

Id.
Id.
Id. at 797-98 (citations omitted).
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Prock v. Town of Danville, 655 N.E.2d 553,560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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to do so from [the developer].'60
The court pointed out that by the agreement, "the town was not
contractually bound to zone the property in a particular way or to promise
that, in the future, it would rezone the property to expand the landfill."16'
Further, the town did not promise to support the developer's efforts
regardless of whether those efforts were in compliance with the town's
statutory zoning procedures.'62 The court also noted that the agreement
As~ such, no contract
was signed after the property had been r e ~ 0 n e d . l ~
zoning could be found.'64 Because there was no contract, the court
declined to express an opinion as to whether contract zoning was in fact
It seems that
illegal, thus resulting in invalidating the zoning ordinar~ce.'~~
in evaluating this bargained for agreement, the court drew a fine line
between the agreement to support the developer's application in exchange
for the payment of a fee and a contract with mutual promises and the city
agreeing to rezone in exchange for a fee.'66 Clearly, the inducement for the
rezoning was the anticipated agreement, which provided that it would be
effective following recording of the 0 r d i n a n ~ e . l ~ ~
In a more recent Indiana opinion, the court again declined to take a
position on the legality of contract ~ 0 n i n g . I ~In~ Ogden v. Premier
Properties, U.S.A, Inc., the city council voted to adopt an ordinance that
rezoned from residential to commercial certain property in order to
The developer filed a petition to
construct a retail shopping fa~i1ity.l~~
rezone four years earlier.I7O The Area Plan Commission recommended
denial of the request to the city council, and the city council denied the
zoning petition.17' The developer filed another petition that was also
denied, then another petition seeking to rezone the property.172The Area
Plan Commission again recommended
"Each rezoning petition

I6l
la2

'@

I7O
17'

172
173

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id.
See id. at 560-61.
Id.
Ogden v. Premier Props., USA, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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included a Use and Development ~ o m m i t m e n t , ' ~which
~
placed
The city
restrictions and requirements on the proposed de~eloprnent."'~~
council considered the petition at a hearing at which the developer
"introduced a document titled 'Covenant' that contained written
commitments 'in addition to the covenants set forth in the Use and
Development Commitment.77,176 c cThe commitments were conditioned on
the City Council approving the developer's zoning request and were
binding on the developer for twenty years.7,177 c cThe City Council voted in
favor of the petition adopting the rezoning Ordinance which incorporated
the [Use and Development C~mmitment]."'~~
The court rejected the contract zoning claim asserted by the
neighbors.179 The neighbors claimed that the city council and the
developer entered into a contract for zoning because of the alleged
agreements made by members of city council verbally and in a written
covenant.'80 The court first pointed out that the fact that the developer met
with city council members did not impeach the validity of the rezoning
since the council acted "officially only though minutes and records at a
duly organized meeting."18' As such, alleged verbal promises outside a
'74

Under the zoning ordinance, a petition for rezoning was required to be referred to
the Area Plan Commission (APC), which made recommendations to the city council for
final action. Id. at 666. The APC could ''permit or require a landowner to make a written
commitment on the use or development (UDC) of the property that was subject to the
rezoning." Id. If the rezoning is approved, "the UDC is attached to, incorporated by, and
recorded with the ordinance, and the APC retainrs] the power to modify, enforce and
terminate the UDC." Id. at 667. The court ruled that UDCs are properly considered in
connection with a rezoning petition, and it was not a violation of the ordinance for the city
council to consider commitments other than UDCs. Id. at 666. The court also rejected the
claim that the ordinance was void because the city council considered the UDC before it
had been reviewed by the APC in its final form as contemplated by the ordinance. Id. at
668. Instead, the city council had the power to reject the UDC as proposed or require
amendment of the petition for rezoning and obtain another APC review before returning to
the city council. Id.
17'
Id. at 664.
176
Id. "The covenant was intended to accommodate the concerns of the adjoining
landowners and the city council." Id. For instance, the developer promised to construct
berms on two sides of the proposed facility, restrict hours of garbage disposal, maintain
landscaping, construct improvements to the roads abutting the facility, including adding
traffic lanes and turn lanes, and install a traffic light. Id.
'77
Id. at 664-65.
17'
Id. at 665.
17'
Id. at 668.
180
Id.
18'
Id. at 669.
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meeting did not contractually bind the city council, but simply reflected the
nature of the legislative process.'82 The court went on to show how the
facts there were weaker than in Prock, where the town was a party to the
agreement with the developer and agreed to support the developer in
obtaining permits and approvals for the project.Ig3 Yet, the court in Prock
failed to find contract zoning.Ig4 Here, the city council was not a party to
the covenant, which did not bind the city council to zone the property in
any particular way.lg5 AS in Prock, the rezoning was approved before the
covenant became effective-that is, the agreement was signed after the
ordinance was passed, hence the town council could not have contracted
away its power to zone because the zoning was already completed before
the agreement was executed.'86 Here, a provision in the covenant stated it
would become effective five days after the passing of the ordinance.18'
The holding in this case can be criticized as evasive and superficial, that
the order in which the act of rezoning and formal signing of an agreement
to rezone occurs does not make a critical difference if the inducement and
sole reason for the rezoning is the promise by the developer, and the
rezoning contemplates the entering into the agreement. At the same time,
it is hard to see what was wrong with the proposed covenants or why a
decision to rezone should not be made on the basis of proposed uses. It
should have been sufficient that a promise to rezone was made on the basis
of the consideration of the public interest, that allowing the new use
reflected the changing needs of the community, and that the landowner's
proposed uses would be in harmony with prevailing conditions.
The Massachusetts courts have also rejected a per se treatment of all
agreements between a municipality and a developer as illegal contract
zoning.lgg Instead, what seems to matter is whether the rezoning serves the
public interest and that the consideration offered by the developer was not
extraneous to the property at issue.'89 In McLean Hospital Corp. v. Town
~
to rezoning, a hospital was situated on a single
of ~ e l m o n t , 'prior
residence D zoning district as a non-conforming use.l9' Residential zoning
districts bordered the locus on the northeast and northwest, and local
Id.
Id. (citing Prock v. City of Danville, 655 N.E.2d 553, 560 (111. App. Ct. 1995)).
Id. (citing Prock, 655 N.E.2d at 560).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 669.
Id.
See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118 (Mass.
Id. at 122.
778 N.E.2d 1016 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
Id. at 1018.
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business districts bordered the locus on the ~0utheast.l~~
The hospital
presented a proposal that led to the parties entering into a memorandum of
understanding of the proposal, which contemplated rezoning the entire site,
together with commitments to benefit the town generally, but not
ex~lusively.'~~
These commitments included the following: (1) legal
protection of significant historical features; (2) acquisition by the town of
an interest in the site, including title to a major portion for open space and
a cemetery; and (3) a tax exemption for that portion dedicated for hospital
operations, traffic management, and commitments for recreational
benefits.'"
"Pursuant to the memorandum of understanding, the town embarked
on a process leading to a comprehensive rezoning of the [area],"195the
proposed rezoning being substantially similar to the memorandum of
~ n d e r s t a n d i n ~ . ' ~The
~ town planning board recommended that the
~
extended discussion, the amendment
amendment be a p p r 0 ~ e d . l ~After
failed.19* But on reconsideration of a revised roposal that reflected
concerns expressed earlier, the proposal passed.'98 The hospital and the
town then executed a memorandum of agreement incorporating the parties'
various commitments to each other.200 In considering a challenge to the
rezoning, the court noted that the challengers "employ[ed] the label
'contract zoning' as an epithet that suggest[ed] that zoning action taken in
connection with any agreement with an affected landowner is unlawful.'y201
This was wrong as a general proposition.202 The court explained that
"[tlhe existence of an agreement per se does not invalidate related zoning
actions; it is the nature of the agreement and the character of the zoning
action that determine the outcome."203
Attacks on zoning enactments as unlawful contract zoning had been

lg2

Id.
Id.
Id. at n.5. The commitments included reducing the maximum square footage of
the research and development subdistrict, the payment of $800,000 by the hospital to the
town for traffic mitigation, payment by the town to the hospital of $1.5 million, and further
amendments. Id. at 1019.
lg5
Id. at 1019.
lg6
Id.
lg7
Id.
lg8
Id.
Id. at 1020.
2*
Id.
201
Id.
202
See id. at 102 1.
203
Id. at 1020.
lg3

'*
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considered previously by the appellate courts in ~ a s s a c h u s e t t s . Each
~~~
case involved an agreement between the municipality and the developer,
but in each case the zoning action was upheld.205 In the first such case,
' ~ agreement
Sylvania Electric Products, Znc. v. City of ~ e w t o n , ~the
provided that if the city rezoned a potential parcel from a single residence
the landowner would restrict
district to a limited manufacturing distri~t,2~'
its uses of the parcel in certain ways and convey to the city an option to
purchase a portion of the property.208 The McLean court quoted the
Sylvania court and stated that "[ilt was clear that the respective
undertakings were contingent on each other or, as the court expressed it,
'the option proposal was a significant inducement of the zoning
amendment and the amendment induced the giving of the option. 3,209 The
McLean court went on to state that "[tlhe mutual dependence of the
parties' commitments did not by itself render the zoning aspect invalid.9,210
Notwithstanding that local "officials let it be known that favorable
rezoning depended in great likelihood on the adoption of the option
restrictions," this was still
It also did not "infringe zoning
principles that, in connection with a zoning amendment, land use was
regulated otherwise than by the amendment" to the zoning ordinance.212
The court explained that the "'[zloning regulations existfed] unaffected
by, and [did] not affect, deed restrictions.' In other words, the zoning
action, if otherwise valid, [stood] by itself and its legitimacy [was] not
lessened because it was accompanied, and even encouraged, by ancillary
agreements not involving consideration extraneous to the property being
rezoned.,7213

In Sylvania, the zoning decision that the locus, as
restricted by the owner, should be a limited manufacturing
district "was an appropriate and untainted exercise of the
zoning power. What was done involved no action
contrary to the best interest of the city and hence offensive
--

-

--

204

Id.
205
Id.
2M
183 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 1962).
'07
Id. at 1 19.
'08
Id. at 120.
'09
McLRan Hosp. Corp., 778 N.E.2d at 1020-21 (quoting Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc.,
183 N.E.2d at 122).
'lo
~ dat. 1021.
211
Id.
'I2
Id. (quoting Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 183 N.E.2d at 122).
'I3
Id. (quoting Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 183 N.E.2d at 122).
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The other Massachusetts appellate case, Rando v. North
~ t t l e b o r o u ~ h held
, 2 ~ ~the same.216 In Rando, a developer sought to have
land in a residential district rezoned to a commercial distri~t.~"TO induce
the rezoning, the developer made various promises relating to the subject
property and the area, "including a 'no build' buffer zone, traffic
improvements, mitigation payments, and a commitment not to seek tax
abatements with respect to the rezoned land for five years."218 'The
plaintiffs argued that the town had bargained away its police powers in
return for the promised benefits."219 Comparing the objection to that in the
Sylvania case, the Rando court upheld the trial court's finding that the
town meetings had not been improperly influenced to act against the
town's best interests and instead on behalf of the developer.220

In addition, the [Rando] court agreed that the benefits
promised by the developer did not constitute "extraneous
consideration," stating, "We do not think a payment that is
promised by the developer rather than required by the
municipality and that is reasonably intended to meet
public needs arising out of the proposed development can
be viewed as an 'extraneous influence' upon a zoning
decision."221
Under this definition, the zoning authority was found not to have entered
into a bilateral contract with a landowner because of the following: (1) the
landowner's application for rezoning detailed various conditions to be
placed on the proposed rezoned property, including undisturbed buffers
(these promises were unilateral, and no promises were made by the zoning
authority); and (2) the zoning authority imposed a 100 foot buffer on a
parcel and made no promise associated with this provision and the
landowner made no promise in return.222Viewing the "whole record," no
evidence supported that a transaction occurred in which either side
2'4

Id. (quoting 183 N.E.2d at 122).
692 N.E.2d 544 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
'I6
McLean, 778 N.E.2d at 1021.
7I'
Id. (citing Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1998)).
Id. (citing Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 546).
219
Id. (citing Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 546).
220
Id. (quoting Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 549-50).
221
Id. (citing Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 548).
222
See id.
5I'
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undertook to obligate itself in any
NO meeting of the minds took
place, and no reciprocal assurances were made.224The court continued,
Thus, challenges to zoning enactments on the basis that
they are products of contract zoning provoke two
questions: (1) was the action "contrary to the best interest
of the city and hence offensive to general public policy;"
and (2) did it involve extraneous consideration "which
could impeach the enacting vote as a decision solely in
respect of rezoning the locus.7 ~ 2 2 5
Rando seems much more narrow and strict in its treatment of
agreements between municipalities and landowners than Sylania. In
Sylvania, the court upheld an arrangement involving mutual commitments,
which the court found were contingent upon each other, and the rezoning
was in the public interesteZz6In contrast, the Rando court took pains to
show only unilateral promises by the landowner, seemingly suggesting that
zoning involving a bilateral agreement would be invalid in
Massach~setts.~~'
However, the two questions identified as pertinent in
contract zoning challenges said nothing about bilateral promises. Rather,
they focused solely on the benefit to the municipality and the connection
between the promises forming the basis for the zoning and the property.
Additionally, it is difficult to view the landowner's promises as being
unrelated to the anticipated rezoning. The McLean court relied on both
Sylvania and Rando to uphold what could hardly be regarded as anything
but a bilateral agreement.228This reliance on both cases, therefore, makes
the resolution of the issue unclear.229 McLean simply found the

223
224

225
226
227

Id. at 1023.
See id.
Id.at1021.
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Mass. 1962).
See Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 548 (Mass. App. Ct.

1998).
228

229

See McLean Hosp. Corp., 778 N.E.2d at 1021.
The McLean court went on to state that
[i]n determining whether the rezoning challenged here satisfied the
criteria of Sylvania and Rando, we apply the standard that a party
attacking a zoning amendment has a heavy burden, one requiring that
he "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the zoning regulation
is arbitrary and unreasonable, or substantially unrelated to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
(continued)
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challengers failed to demonstrate that the interests of the town were not
served by the rezoning.230 "Indeed, while McLean's interests [were]
obviously enhanced, a factor that [did] not discredit the zoning action, . . .
the benefits that flowed to the town from the agreement [were] obvious."23'
The town was confronted with a situation in which the landowner had the
right to "develop the unused portion of its property into sin le family
residences and had an immediate economic incentive to do so."432 Under
the agreement, the landowner surrendered this right, a concession of clear
benefit to the town, on the conditions that the land be rezoned, that the
town pay McLean $1.5 million, and that the town help McLean receive tax
relief that similar institutions enjoy.233In return,
the town received not only the elimination of the potential
for an undesired residential development of the locus, an
accomplishment that by itself would appear to satisfy the
requirement that the zoning be for a public purpose, but
also open space; a cemetery; protection for significant
historical features; commitments with respect to affordable
housing and recreational benefits; and a traffic
management agreement.234
The landowner's commitments were substantially related to the
general welfare, and the town meeting therefore could lawfully act to
rezone based upon them.235 No evidence indicated that the developer
improperly influenced the town meeting to decide in favor of the developer
rather than in the town's best interests.236 Moreover, "[tlhe consideration
flowing to the town under the agreement [was] not 'extraneous' in the
sense used in Sylvania and Rando (as, for example, a request to give land
Id. at 1022 (quoting Johnson v. Edgarton, 680 N.E.2d 37,40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)). The
challenger "must demonstrate that the validity of the enactment 'is not even fairly
debatable."' Id. (quoting Crall v. Leominster, 284 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Mass. 1972)). "If the
validity of the zoning action is fairly debatable, local judgment on the subject should be
sustained." Id. (quoting National Amusements, Inc. v. Boston, 560 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1990)).
230
Id. at 1022.
23'
Id. (citations omitted).
232
Id. at 1022.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. (citing Sylvania Elec. Prods, Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118, 122
(Mass. 1962)).
236
Id. (citing Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 549 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1997)).
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for a park elsewhere in the city) which could impeach the enacting vote as
a decision solely in respect of rezoning the
Instead, "each
element of such consideration was reasonably related to the [property]
being rezoned."238The court explained:
We believe it too narrow to require that, in order not to be
labeled excessive, consideration must directly "mitigate"
some deleterious effect of the development authorized by
the rezoning (although such consideration would
obviously be permissible). Rather, it is adequate that the
consideration bear some identifiable relationship to the
locus so that there can be assurance that the town's
legislative body did not act for reasons irrelevant to the
zoning of the site at issue. This requirement was satisfied
here.239
Therefore, it seemed that the crucial point made by the court in
determining the validity of the rezoning made in connection with an
agreement was that the town benefited from the developer's promises and
that those promises related to the parcel at issue.
At the end of the opinion, the court did state that the "rezoning [was
not] a product of a bilateral contract that bound the town to rezone solely
in consideration of the promises of the landowner,9,240 and at the same time
it recognized that the rezoning was conditioned on the developer's
promises.24' It pointed out that the rezoning was not a term of a contract,
but was a "condition that had to be fulfilled before a separate agreement
became enforceable."242 The court attempted to distinguish this from a
bilateral contract between the developer and the municipality by stating
that in the case before it, "the municipality [made] no promise and there
[was] no enforceable contract until the municipality act[ed] to rezone the
property."243 This attempted distinction seems disingenuous and belied by
the terms of the agreement. Arguably, an agreement between the parties
existed, as the developer's promises clearly induced the rezoning, and
these promises would only be fulfilled upon rezoning. The court might
237

Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Sylvania, 183 N.E.2d at 122).
Id.
239
Id.
Id. at 1023.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. The court also ruled that "[tlhe rezoning having been adopted for a valid
public purpose in relation to an area that is discrete in its geography, contours, and size, it is
not spot zoning." Id.
238
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well have upheld the rezoning based upon its concluding remarks that it
saw
nothing in the Zoning Act, . . . or in other applicable legal
principles that prohibite[d] a municipality from
negotiating with a private landholder to bring about the
receipt of benefits for desirable public purposes once
otherwise valid zoning has taken place, assuming that
those benefits have some reasonable relationship to the
site covered by the zoning.244
Indeed, as the court recognized, "such arrangements are consistent
with good overnment in general and with effective land use planning in
The
particular."845 They do not involve a surrender of police
court's suggestion that a bilateral contract binding the town to rezone
solely in consideration of the promises of the landowner and that benefit
the city would be illegal, but that the city can negotiate and extract
promises from a landowner and based upon these romises decide to
rezone so long as the rezoning benefits the ~ i t ~ : ' ~ m a k e stoo fine a
distinction. Yet, it seems to reflect the approach taken by courts inclined
to uphold rezoning where the developer has made significant concessions
of benefit to the parcel at issue and surroundings.248 In this vein, courts
244

Id.
Id.
246
Id.
247
In Paul v. City of Manhattan, 51 1 P.2d 244 (Kan. 1973), restrictive covenants
placed on the property in connection with rezoning did not amount to contract zoning
because they "were not prerequisites to the zoning, nor . . . a controlling factor in the
court's decision. They were merely considered as they might bear on population densitya key issue raised by plaintiffs." Id. at 251. Further, "rezoning would conform to the
master land use plan even if the covenants were ignored." Id. In Arkenberg v. City of
Topeka, 421 P.2d 213 (Kan. 1966), in connection with an application by the developer for a
rezoning, the developer "expressed its willingness to convey to the city an easement for
parking purposes consisting of a ten foot strip of land." Id. at 216. Rezoning was
approved. Id. The plaintiffs alleged contract zoning. Id. The court held contrary to the
case cited by plaintiffs, Hudson Oil Co. v. City of Wichita, 396 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1964),
stating that "[o]bviously the effect of any agreement respecting the right-of-way would be
to alleviate the traffic condition. If it were in fact made by the governing body as a
prerequisite to rezoning, which does not affirmatively appear, that would be a reasonable
requirement." Arkenberg, 421 P.2d at 218.
248
See Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 415 A.2d 461, 464 n.2 (Pa. Comrnw. Ct.
1980). In Carlino, the court stated that "where the 'contract' would consist of special
limitations affecting the zoning amendment in respects which the landowner accept[ed] in
(continued)
245
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have held that the fact that the city stands to benefit from the rezoning, by
itself, does not make an agreement contract zoning.249
What seems a departure from the qualified conclusion in McLean is
where the court focused its analysis of
Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC,~~'
the contract zoning challenge on the relationship the rezoning bore to the
consideration re~eived,'~'finding what can only be regarded as a most
tenuous relationship between the consideration received and the use of the
parcel at issue sufficient to avoid the contracting away of governmental
powers ~hallenge.~~'There, the Massachusetts high court upheld a
rezoning where the developer offered to make an $8 million gift for the
construction of a new high school if its rezoning application was permitted,
allowing it to build and operate a power plant on the site.253The town held
order to have the amendment enacted," such "contract zoning" is a valid exercise of the
police power. Id.
249
See City of Springfield ex rel. Burton v. City of Springfield, No. 00 CA 14,2000
Ohio App. LEXIS 2721, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 23, 2000). In this case,
the city agreed to bear the cost of construction with the understanding
that, if the zoning was changed to allow for residential or commercial
development of the abutting property, the developer would contribute to
the cost of the road in proportion to the manner and extent to which the
property was developed. Neither the [original] [algreement nor [slide
[agreement], which supplemented it, required the city to zone the
property in any particular way. As the trial court pointed out, the fact
that a city st[ood] to benefit from a zoning decision d[id] not disqualify
the city from enacting zoning regulations and [could not] be considered
as illegally controlling the course of legislative decision making.

Id. at Y7.
250

793 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2003).
See id. at 365-66.
See id. at 368.
253
Id. at 361-62. After the town began to examine ways to increase it property tax
base, it appointed an economic development task force to study the issue. Id. at 361. The
task force prepared a report, identifying a parcel of land that abutted land already zoned for
industrial use as a candidate for rezoning from agriculture and suburban to industrial use.

"'
'"

Id.
Subsequently, at the . . . town meeting, a zoning article proposing the
rezoning fell eight votes short of the required two-thirds majority.
Thereafter, IDC, which owned a power plant in the town, began
discussions with town officials about the possibility of rezoning the
[site] so that a second plant might ultimately be built on it. These
discussions included the subject of what public benefits and financial
(continued)
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an open town meeting at which the proposed rezoning was introduced.254
IDC made a presentation at the meeting and reiterated its offer of an $8
million gift.255 "The planning board and finance committee both
recommended passage of the zoning article. There was some discussion of
the zoning aspects of the proposal, as well as discussion regarding the
offered gift."256 The ordinance passed by more than the two-thirds vote
required.257 Thereafter, IDC submitted applications for five special
permits, which were granted.258Landowners located near the site filed suit
against IDC, the town, the town zoning, board of appeals, and the property
owners, arguing inter alia that the rezoning constituted illegal "contract
zoning" or "spot zoning."259 The trial court viewed the $8 million gift as
"extraneous consideration" since no attempt was made to show that the
developer offered it to mitigate the impact of the project.260As such, it was
"offensive to public
The trial court ruled that the offer made
was sufficient to nullify the rezoning vote, even "without the necessity of
finding that voting town meeting members were influenced by it.7,262 ne
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed.263The court stated that
[tlhe enactment of a zoning bylaw by the voters at a town
meeting is not only the exercise of an independent police
inducements IDC might offer the town with regard to the proposed
[power] plant. The town administrator told IDC that the town was
facing an $8 million shortfall in its plans to construct a much needed
new high school. Shortly thereafter, the president of IDC publicly
announced that IDC would make an $8 million gift to the town if IDC
(1) decided to build the plant; (2) obtained the financing and permits
necessary to build the plant; and (3) operated the plant successfully for
one year. The offer was made to generate support for the plant and
became [public] knowledge in the town.

Id. at 361-62.
254
Id. at 361-62.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 362.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 362-63.
260
Id. at 363.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id. at 363-64. The court began with a discussion of the source of the municipality
power to enact local ordinances-the Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at
364. The zoning power enabled municipalities to enact zoning ordinances or bylaws as an
exercise of their "independent police powers." Id.

Heinonline - - 3 3 Cap. U. L. Rev. 4 2 9 2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
power; it is also a legislative act, carrying a strong
presumption of validity. It will not normally be undone
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate "by a preponderance
of the evidence that the zoning regulation is arbitrary and
unreasonable, or substantially unrelated to the public
health, safety . . .or general welfare."264
This "analysis is not affected by consideration of the various possible
motives that may have inspired the legislative action."265 The court
explained that "contract zoning" involves "a promise by [the] municipality
to rezone a property either before the vote to rezone has been taken or
before the required [statutory] process has been undertaken."266 The court
ruled that the trial court found no such advance agreement occurred here,
since despite IDCYsoffer of $8 million, the voters of the town meeting
were not bound to approve the zoning change.267 Because the town
followed the statutory procedures, the rezoning was not illegal under state
law on that basis.268
The court noted that the trial judge found that absent the $8 million
offer, the rezoning was substantively valid, meaning not arbitrary nor
unreasonable, and was "substantially related to the public health, safety, or
general welfare of the town."269 In other words, the adoption of the
rezoning even without the offer of $8 million served a public purpose.270
Here, the site "abutted land zoned for industrial use; a town-appointed task
force . . . had recommended its rezoning after studying the town's tax base
and the need for economic development; and a previous rezoning attempt
. . . barely failed to get the necessary two-thirds [vote required]."271
Therefore, the enactment of the rezoning was not violative of state law
or constitutional provisions, as the $8 million was not "extraneous
con~ideration."~~~
Instead, the court concluded that a voluntary offer of
public benefits is not, standing alone, an adequate ground on which to set
In general, the court found "no
aside an otherwise valid legislative
-

-

Id. (quoting Johnson v. Edgartown, 680 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 1997)) (citations

omitted).
Id.
Id. at 365.
267
Id. at 366.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 368.
270
Id.
271
~ d(footnote
.
omitted).
272
Id.
273
Id. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the trial court's reliance on Sylvania to
this effect was misplaced. Id. at 368. "Th[at] opinion cit[ed] no supporting authority for
(continued)
265

266
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reason to invalidate a legislative act on the basis of an 'extraneous
consideration,' because [courts] defer to legislative findings and choices
without regard to motive."274 The court saw "no reason to make an
exception for legislative acts that are in the nature of zoning
enactments."275 It found "no persuasive authority for the proposition that
an otherwise valid zoning enactment is invalid if it is an way prompted or
encouraged by a public benefit voluntarily offered. 6 The offer of a
792

'

the proposition that the presence of an 'extraneous consideration' at the time of the vote on
a zoning amendment would invalidate the vote, but the language has since been given
added life in two cases decided by the Appeals Court." Id. at 368-69 (citing McLean Hosp.
Corp. v. Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016 (Mass. 2002) (holding that a promise of the landowner
to surrender its right to develop an unused part of the property and provide open space, a
cemetery, protection for significant historical features, commitments with respect to
affordable housing and recreational benefits, and a traffic management agreement were not
extraneous consideration, but were reasonably related to the locus being rezoned); Rando v.
Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 548 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that where
payment that was "promised by the developer rather than required by the municipality and
that [wals reasonably intended to meet public needs arising out of the proposed
development [could not] be viewed as an 'extraneous influence' upon a zoning decision")).
The Durand court also noted a change in attitude among the courts on the concept of
contract zoning, with recent courts confining its meaning to a situation involving reciprocal
promises between a municipality and a landowner. Id. at 367. In their definition, the courts
do not include rezoning made on conditions designed to limit use of land or other forms of
mitigation for the adverse impacts of its development, as this is a commonly accepted tool
of modem land use planning. Id. In any event, the court cautioned, "A court examining a
zoning arrangement should not affix a formalistic label to it, but rather should engage in the
substantive inquiry [to ascertain] whether the zoning action [wals consistent with . . . law
and constitutional requirements, and otherwise satisfies the criteria for a valid exercise of
police power." Id. at 367 n. 17.
274
Id. at 369.
275
Id.
276
Id. The dissent found that "the town meeting improperly agreed to exercise its
power to rezone land in exchange for a promise to pay money. The exercise of that power
to approve the requested zoning change was a condition precedent to the promise of IDC
. . . to pay money under its agreement with the town." Id. at 370 (Spina, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Additionally, the dissent found that this was not "a decision solely
in respect of rezoning the locus. [Instead, t]he parties struck a bargain: the payment of
money in retum for a zoning change." Id. at 370-71 (citations omitted). This was a sale of
the police power because nothing in the record "legitimize[d] the $8 million offer as
'intended to mitigate the impact of the development upon the town,' or as 'reasonably
intended to meet public needs arising out of the proposed development."' Id. at 371
(quoting Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 548). The consideration was extraneous and unrelated to
any aspect of the development. Id. at 37 1.
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benefit in exchange for the exercise of the municipality's zoning power
seems to fall at the heart of the contract zoning prohibition, if the
prohibition exists for that sake alone. But if the prohibition exists in order
to require the zoning authority to show that a rezoning is otherwise in the
public interest, then the fact that a municipality achieves a benefit while
otherwise faithfully carrying out its responsibilities should not be of great
concern, particularly if the municipality could have rezoned without the
benefit offered.277 However, if the presumption of the validity of the
enactment of the legislation is applied as the court did here?78 then the
concern that the public interest considerations may be given short shrift
with the lure of $8 million will not be tested by judicial review.

B. Lack of Transparency Where Zoning Bypasses the Statutory
Procedures
Contract zoning has been held to be objectionable because such an
agreement by the zoning authority bypasses the notice and public hearing
procedures required for enacting a zoning ordinance.279 This lack of
transparency occurs even if the municipality informs the public at the time
of the rezoning that the land at issue will be governed by separate rules.
Others who come later to examine the ordinance to try to understand the
general plan for the community will not fully understand how the plan is
designed since the plan itself will not reflect all of the considerations that
went into the rezoning decision. Similarly, if the zoning authority board
has already contracted to support the landowners' request for rezoning
before public hearing, "hearings regarding the issue of rezoning would
then be a 'pro forma exercise since the [board would have] already
obligated itself to a decision.,~280 If the agreement is expressly

277

But see Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). There,
the court declared invalid as an instance of contract zoning an ordinance where the
consideration was extraneous to the land at issue. 'The 'contract zoning' charge aros[e]
from the requirement of [the ordinance] that the developer improve [the road] next to the
property and widen a one-lane bridge on [the road] near, but not adjacent to, the property."
Id. at 716. The court explained that "[wlhere the offer made or the exaction demanded for
the rezoning bears no reasonable relationship to the activities of the developer the action of
the county or municipality in rezoning the property in exchange for such offer or exaction,"
amounts to a "contracting away of the police power, which is forbidden." Id. at 717.
278
See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 364.
279
See Morgran Co. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
Id. at 643 (quoting Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Ha. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996)). The city had not expressly or irrevocably committed itself to rezone the
area. See id. at 641-42. Nonetheless, the court concluded that since the decision to rezone
(continued)
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conditioned upon approval by the public at a hearing, then there seems to
be no good reason for not allowing the municipality to work out the terms
of the rezoning and future uses in advance, as is contemplated under a
development agreement. Of course, the zoning authority begins the
hearing process with a contractual obligation to obtain public approval, but
it is free to be persuaded otherwise at the hearing.
The question of bypassing the notice and public hearing procedures
has also arisen in the context of settlement of litigation brought by a
developer challen 'ng the municipality's denial of an application for a
proposed land useFgl The Florida courts have found such agreements the
equivalent of invalid contract zoning where, under the settlement
was contingent on the filing of restrictive covenants by the developer, a bargaining away of
police power had occurred. Id. at 643.
See Warner Co. v. Sutton, 644 A.2d 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). There,
the landowner owned approximately 3,000 acres of land adjoining the Manumuskin
Watershed in Maurice River Township, which for many years was used for mining of sand
as a legal nonconforming use. Id. at 658. The city then rezoned the land to a classification
in which mining was not permitted. Id. The landowner's application for a renewal of its
license to continue its mining activity was granted in part and tabled in part. Id. The
landowner sued seeking to invalidate the ordinance, alleging spot zoning and a taking of
property. Id. The parties reached a tentative settlement of the suit. Id. "Under the
proposed agreement, the Township recognized [Landowner's] mining nonconforming use
status, and that it applied essentially to [Landowner's] entire tract." Id. Landowner
abandoned its challenge to the rezoning and its damage claim, "and in turn was given a
conditional right to construct a planned residential village on the tract." Id. The court
found that the consent order caused the municipality to surrender its legislative function and
took away the public's right to be heard. Id. at 660. The consent order, therefore,
amounted to contract zoning, and it frustrated the public's right to be heard on rezoning. Id.
"In other words, the municipality's exercise of its police power to serve the common good
and general welfare of all its citizens 'may not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its
exercise controlled by the considerations which enter into the law of contracts."' Id. at 659
(quoting V.F.Zahodiakin Eng'g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J.
1952)). But see Murphy v. City of W. Memphis, 101 S.W.3d 221 (Ark.2003) (failing to
address the contract zoning issue where the settlement agreement involving rezoning was
not finalized until a council meeting was held, and all procedures for passage of an
ordinance, including notice to the public and opportunity to be heard, were followed); Toll
Bros., Inc. v. Township of W. Windsor, 756 A.2d 1056, 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000) (holding that consent orders and judgments are not necessarily a form of contract
zoning provided certain procedures are followed to ensure that the interests of low and
moderate income households are adequately protected); Livingston Builders, Inc. v.
Township of Livingston, 707 A.2d 186, 192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (approving a
settlement against a charge of illegal contract zoning where the order was expressly
conditioned on the city adopting an ordinance through established procedures).
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agreement, the municipality binds itself before satisfying the public notice
and hearing req~irements.~"This could not be allowed, for the carefully
structured provisions for public notice and public hearings, which in many
cases required consideration of staff or planning commission
recommendations, would be stripped of all meaning and purpose if the
decision-making body had previously bound itself to reach a specified

282

Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360.
See id. at 1359. In Chung, the landowner filed a petition with the county to
rezone eleven acres. Id. After the county commissioner denied the rezoning petition, the
landowner took legal action. Id. Subsequently, the landowner and the county entered into a
settlement agreement that obligated the county to rezone the landowner's property, subject
to numerous stipulations and conditions. Id. "Based on the settlement, the trial court
entered a stipulated final judgment and retained jurisdiction over its enforcement." Id. An
adjacent landowner intervened, and the trial court vacated the stipulated final judgment. Id.
On appeal, the adjacent landowner argued that the settlement amounted to contract zoning.
Id. In agreeing with the adjacent landowner, the court explained that "[c]ontract zoning
refers to an agreement between a property owner and a local government where the owner
agrees to certain conditions in return for the government's rezoning or enforceable promise
to rezone." Id. (citing James D. Lawlor, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of
Agreement to Rezone, or Amendment to Zoning Ordinance, Creating Special Restrictions
or Conditions Not Applicable to Other Property Similarly Zoned, 70 A.L.R.3d 125, 131
(1976)). The court explained that "[olne of the reasons contract zoning is generally rejected
is because 'the legislative power to enact and amend zoning regulations requires due
process, notice, and hearings."' Id. (quoting Teny Lewis et al., Spot Zoning, Contract
Zoning, & Conditional Zoning, in 2 FLORIDA
ENVIRONMENTAL
& LANDUSE LAW9-1,9-13
(James J. Brown ed., 2d ed., 1994)).

Assuming that the developer and municipality bargain for a rezoning
ordinance that is fairly debatable and non-discriminatory, contract
zoning is nevertheless illegal when they enter into a bilateral agreement
involving reciprocal obligations. By binding itself to enact the
requested ordinance (or not to amend the existing ordinance), the
municipality bypasses the hearing phase of the legislative process.
Id. at 1359-60 (citing Roy P. Cookston & Burt Bmton, Zoning Law,35 U . MIAMIL. REV.
581, 589 n.34 (1981)); see also P.C.B. P'ship v. City of Largo, 549 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
In Chung, it can be argued that the court did not prohibit settlement agreements per se,
but implied that the agreements may be upheld if the local government conforms to the due
process, notice and hearing requirements. Id. However, the Second and Fourth Districts of
Florida have come to mixed decisions when confronted with the issue of contract zoning in
the context of settlement agreements. Compare P.C.B. P'ship, 549 So. 2d at 741, with
Molina v. Tradewinds Dev. Corp., 526 So. 2d 695, 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In
(continued)
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The Maryland courts have taken a similar position on rezoning arising
out of settlement agreements, specifically against agreements whereby the
city agrees to rezone upon the landowner's agreement to conditions to be
imposed on the land.284
20041
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C. Agreements that Destroy the Uniformity that Is Required in Each
District
"The rezoning of a parcel of property by a municipality based in any
way upon an offer or agreement by an owner of property" is said to be
illegal to the extent that it "is inconsistent with, and disruptive of, a
comprehensive plan."285 One court stated: "If local government could
P.C.B. Partnership, the Second District ruled that contract zoning resulted from a
settlement of litigation, and the settlement agreement was unenforceable because it restricts
the city's decision-making responsibility and eliminates the city's ability to exercise its
police power. P.C.B. P'ship, 549 So. 2d at 741. Conversely, the Fourth District in Molina
upheld a rezoning settlement agreement and ordered the city to comply with the agreed
terms. Molina, 526 So. 2d at 696.
284
See, e.g., AttmanIGlazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 552 A.2d 1277 (Md.
1989). In Anman, a developer sought rezoning of two parcels that had been acquired and
assembled by the city for an urban renewal project. Id. at 1278. Originally, one parcel was
zoned neighborhood commercial and business use and the other for residential use. The
developer proposed the construction of a commercial office building. Id. The developer's
initial request was granted, and the aldermen amended the urban renewal plan to change the
designation of the two parcels to commercial use. Id. at 1279. "The resolution also
permitted the erection of a professional office building, on the condition that the owner of
the building provide 252 parking spaces, [which] could be located on-site or on other
property within 500 feet of the building." Id. By resolution, a conditional use for the
proposed building was approved. Id. Disagreements later developed regarding the number
of parking spaces to the point that the city denied the developer a use permit for the
building. See id. at 1279-80. The developer sued and the parties reached a settlement
agreement, although there was serious disagreement between the parties as to the terms of
their settlement. Id. at 1280-81. The court of appeals ruled that if, as the developer
contended, the agreement was intended to require the city council to grant an amended
conditional use on the conditions specified, the agreement was invalid. Id. at 1282. The
mayor and aldermen could not bind themselves acting in the capacity as zoning authority to
future zoning or conditional use decisions. Id. at 1282. The court did not reach a decision
as to whether the conditions agreed upon were themselves legally permissible, but noted
that the prohibitions against contracting away the exercise of zoning power applies whether
the conditions are valid or invalid. Id. at 1284.
285
Hale v. Osbom Coal Enters., Inc, 729 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)
(holding that there was invalid contract zoning where the landowner entered into an
agreement with the city whereby the city would annex the property and rezone additional
parcels in return for the landowner's promise to pay $.I5 per ton of coal mined in the town
(continued)
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change its zoning laws by private agreements with individual landowners,
a hodgepodge of regulations would develop, the legislative process would
Thus,
be usurped, and the public good would be
agreements that would result in the destruction of the uniformity required
by Euclidean zoning have been struck down as a form of contract
zoning.287 The Florida Supreme Court in Hartnett v. us tin^^^ took this
position. There, because landowner wanted to buy land and build a
shopping center, the landowner asked the city to rezone the land for
commercial use.289 The city refused to make the change unless the
landowner agreed to certain conditions, including building a wall,
maintaining a forty-foot setback, landscaping the setback, protecting
neighbors against glare and disturbance, and paying for additional police
protection.290 The action was held invalid, and the court stated that "[ilf
each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of variables that could
enter into private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of
community planning and zoning would collapse."291
limits); see also Willis v. Union County, 335 S.E.2d 76, 77 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985). In Willis,
the court held as follows:
To avoid contract zoning, all the areas in each class must be subject to
the same restrictions. If the rezoning is done in consideration of an
assurance that a particular tract or parcel will be developed in
accordance with a restricted plan, this is contract zoning and is illegal;
[evidence in this case showed] that at meetings regarding the rezoning
petition, defendants' attorney . . . referred to specific plans, including
drawings and rental rates for a proposed apartment building to be
constructed on the property. There is also evidence that [the attorney]
made representations at the various hearings to the effect that there
should be no concern about mobile homes on the property after
rezoning because the defendants were willing to put restrictions in the
deeds prohibiting mobile homes.
Id. at 77. But see Riverschase Homeowners Protective Ass'n., Inc. v. City of Hoover, 531
So. 2d 645 (Ala. 1988) (holding there was no contract zoning).
Pima Gro Sys., Inc. v. King George County Bd. of Supervisors, 52 Va. Cir. 241,
244 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) (finding that the county did not just agree to rezone, an act which of
itself is generally illegal as "contract zoning"; rather, the county actually agreed to allow an
activity that was prohibited to all others under the zoning ordinance, and this was beyond
the county's powers).
287
Atrrnan/Glazer P.B. Co., 552 A.2d at 1282-83.
93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
289
Id. at 87.
Id. at 89.
291
Id.

'"

'"
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Early on in Illinois, contracts between a city and a developer regarding
zoning were similarly condemned on this basis, among others.292 In
Cederberg v. City of RocL$ord, the city rezoned two lots from residential to
local business.293 In rezoning, the landowner was required to execute a
restrictive covenant, which was recorded as a condition to the passage of
the zoning committee's report recommending rezoning.*" The covenant
provided that notwithstanding the rezoning and business classification
(which by the city's ordinance, permitted forty-four types of local
businesses), twenty-six enumerated uses would not be allowed on the lots
in question.295 The parties agreed that the covenant was void because it
was a type of contract zoning.'% Thus, "[tlhe precise question left for
review [was] what effect, if any, the restrictive covenant bore upon the
validity of the ordinance rezoning the property from a residential to a local
business distri~t."'~' The court agreed with the trial judge and the parties
that the restrictive covenant was an invalid attempt by the city to control
the use of the land.298 Among the reasons emerging from the cases
establishing this rule against such zoning practices were the following:
20041

[Tlhat by entering into agreement with the property owner,
the zoning authority might use the zoning power to further
private interests in violation of public policy; that such
rezoning was a deviation from a basic zoning plan
resulting in non-uniform application of the zoning law and
inconsistencies within a zoning classification; that when
the actual zoning requirements in force are determined by
reference to evidence extrinsic to the zoning ordinance,
that zoning law is rendered vague.299

292

See, e.g., Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249, 251 (Ill. Ct. App.
1972). But see Goffinet v. County of Christian, 333 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)
(expressing acceptance of conditional zoning).
293
Cederberg, 291 N.E.2d at 250.
294
Id.
295
Id.
'" Id. at 251.
297
Id.
298
Id. (citing Houston Petroleum Co. v. Auto. Prod. C. Ass'n, 87 A.2d 319 (N.J.
1952); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Ha. 1956)).
299
Id. The zoning ordinance also failed in the absence of evidence that it was
necessary or that it was granted only after a consideration of the appropriate use of the land
within the total zoning scheme of the community. Id. at 252. The court struck down the
ordinance, stating that no evidence demonstrated that the city gave any consideration to the
statutory standards of public health, safety, comfort, morals, or welfare, and that the effect
(continued)
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However, imposing differing conditions on property in the same land
use category is not wholly arbitrary. Rezoning upon conditions or
promises limiting use recognizes that the particular characteristics of
particular parcels may differ sufficiently so that different uses make sense.
Some parcels that have particular uses may have greater or lesser impact
on surrounding properties. Also, use classifications may have occurred at
different times when the concerns of the municipality were different.300
Indeed, uniformity for that sake alone may be arbitrary and inconsistent
with good governance.

D. When the Municipality Is not a Party to the Agreement, Contract
Zoning Has not Been Found
When the zoning authority is not a party to an agreement between the
town and the developer, and the zoning authority acts to rezone in
accordance with the public hearing requirements, courts have not found
contract zoning, even when it appears that the zoning authority was
motivated to rezone by the agreement.301 Thus, under one court's
of the enactment taken together with the covenant was to create a classification not set forth
in the general zoning ordinance. Id.
300
See Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 160 A.2d 379, 382-83 (Md. 1960) Giger v.
City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Neb. 1989); Nicholson v. Tourtellotte, 293 A.2d
909,911 (R.I. 1972).
301
See, e.g., Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 239 A.2d 748, 757 (Md. 1968). In
Funger, the developer and the town entered into an agreement whereby the town would
recommend rezoning to the county council if the developer dedicated two acres to a scenic
and conservation easement, limited the development of sixteen acres for a period of twenty
years to the use currently permitted in the rezoned classification and to the density currently
permitted for eighteen acres, and gave the town twelve acres of the tract for park land. Id.
The area was rezoned by the county council following the hearing. Id. at 752. The
ordinance was held valid and not contract zoning. Id. at 757. Moreover, in State ex rel.
Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533,537,540 (Wis. 1970), neighboring landowners and
a developer had an agreement made enforceable by the city by injunction. Id. at 536. The
court held that such an agreement was valid where the agreement did not directly involve
the city, though a contract between the city and landowner to zone or rezone would be
illegal and the ordinance void. In City of Greenbelt v. Bresler, 236 A.2d 1 (Md. 1967), the
court held that an agreement between a landowner and a governmental body of an
organization not having formal zoning authority does not amount to contract zoning. Id. at
4. The city agreed to recommend rezoning in return for a developer's agreement to limit
development density of the land as rezoned and promise to donate several acres to the city
for use as a park. Id. at 2-3. When the developer later reneged, the court held that the
agreement was enforceable against owner. Id. at 6; see also Pressman v. City of Baltimore,
160 A.2d 379,386 @Id. 1960) (upholding rezoning ordinance where there was no evidence
that the city council was actually influenced in passing the ordinance by the existence of the
(continued)
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conception,
when a city itself makes an agreement with a landowner to
rezone the contract is invalid; this is contract zoning.
However, when the agreement is made by [persons other
than the municipal arm of government with ultimate
zoning authority] to conform the property in a way or
manner which makes it acceptable for the requested
rezoning and the [municipality] is not committed to
rezone, it is not contract zoning in the true sense and does
not vitiate the zoning if it is otherwise valid.302
If the concern is about the influence of a promise by the developer in
connection with a zoning request, that the party entering into the
agreement is not the ultimate zoning authority, but plays an important role
in the zoning process, should make little difference if the prohibitions
against contract zoning are to be consistently applied. Surely, a
recommendation by a planning board, even if based upon an agreement
with the landowner, will have significant influence on the legislative body
ultimately enacting the zoning ordinance. As such, the distinction may not
be a valid one.
E. Special Types of Zoning Resist Challenge as Contract Zoning
Special types of zoning may require pre-zoning contact, negotiations,
and bargains between the developer and the municipality toward the
adoption of a development plan, and such contacts and bargains may not
be regarded as contract zonin . In Rutland Environmental Protection
county rezoned the property from a
Association v. Kane County,"'the
farming district to a community unit district (CUD), allowing the
developer to build an amusement park.304 The adjoining landowners
agreement between the landowner and city planning commission, and there was no
authority in the state enabling act authorizing the planning commission to condition
approval as such); People's Counsel for Baltimore County v. Beachwood I Ltd. P'ship, 670
A.2d 484, 507 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (holding that a contract zoning charge was not
established absent evidence of a deal with the county council, the body with authority to
rezone, as opposed to the planning board); Ass'n to Protect Anderson Creek v. City of
Bremerton, No. 20878-4-11 1998, Wash. App. LEXIS 166, at *17 (Wash. App. Feb. 6,
1998) (finding no contract zoning existed when the city administrator agreed to apply and
agreed to support rezoning of property, but the city administrator did not have the power to
rezone, only the city council did).
302
State ex rel. Zupancic, 174 N.W.2d at 538.
303
334 N.E.2d 215 (111. App. Ct. 1975).
3W
Id. at 217. Under the ordinance,
(continued)

Heinonline - - 33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 439 2004-2005

440

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[33:383

complained that "the requirements under the CUD zoning classification
were changed from planned arrangements of residential uses and attendant
commercial and industrial uses to allow for the proposed park."305 The
court found that CUD "is a method of land use control designed to
supplement existing master plans and zoning ordinances."306 It does this
by permitting the combining of different land uses on the same tract.307It
"is intended to apply to specific property and [is] meant to facilitate the
development of an environmentally sound and functional unit."308 CUD
zoning enjoys the advantage of flexibility over traditional Euclidean
zoninb which divides communities into districts and rezones segregated
uses.3 Because negotiations are necessary so that the overall aims of
CUD zoning may be accomplished, and because the regulatory ordinance
mandates conferences, the defendants' conduct in meeting beforehand with
the developer did not contribute to contract zoning.310
Agreements in connection with floating zones, as well as the
community unit district in Rutland, a type of planned unit development
(PUD),~"have withstood the contract zoning ~harge.~"Their effect is
an applicant for CUD zoning must, at in informal conference, submit to
the plat officer a sketch plan describing existing conditions of the site
and of the proposed development. After the preapplication conference,
the plat committee reviews the proposal. Recommendations made by
the plat officer or committee during the initial review may be
incorporated into the development plan. After approval in the initial
proposal by the plat committee, a detailed development plan is prepared
which must include certain specified information, and this plan is then
reviewed by the plat officer and committee with approval contingent
upon the plan meeting specified criteria. Regulations require that a
developer's final plan contain approved provisions for such items as
streets, utility easements, water distribution, lighting and landscaping.
It is only after the plat committee has approved the development plan
that the applicant may first petition for CUD zoning.

Id. at 219.
30S
Id. at 217.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id.
309
Id. (citing Rudderow v. Township Comm. of the Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 297 A.2d 583
(N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972)).
310
Id.
311
"[Tlhe floating zone involves a predetermined set of criteria, established in the
zoning code, but not yet affixed to any specific property." Roy P. Cookson & Bart Bruton,
Zoning Law,35 U. MIAMIL. REV.581, 594 (1981). Before the zoning authority "'settle[s]
(continued)

"
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similar "in that the local government may require performance of certain
conditions and impose restrictions before approving the developer's plan,"
but uses are determined based on the particular circumstances of the
area.313Unlike most districts created [under the general] zoning ordinance,
a floating zone has no fixed location within the
It is usually
attached to a particular tract of land through rezoning of the land by
petition of the landowner.315 It may contain any use permitted in the
particular district by the specific ordinance creating it, or it may restrict
uses to be permitted on the tract based on a determination of conflicts with
adjoining existing or potential uses, when required for a greater degree of
control over the manner and development to protect the general welfare.316
A floating zone, therefore, is, by definition, conditional317and rezoning to a
floating zone cannot, by its very nature, be bound upon precise and
inflexible standards for each plot of ground because each plot of ground is
different and the environment in which it lies is different.318 "So long as
the floating zone on a particular tract, the developer must comply with the conditions,
density, setback, height, and other specified requirements." Id. A minimum size for the
proposed zone may be required, and conditions of the Euclidean zoning type are usually
imposed by the ordinance. Id. A PUD is similar to a floating zone. Id. It is a district in
which a planned mix of residential, commercial, and even industrial uses is sanctioned
subject to restrictions calculated to achieve compatible and efficient use of land. Id. The
ordinance authorizing the PUD will usually define the rights and objectives only in general
terms, leaving the specifics to the development by the developer. Id.; see also MANDELKER,
supra note 19, $5 6.60,6.61,9.01,9.24.
312
See Cookson & Bruton, supra note 31 1, at 593-94.
313
. Id. at 593; see also Wegner, supra note 40, at 983-85.
314
Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706,710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
31S
Id.
316
Id.at711.
317
In Treme, the court rejected the claim that a floating zone was an instance of
contract zoning, finding that municipalities need a certain degree of "flexibility in
determining whether particular types of uses should be allowed within the environs of an
area zoned for some other use where the newly allowed use can be made compatible with
the existing uses." Id. at 712. The commercial district here satisfied these requirements.
Id.
318
See id. In Treme,
there [were] certain mandatory requirements for uses within the new
zone which the Council [was] not free to expand. The regulations
limit[ed] the uses, established minimum performance standards and
sign regulations. The council [could] impose greater restrictions and
[was] required to prescribe height restrictions, lot area and yard
requirements, and off-street parking and loading requirements.
(continued)
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the legislative [decision] is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,
landowners . . . have no cause to object because the determination made
under the general standards of the ordinance produce different results on
different tracts of land.7,319
In Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Mayor of Jackson,320 a
developer filed a zoning application requesting the city to rezone
approximately 21 acres out of a 150-acre parcel of land from a singlefamily residential and general commercial classification to a restricted
Plaintiffs opposed
commercial and limited commercial clas~ification.~~'
this rezoning application, and the developer withdrew the application, but
~ ~ Planning
then refiled seeking to develop the same area as a P u D . ~The
Board approved the proposed PUD and recommended that the Jackson
City Council approve the application so long as a housing component was
added.323 Following the required notifications, the Planning Board

Plaintiffs [had no right to] complain that the Council [might] exercise
its legislative judgment to impose more stringent requirements [on a
commercial district] than it [did] in another.
Id. The court further found "no objection to the fact that the ordinance [did] not spell out in
detail the standards upon which a determination to rezone to [commercial] is to be made.
The section [did] provide for general standards which [were] to be considered by the
legislative body." Id.
319
Id. at 713. Though the ordinance did authorize spot zoning, it was not invalid on
that ground. Id. The court pointed out that any zoning ordinance that allows for
amendment allows spot zoning. Id. Spot zoning may be invalid or valid. Id.
If it is an arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of the small area to a use
inconsistent with the uses to which the rest of the district is restricted
and made for the sole benefit of the private interests of the owner, it is
invalid. On the other hand, if the zoning of the small parcel is in accord
and in harmony with the comprehensive plan and is done for the public
good-that is, to serve one or more of the purposes of the enabling
statute, and so bears a substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare, it is valid.
Id. Nor was the zoning otherwise unconstitutional because of ample evidence of
reasonableness, it served the general welfare, did not adversely affect the public roads and
the value of nearby property, and did not deviate from the comprehensive plan. Id. at 71315.
320
749 So. 2d 54 (Miss. 1999).
321
Id. at 56.
322
Id.
323
Id.
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considered the developer's application, but failed to reach a consensus.324
The developer then filed an amendment increasing the size of the proposed
PUD from twenty-one to fifty acres.325The Site Plan Review Committee
approved the proposed PUD, but the developer was obligated to meet
twenty-three req~irernents.~'~ After a hearing, the city council
unanimously approved the application, contingent upon those
requirements.327 These included the following: a pedestrian circulation
plan; that the revised site plan comply with all requirements of the PUD
district provision of the zoning ordinance; that the functional aspects of the
project did not negatively impact surrounding land uses of the area's
infrastructure capacity; that the covenants previously submitted by the
developer be incorporated as much as possible into the final covenants; and
that the final covenants be approved by the city council. 328 Plaintiffs
challenged the rezoning on the ground inter alia that it amounted to
contract zoning, which was
The court pointed out that
[almple statutory authority exist[ed] in the form of
traditional zoning legislation that [could] be construed to
support this novel regulatory device. The key question
was whether such authority should be narrowly or broadly
construed. Many states have traditionally opted for
narrow construction of enabling legislation to ensure
against unwarranted action by local governments, but the
present trend is toward a more expansive view of local
government powers and a more generous interpretive
view.330

324

Id.
Id.
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Id. at 56-57.
329
Id. at 57.
330
Id. at 58. The court chose to rely on the decision from the New Mexico Supreme
Court, Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 796 (N.M. 1992), for the proposition that
"contract zoning was only illegal in cases in which a municipality committed itself to
rezone property in such a manner as to circumvent the notice and hearing process or to
compromise the rights of affected persons." Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n, 749 So.
2d at 58. The court noted that Dacy raised serious doubt as to whether the agreement in the
present case constituted contract zoning at all. Id. The court then quoted the Dacy court,
stating that "[c]onditional zoning is not contract zoning at all, because it does not involve a
promise by either party. Rather, conditional zoning describes the situation in which a
(continued)
325
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Under the more generous interpretive view, it is "[tlhe absence of an
enforceable promise by either party [that] distinguishes conditional zoning
from contract zoning."331 Here, the conditions set forth by the site plan
committee and adopted by the city council were the sort of conditions
inherent to any PUD, fully consistent with the goals and purposes of the
PUD land planning device.332 Given the nature of a planned unit
development, a district containing "a planned mix of residential,
commercial, and even industrial uses is sanctioned subject to restrictions
calculated to achieve compatible and efficient use of land."333 In sum, far
from constituting a "contracting away" of the city's police power, the
contingent zoning/PUD constituted an effective tool for the development
of the property in a manner that satisfied the concerns of the residents
living closest to the property.334
In Campion v. Board of Alderman of New ~ a v e nthe
, ~court
~ ~ upheld
conditions imposed on approval of a Planned Development District
because they created a new zone, such that uniformity of regulations was
not at issue.336

IV. CONTRACT
ZONINGCOMPARED
TO CONDITIONAL
ZONING
In contrast to contract zoning, which usually requires the showing of a
bilateral contract, conditional zoning is analogous to a unilateral contract.
The local government does not promise to rezone, but, either voluntarily or
through negotiation, the developer agrees to conditions that are otherwise
not required in the proposed zone.337 This type of zoning does not
represent the same relinquishment of police power authority as contract
zoning because the agreement occurs as part of a regulation that flows
from comments made during the hearing process. Here, the deal is not
complete until after the municipality has heard concerns both of
landowners seeking to rezone and of the neighbors, and until the
municipality has tried to arrive at a workable compromise. In addition, the
deal is transparent in that the conditions that form the agreement are
municipality rezones on condition that a landowner perform a certain act prior to,
simultaneously with, or after the rezoning." Id.
331
Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n, 749 So. 2d at 58 (quoting Dacy, 845 P.2d
at 796).
332
Id. at 59.
333
Id.
3"
Id. at 63.
33s
NO. CV020462505S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 874 (Corn. Super. Ct. Mar. 21,
2003).
336
Id. at *19-20.
337
See Wilrnington Sixth Dist. Cmty. Comrn. v. Pettinaro Enter., No. 8668, 1988
Del. Ch. LEXIS 142, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1988).
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explicitly set forth in the zoning amendment so that every one who
subsequently reviews the zoning amendment will have a clear and accurate
understanding of the uses to which the land can be put and the reasons the
municipality decided to allow those uses. The conditions can be made a
part of the zoning text or can be evidenced by the recording of an
enforceable covenant binding the developer and his assignees to the
negotiated condition.338
The unilateralhilateral distinction has often been overlooked by the
courts, and much of the confusion in the cases can be attributed to the
failure of courts to properly define the two concepts.339
[Clonditional zoning properly understood involves only an
adopted zoning ordinance which provides either: (1) The
rezoning becomes effective immediately with an
automatic repealer if specified conditions are not met
within a set time limit, or (2) the zoning becomes effective
only upon the conditions being met within the time
See id. at *lo. The court noted that "some courts had found contract zoning
unenforceable per se, while other[s] have enforced contract zoning if reasonable, nondiscriminatory and serving the public welfare." Id. at *8. Other courts have recognized a
slight difference between contract zoning and conditional zoning, prohibiting the former
and permitting the latter. Id. at *8-9 (citing 6 POWELLON REALPROPERTY5 871.4 (1988);
State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 1970); Church v. Town of Islip,
168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960); 2 ROBERTM. ANDERSON,AMERICANLAWOF ZONING3d 8
9.20 (3d ed. 1986)); see also Haas v. City of Mobile, 265 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1972). In Haas,
an ordinance rezoning an area provided that
no lot or parcel of land hereinabove described shall be used for any use
allowed in [the rezoned district] until all the conditions set forth below
have been complied with: subject to a reservation of the right of way
for [a parkway] and a second means of ingress and egress to the
proposed [parkway] be provided.
Hans, 265 So. 2d at 566. A challenge to the rezoning was made on the basis that such a
collateral agreement or deed to be executed between the city and he property owner
constituted contract zoning. Id. The challenge was rejected because, as the court pointed
out, zoning based upon an offer or agreement would be invalid, but it "is well-established
that a zoning ordinance may place upon a property owner reasonable restrictions and
requirements in the use of the zoned property and this court has expressly approved such
restrictions and requirements." Id.
339
See City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Tenn. 1953)
(treating a unilateral promise by a developer without a reciprocal promise by the city as if it
were a clear unequivocal bilateral contract controlling the discretion of the local
government, making rezoning invalid per se).
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The early attitude of the courts was to ignore this distinction and
declare both contract and conditional zoning to be invalid per se.341 The
reasons conditional rezoning did not fare well are myriad, including that
despite the apparent unilateral structure, conditional rezoning introduced
an element of contract-the imposition of conditions on the land subject to
rezoning being a quid pro quo for rezoning, although no express contract
with the zoning authorities could be proven, given the close connection
between the recording of restrictions at or soon after the rezoning.
Conditional rezoning was also struck down because it constituted an abrupt
departure from the comprehensive plan contemplated in zoning.342
Other faults assigned by courts in their disapproval of
conditional rezoning are that the zoning authority might
use the zoning power to further private interests in
violation of public policy, that the zoning authority might
improperly try to control the use of the land . . . and that it
furnishe[d] an avenue for corruption of
Others viewed the rezoning of a particular parcel of land, upon conditions
not imposed by the zoning ordinance, as prima facie evidence of "spot
zoning"344 where it singles out one parcel for non-uniform and noncomprehensive treatment in its most maleficent aspect, as not in
accordance with a comprehensive plan and as beyond the power of the
municipality.345This view is premised on the notion that legislative bodies
State ex rel. Zupancic, 174 N.W.2d at 538.
See Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249, 251-52 (Ill. Ct. App. 1972);
Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791, 795-96 (111. Ct. App. 1969). But see Goffinet
v. County of Christian, 333 N.E. 2d 731, 736 (111. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that conditional
zoning may be upheld in some instances). In GofSinet, the proposed use was a plant to
manufacture synthetic natural gas that would serve an area where a fuel shortage existed.
Id. at 732. Such use would fill a genuine public need and would unquestionably serve the
public health, safety, and welfare. Id. at 736.
Treadway v. City of Rockford, 192 N.E.2d 351,356 (Ill. 1963).
343
Gofinet, 333 N.E.2d at 736.
See supra note 114 for a discussion of spot zoning.
345
Ziegler, supra note 45, 041.4; see also Blades v. City of Raleigh, 187 S.E.2d 35,
45 (N.C. 1972); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432,44041 (N.C. 1971); Appeal of
Cleaver, 24 Pa. D & C 2d 483, 492 (1961) (holding that rezoning upon limitations on the
use of the rezoned land is invalid because it resulted in the devotion of a comparatively
small area to a use inconsistent with the uses to which surrounding property was used and
was made for the sole benefit of the private interests of the landowner); Oury v. Greany,
267 A.2d 700,702 (R.I. 1970) (finding invalid rezoning upon the condition that the rezoned
(continued)
341

"'

"
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must rezone in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and Euclidean
zoning requires that in amending the ordinance to confer upon a particular
parcel a district designation, it may not curtail or limit the uses and
structures placed or to be placed upon the rezoned lands differently from
those permitted upon other lands in the same district. Consequently,
"where there has been a concatinated [sic] rezoning and filing of a
declaration of restrictions, the early view . . . was that both the zoning
amendment and the restrictive covenant were invalid.,7346
The early Maryland court decisions showed a disfavor of conditional
zoning, equal to that with contract zoning, although not clearly

property be used exclusively for a particular business use because it was not consistent with
the comprehensive plan, but instead was an accommodation to the landowner, made
without regard for the public health, safety, and welfare).
346
State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Wis. 1970) (citing 3
RATHKOPF,supra note 345, at 74-9); see also Templeton v. County Council of Prince
George's County, 321 A.2d 778 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). The court addressed the
contention that "conditional zoning might have been utilized in this case . . . in the sense
that the District Council might have considered a grant of the requested reclassification,
subject to a reversion to residential use on the discontinuation of the roofing business by the
appellant." Id. at 783. The court held that even if it were, it was quite apparent that the
appellant "proceeded upon a distorted construction of conditional zoning generally and as
contained in Chapter 471, Laws of 1968." Id.
The latter provides that the District Council for Prince George's County
in approving any local map amendment, may give consideration to and
"adopt such reasonable requirements, safeguards and conditions, as
may in its opinion be necessary either to protect surrounding properties
. . . or which would further enhance the coordinated harmonious and
systematic development of the Regional District."
Id.

The novel suggestion that a zoning reclassification to commercial might
be made by the District Council subject to a reversion to residential
obviously is not supported by this statutory authority for conditional
zoning, nor by general law. Conditional zoning is a device employed to
bring some flexibility to an otherwise rigid system of control. The
conditions generally imposed are those designed to protect adjacent
land from the loss of use value which might occur if the newly
authorized use were permitted without restraint of any kind. Reversion
of the reclassification to residential use when, and if, appellant should
discontinue her roofing business is patently no such restraint.
Id. (citation omitted).

Heinonline - - 3 3 Cap. U. L. Rev. 4 4 7 2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5

448

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[33:383

distinguishing the two. In Rodriguez v. Prince George's ~ o u n t ~ , 3the
~'
court pointed out that the "early view of most courts was that conditional
(or, as it is sometimes called, 'contract') zoning was unlawful per se."348
The three reasons for this are
that rezoning based on offers or agreements with the
owners disrupts the basic plan, and thus is subversive of
public policy reflected in the overall legislation, that the
resulting 'bcontract" is nugatory because a municipality is
not able to make agreements which inhibit its police
powers, and that restrictions in a particular zone should
not be left to extrinsic evidence.349
Recently, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Mayor of Rockville v.
Rylyns ~ n t e r ~ r i s e s ;struck
~~
down a zoning ordinance passed in
connection with an annexation agreement as an instance of impermissible
conditional zoning.351While the court held that not all conditional zoning

"'

558 A.2d 742 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
Id. at 749.
349
Id. at 749 (quoting Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429, 433 (Md. 1959)).
"[Clovenants coupled with the site plan attached, if adopted as a basis for the requested
reclassification, [would produce] a form of conditional zoning." Id. at 750 (quoting
Montgomery County v. Nat'l Capital Realty Corp., 297 A.2d 675, 680 (Md. 1972)). So
too, an amendment to the basic plan, where the applicant "was offering a deal to the District
Council: in order to induce the Council to approve its application for reclassification, the
applicant [agreeing] in advance to exclude from the scope of the approval certain uses
expressly permitted in the approved zone," is a form of conditional zoning and invalid. Id.;
see also ,Montgomery County, 297A.2d at 680 (finding invalid rezoning conditioned upon a
landowner's offer to subject land to restrictions on use, as impermissible conditional
zoning); Carole Highlands Citizens Ass'n v. Bd. of County Comrn'rs., 158 A.2d 663, 66566 (Md. 1960) (finding invalid rezoning of land from single family residential purposes to
commercial, subject to an agreement by the landowner limiting the use of the land, whether
or not a binding contract was involved, where the rezoning created a novel classification
not authorized by the general plan).
350
814 A.2d 469 (Md. 2002).
351
Id. at 503. There, the owners of certain property located in the county, abutting
the city, petitioned the city for annexation of the property into the city. Id. at 473. At the
time of the petition, the property was zoned 1-2 (Heavy Industrial), and this was the zone
recommended and adopted in the county's master plan. Id. The petition requested a
rezoning to 1-1 (Service Industrial), "consistent with the zoning in adjacent properties
located within the City's boundaries." Id. On the property, the owners intended to erect
and operate a gasoline service station. Id. However, the "1-2 zone did not allow gasoline
service stations under any circumstances." Id. Following the public hearing before the
(continued)
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was invalid,JS2zoning that conditions the rezoning on the landowner's
agreement not to use the land in ways otherwise permitted by the existing
zoning is impermissible because the language of the enabling legislation
was intended to allow local governments "to fashion supplementary
conditions in the placement of a given property in a Euclidean zone, not in
derogation of the uses allowed in that zone."353 This meant that only
conditions relating to the design of buildings, construction, landscaping, or
other improvements, and alterations, but not those relating to otherwise
permissible uses, may be subject to conditions in zoning.354 Otherwise,
such conditions on uses would violate the requirement of uniformity within
classes or development in a
The court explained that the reason
such a narrow reading of the statute was called for related to the Euclidean
zoning concept.356 Conditional zoning, resulting in a limitation of
otherwise permissible uses, would violate the mandated uniformity
req~irernent.~" The foreclosing, by limitations pertaining only to the
subject property, of all of the otherwise permitted commercial uses, other
than the one expressly permitted in the rezoning ordinance (in this case,
county planning board and consideration by the city council, the city council adopted a
resolution disapproving the request for rezoning, citing concerns about the appropriateness
of the use. Id. at 474. Several months later, the city council was asked to reexamine the
rezoning request. Id. The city council concluded that it would support the rezoning from I2 to 1-1, "provided the city restrict the retail use of the site." Id. The city council resolved
to rezone the property on the condition that the "city prohibits the retail use of the site,
except for a gasoline service station." Id. At the time, the "1-1 zone allow[ed]
approximately 100 permitted uses and 18 additional uses with the grant of a special
exception." Id. at 474 n.1. Commercial retail uses, including antique shops, garden
supplies, paint and wallpaper, photographic supply, and pet grooming activities were
included in these enumerations. Id. Rylyns challenged the annexation and rezoning on the
grounds that it constituted improper conditional and spot zoning. Id. at 475. Rylyns also
challenged the rezoning on the ground that the annexation statute prohibits an annexing
authority for five years from rezoning annexed property to uses different from that applying
in the pre-annexation jurisdiction without the express approval of the county planning
authorities of the pre-annexation jurisdiction. Id. The court agreed with Rylyns, finding
that such a construction of the annexation was necessary to preserve the integrity of the
master plan adopted by the jurisdiction having planning authority immediately prior to
annexation. Id. at 492.
352
Id. at 500.
353
Id. at 501.
3"
Id. at 502 (citing Bd. of County Comm'rs v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 501 A.2d 489,
492 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)).
355
Id.
356
Id. at 503 n.29.
' Id. at 502.
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operating a gasoline service station) allowed by special exception in the 1-1
zone, amounted to impermissible conditional zoning.358 The result of the
agreement to limit permissible uses was "a distinct mini-district that
undermined uniformity.9,359
In a highly critical dissent, one justice argued that the majority misread
the statute authorizing conditional zoning when it found that the only
conditional zoning authorized b the statute were those that did not relate
to uses of the subject property.3 2 The dissent stated that it was difficult to
perceive how limiting a use, so long as the uses to which the property is
limited are uses otherwise permitted in the district, affects the uniformity
~'
all the prior cases on conditional zoning involved
of a d i s t r i ~ t . ~Indeed,
instances in which the conditions related to use limitations.362Those cases
prompted the legislature to adopt enabling legislation allowing for
conditional zoning.363 In addition, the legislative history contained clear
indication that it was intended to provide municipalities with flexibility in
achieving desirable means of minimizing the adverse effects of zoning
change, while at the same time avoiding the constitutional pitfalls of
contract zoning, permitting orderly development using controls similar to
those in subdivision regulations.364
The dissent's points are well-taken. The majority placed undue
importance on uniformity for uniformity's sake. Considering the theory of
Euclidean zoning is to protect landowners from the externalities of
neighboring land uses, uniformity should refer to the outer limits of uses
while not requiring all uses that are permitted. One could argue that such
limitations serve this purpose where uses are limited within a zone by
conditional rezoning.
Some courts have considered arguments that conditional zoning was
ultra vires as no such authority could be found under the state zoning

Id. at 503.
Id. at 504 (quoting Carole Highlands Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 158 A.2d 663, 664-66 (Md. 1960)). The court also found impermissible contract
zoning when, as part of the annexation agreement, the municipality agreed to rezone in a
certain way. Id. at 505. The court cautioned, though, that its holding should not preclude
annexation agreements normally involving certain executory accords, for which the parties
have bargained, governing the anticipated annexation, including the zoning to be assigned,
so long as the agreements relative to the anticipatory zoning action do not violate other
legal requirements, such as the prohibition on conditional zoning. Id. at 507 n.34.
360
Id. at 5 1 1 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
36L
Id.
362
Id.
363
Id.
364
Id. at 520-21.
3'8
3'9
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Other courts have rejected the ultra vires argument,
enabling
finding implied authority to rezone with conditions on the basis that the
procedure was within the spirit of the enabling
because silence of an
enabling act on the question of conditional zoning does not necessarily
imply a legislative decision to prohibit it.367
The modem trend is in favor of upholding conditional zoning.368
Generally, such conditions will be upheld when they are imposed pursuant
to the police power for the protection or benefit of neighbors to ameliorate
the effects of the zoning change. Yet, the confusion in the cases continues.
Many cases presenting the issue of conditional zoning have been
characterized by their challengers as involving contract zoning and struck
down on that basis.369 Other courts make an effort to distinguish the two,
365

See, e.g., Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694 (Del. Ch. 1983) (holding that the
city bargained away part of its zoning power by enacting a new ordinance to benefit a
private citizen even though in furtherance of a compromise to avoid threat of suit);
Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (confusing the
bargaining away argument with the ultra vires argument, concluding that since the bargain
was primarily for private benefit, it was not an act on behalf of the general welfare and
therefore ultra vires).
366
See, e.g., Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960) (rejecting the
ultra vires argument, finding implied authority to rezone with conditions as within the spirit
of the enabling act).
367
See, e.g., Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Mass. 1962);
Palisades Props., Inc. v. Brunetti, 207 A.2d 522 (N.J. 1965); Collard v. Inc. Village of
Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981).
368
See Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Mayor of Jackson, 749 So. 2d 54,
59-60 (Miss. 1999) (stating that "contingency zoning [is] an effective tool for the
development of the . . . property in a manner which satisfied the concerns of the residents
living closest to the property"); Chrismon v. Guilford County, 370 S.E.2d 579, 596 (N.C.
1988) (approving the practice as long as the local zoning authority acted reasonably and in
the public interest); Konkel v. Common Council, 229 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Wis. 1975)
(upholding a rezoning ordinance designed to take effect upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions and for the reversion of the prior zoning status if the conditions were not
satisfied).
369
See, e.g., Baker v. Chartiers Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 677 A.2d 1274, 1279
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (holding contract zoning "is a form of unlawful spot zoning where
rezoning is permitted based on regulations and conditions devised by agreement between
the municipality and the landowner"); Knight v. Lynn Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 568
A.2d 1372, 1376 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1990) (same); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d
429, 431, 433 (Md. 1959) (holding rezoning invalid as inhibiting the municipality's
exercise of police power where the rezoning was made conditional upon the execution of an
agreement between landowner and city, set out in the ordinance in the form for recording as
(continued)
I
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upholding rezonings involving only the imposition of condition^.^'^
Decisions from Connecticut courts have responded by reference to
a covenant running with the land, providing that in consideration for rezoning, the owner
would use property only as funeral home, provide adequate facilities for ingress and egress,
and off-street parking, and not object to or oppose the reversion of the property to the
former zoning if its use as funeral home ceased); Rodriguez v. Prince George's County, 558
A.2d 742, 750 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (finding zoning invalid, citing disruptions of
uniformity and the weakening of police powers when a developer agreed not to use the
property in certain ways that would otherwise have been permitted in the zone, and finding
no practical difference between the proposed agreement to omit certain uses in exchange
for approval and any other conditional zoning). In King's Mill Homeowners Ass'n v. City
of Westminster, 557 P.2d 1186 (Colo. 1976), the court responded to a challenge of contract
zoning, largely with a discussion of conditional zoning, finding no contract zoning in the
case. Id. at 1191. The court held that rezoning contingent upon the landowner's fulfillment
of certain conditions does not amount to contract zoning. Id. Cram v. Town of Geneva,
593 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), is an example of a case confusing contract
zoning with conditional zoning, although upholding the rezoning. There, the town enacted
an ordinance to rezone a certain property from residential to business. Id. at 652. In
enacting the ordinance, the town board imposed certain conditions limiting the use of the
property. Id. The residents argued that the ordinance was invalid contract zoning and that
the town failed to take a hard look at the environmental impact of the proposed change as
required by the state environmental law. Id. at 653. The trial court dismissed the action,
and the residents appealed. Id. at 652. The court held that, "[iln appropriate circumstances,
a change in zoning may be subject to reasonable conditions and restrictions related to and
incidental to the use of the property and designed to minimize any adverse impact in the
surrounding area." Id. at 652 (citing St. Onge v. Donovan, 522 N.E.2d 1019, 1022-23
(N.Y. 1988); Dexter v. Town Bd. of Gates, 324 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1975)). The conditions
and restrictions imposed by the ordinance "were related to the use of the property, were
reasonably calculated to minimize any adverse impact on the surrounding residential area
and provide no basis to annul the determination of the Town Board." Id. Accordingly, the
court rejected petitioners' contentions that the enactment of the ordinance was unlawful
contract zoning and was contrary to the town law. Id.
370
See, e.g., Kerik v. Davidson County, 551 S.E.2d 186 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding that only unilateral promises made by the landowner and none made by the zoning
authority meant conditional zoning, not contract zoning); Cross v. Hall County, 235 S.E.2d
379 (Ga. 1977). The Cross court distinguished conditional zoning from contract zoning.
Id. at 382. Here, rezoning conditioned on road improvements was conditional zoning rather
than contract zoning. Id. at 383. At the hearing before the commissioners on the rezoning
application, several neighboring landowners who opposed the rezoning mentioned that the
road leading to the quarry needed paving. Id. The president of the zoning applicant offered
to resurface the road. Id. The rezoning application was approved provided that the zoning
applicant would agree to resurface the road. Id. The paving condition was an attempt by
the board to ameliorate the effects of the zoning change. Id. at 383.
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contract zoning only when conditions are involved. Such courts have
characterized zoning plans imposing conditions as illegal contract zoning
and otherwise found zoning ordinances made with conditions on the
landowner to be invalid. In Bartsch v. Planning & Zoning Commission of
rum bull^^' an attempt by the planning and zoning commission to attach
conditions running with the land that restrict the use of a particular parcel
to a medical office building was held to be an attempt at contract zoning
violating the uniformity provision of the statute because the restriction did
not apply to other properties within the zoning
Relying on Bartsch, in Kaufman v. City of Danbury Zoning
~ o r n m i s s i o n the
, ~ ~court
~
addressed both contract zoning and conditional
zoning, holding that Connecticut did not recognize either.374 There, the
landowner applied for authority to build affordable housing and in that
connection, requested a rezoning change to permit more than one lot per
acre in the area.375 The application was denied.376 Among other
objections, the city claimed that the landowner's application did not
contain a system to guarantee that the affordable housing would in fact be
developed and remain restricted for that purpose, and that it was without
power to devise a system of guarantee on its own initiative because
Connecticut law did not recognize conditional or contract zoning.377 The
court recognized the general prohibition against such zoning on the basis
that it operates to destroy the uniformity requirement for each districtresulting in improper discrimination among owners.378 However, the court
also recognized an important exception to the general prohibitions where
the specific conditions on a rezoning imposed are reasonable and are for
the general community benefit, rather than for the benefit of a single
landowner.379 The court found that "[tlhe conditions that would be
appropriate to supply assurance that the development proposed would in
fact be constructed with the statutory housing com onent could easily
fulfill both prongs of the test if designed properly.'"g Thus, despite the
371
372
373

506 A.2d 1093 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
Id. at 1096.
NO. CV9 0507929 S, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2039 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13,

1993).
Id. at *13.
375
Id. at * l .
376
Id.
377
Id. at *3.
378
Id. at *13-14.
379
Id. at *14-15.
380
Id. at *15. As to reasonableness, the court noted the Connecticut statute on
inclusionary zoning, which authorizes municipalities to adopt zoning regulations to
encourage the development of affordable housing and to impose conditions toward this end,
374

(continued)
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statement by the court that Connecticut did not recognize conditional
zoning, the holding in this case seems to establish the opposite proposition.
Indeed, the bases for the exception seem to be the only circumstances in
which conditional zoning should be upheld.
However, the Florida Supreme Court in Hartnett v. h us tin^^' took a
more categorical attitude on agreements made in connection with a
rezoning by treating a rezoning on conditions as an instance of contract
zoning.382 There, the municipality agreed to rezone l k d to permit the
development of a shopping center upon certain conditions. In finding the
ordinance invalid, the court ruled that the city had no authority to enter into
a private contract with the landowner.383
An Illinois court, in Cederberg v. City of ~ o c ~ o r dfollowed
, ~ ' ~ the
reasoning in the Florida case.385 In that case, the court held invalid the
rezoning of certain lots from residential to local business coincidentally
conditioned upon the execution of a restrictive covenant providing that the
property only be used for offices, finding such agreement to be a form of
contract zoning, making the agreement void.386 The effect of the ordinance
"was to create a classification not set forth in the general zoning
ordinances."387 Similarly, in Andres v. Village of loss moor,^^^ the court
struck down an ordinance rezoning land upon the landowner's fulfillment
of certain conditions, finding the ordinance to have resulted from a deal,
id., as well as authority under other statutes permitting density bonuses for the creation of
affordable housing and the creation of a Community Development Agency, and also
providing authority for imposing conditions to assure the objectives were met, id. at *22.
On the second prong, the court found that such a condition would not only promote benefit
in the community, but the region, indeed, the entire state. Id.
38'
93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
382
Id. at 89.
383
Id. at 87-88.
384
291 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
385
See id. at 250,252.
386
Id. at 251-52.
387
Id. at 252.
388
304 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). In Andres, the city enacted an ordinance
rezoning land based on special ad hoc restrictions and limitations that were not imposed on
other land in the same district. Id. at 701-03. The restrictions included limitations on the
use of a single story attached two-family dwelling, whereas multiple family dwellings were
generally permitted. Id. The restrictions also required construction according to the
building designs and representations made in their owner-developer's promotional
brochure, fencing, screening and general landscaping subject to future approval by the
village, payment of $18,000 to the village for general village purposes. Id. The restrictions
further provided that any violation of the conditions would result in automatic revocation of
the zoning granted. Id.
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which introduced an element of contract.389 Andres relied on a previous
decision from the Illinois Supreme Court, Treadway v. City of ~ o c k f o r d , ~ ~ ~
for the reasons why, "absent general statutory authorization and standards,
the making of individualized zoning deals by local municipalities, apart
from the provisions they are willing to ado t as general zoning regulations,
is an invalid abuse of the zoning power." $1 That is, even when a zoning
ordinance is reasonable and not arbitrary and bears a reasonable
relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare, it is yet invalid if
subject to bargaining or contract.392In Andres, the court explained that
[i]n accepting . . . donations and entering into or approving
these agreements the trustees of the Village undoubtedly
did what they believed was best for the whole community,
but it places them in the questionable position of bartering
their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no
bearing on the merits of the requested amendment.393
The Andres court also expressed the concerns articulated in a Florida
Supreme Court decision, Hartnett v. ust tin,^^^ that
[i]f each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of
variables that could enter into private contracts then the
whole scheme and objective of community planning and
zoning would collapse. The zoning classifications of each
parcel would then be bottomed on individual agreements
and private arrangements that would totally destroy
uniformity.395

If the city could legislate by contract, "each citizen would be governed by
an individual rule based upon the best deal he could make with the

389

Id. at 703; see also Shibata v. City of Napewille, 273 N.E.2d 690, 693 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1971) (invalidating as contract zoning an ordinance made on the condition that the
landowner execute and file a declaration of restrictions as to the use of the property).
3"
192 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. 1963).
39'
Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 703 (citing Allred v. City of Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432,44041 (N.C. 1971); Oury v. Greany, 267 A.2d 700, 702 (R.I. 1970); Baylis v. City of
Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429, 433 (Md. 1959); City of Knoxville v. Arnbrister, 263 S.W.2d
528,531 (Tenn. 1953); Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384,388 (Miss. 1966)).
392
Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791,795-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
393
Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 703 (quoting Hedrich, 250 N.E.2d at 796).
3"
93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
395
Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 704 (quoting Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89).
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Further, Andres relied on Baylis v. City of
governing body.,9396
~ a l t i r n o r e , ~which
~'
held that special conditions imposed on rezoning
amendments are invalid for the chief reasons that
rezoning based on offers or agreements with owners
disrupts the basic plan, and thus is subversive of the public
policy reflected in the overall legislation, that the resulting
"contract" is nugatory because a municipality is not able to
make agreements which inhibit its police powers, and that
restrictions in a articular zone should not be left to
extrinsic evidence.R s

In Andres, the court ruled that the rezoning ordinance, which conditioned
its effectiveness on subsequent execution by the village and the owner of a
contract containing all the ad hoc limitations and requirements of the
ordinance, also exhibited an inherent defect that invalidated the
ordinance.399 In sum, the ordinance was "the very model of invalid
conditional zoning, falling squarely within the general policy
considerations that strongly support the Treadway rule invalidating such ad
hoc conditional rezoning amendments.,m
The zoning ordinances in the Florida and Illinois cases, if the
definition of contract zoning was faithfully applied, would not be struck
down on that basis since they did not involve bilateral agreements. This
may point out that the attempted distinction between contract zoning and
conditional zoning based on the existence of a bilateral as opposed to a
unilateral agreement may be too simplistic and yield unpredictable results
from the courts. Instead, courts would do well to eliminate the false
distinction and consider the substantive effects of the municipality's
Id.
148 A.2d 429 (Md. 1959).
398
Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 704 (quoting Baylis, 148 A.2d at 433).
399
Id. at 706. The court agreed with the trial court that the restrictive covenant was
an invalid attempt by the city to control the use of the land. Id. at 705. The ad hoc
restrictions were not and could not purport to be based on any conceivable lawful zoning
powers of the village in enacting requirements for all similarly zoned property. Id. The
requirement that landscaping be subject to "future approval by the village authorities,
without any standard as to what that approval must be based on [was] an unlawfully vague
provision. To require the payment of a lump sum of money without any basis set forth or
discernable for aniving at that sum [was] unlawful." Id. (citations omitted). The reverter
provision was "a patently unlawful use of the zoning power which ordain[ed] a change in
zoning without any of the procedural steps or substantive considerations necessary thereto."
Id. at 705-06 (citing Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384,388 (Miss. 1966)).
400
Id. at 706.
396
397
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wielding of its police power. In Andres, the holding is questionable on
public policy grounds since the court found the ordinance by all indications
was reasonable, not arbitrary, and it bore a rational relationship to the
public interest, health, and b elf are.^' Therefore, it should have been
upheld, as the zoning enabling acts require nothing more.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in People's Counsel for Baltimore
distinguished
,~~
contract from
County v. Beachwood Ltd. ~ a r t n e r s h i ~
conditional zoningYN3though declaring the rezoning invalid on other
grounds.404 There, the board of appeals voted to grant the developer's
petition to reclassify the property, but with the condition that it finance an
off-site improvement.405 Opposed to the condition, the developer argued
that the reclassification was the result of contract zoning and that the office
of planning and zoning sought to use the comprehensive zoning as a means
Though the
to pressure it into financing an off-site traffic impr~vement.~"~
court failed to find evidentiary support for this allegation, it did discuss the
concept of contract zoning.N7 The court pointed out that
20041
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one reason the allusions to contract zoning in the case had
such a phantom-like quality is that neither the case law,
here or abroad, nor the academic commentary seems to
have a firm grip on exactly what was meant by the term
"contract zoning" or by its doctrinal doppelganger,
"conditional zoning." In the broadest of senses, both
involve some sort of understanding between the
governmental unit and the developer, whereby the doing
of certain acts by the developer will result in favorable
rezoning treatment by the governmental unit. Beyond
that, the definitions begin to
While "[s]ome academic authorities treat contract zoning as the more
generic phenomenon," with conditional zoning as a special instance

Id. at 703.
670 A.2d 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
'03
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 502. The court held the evidence insufficient to justify a rezoning on the
ground of mistake in the original zoning, and the finding of 'change in circumstances was
not clear and detailed as required by the zoning act. Id.
'05
Id. at 489,503.
Id. at 503.
407
Id. at 504-08.
'
0
8
Id. at 504 (emphasis omitted).
40'
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thereof,409others do just the
Yet, others treat the two as
closely-related but distinct phenomena, with "contract zoning" being
illegal and conditional zoning slowly emerging into general a~ceptance.~"
The court explained that Maryland cases had treated "'contract zoning'
narrowly as a situation wherein the developer . . . enters into an express
and legally binding contract with the ultimate zoning authority."412Part of
the reason for the illegality is that "the governmental unit may not bargain
away its future use of the police power."413 The court distinguished those
cases in which a developer makes agreements with a governmental unit
that lacks ultimate decision-making authority on the rezoning.414 Thus,
when the city council was not bound by the recommendations of the
planning commission in which the commission sought to impose
conditions that it was not authorized to exact and that were therefore
invalid, and in which the council did not undertake or attempt to
incorporate the invalid conditions in its rezoning ordinance and did not
even refer to them, no issue of contract zoning arose.41s In Peoples
Counsel for Baltimore County, there was no evidence of any agreement
with the developer or that any changes to the comprehensive zoning was in

'09

Id. (citing DONALDG. HAGMAN,URBANPLANNING
AND LANDDEVELOPMENT
CONTROL
LAW5 94 (1975)).
4'0
Id. (citing 2 ANDERSON,supra note 338, $8 9.20-9.21 (3d ed. 1986)).
4"
Id. (citing ARDENH . RATHKOPF
& DAREN
A. RATHKOPF,
THELAWOF ZONING
AND
PLANNING
s29A.03 (1975)).
4'2
Id. at 505. The court went on to discuss Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429
(Md. 1959), a case in which the city granted a rezoning conditioned on a binding agreement
by the property owner to use the benefit of the reclassification only for the purpose of
building a funeral home. Peoples Counsel for Baltimore County, 670 A.2d at 505; Baylis,
148 A.2d at 431. The Baylis court held that the ordinance was invalid because the final
form of the ordinance made the reclassification conditional upon the execution of an
agreement, set out in the ordinance, between the owners and the city, and the recording of
such agreement upon the property owners, their successors, heirs, and assigns. Baylis, 148
A.2d at 431. But see Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 160 A.2d 379 (Md. 1960), where, in
contrast to Baylis, the owner entered into a formal and undisputed agreement with the city
planning commission, which recommended that the rezoning be approved. Id. at 384-85.
The court there declined to hold that the agreement constituted illegal contract zoning,
restricting the application of the ban on contract zoning to those instances where the
legislative body itself, as opposed to some other governmental agency, is party to the illegal
contract. Id. at 386.
4'3
People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 670 A.2d at 505.
4'4
Id. at 506.
415
Id.
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In recent decisions, despite the blurring of lines, courts have approved
conditional zoning where they find that under such zoning, without legally
committing itself to rezone, the municipality bargains for a landowner's
promise to take remedial action to minimize the adverse effects of the
proposed development or limit the proposed use in some way as a
condition of approval so as to protect adjoining landowners, and it is in the
public interest.417 Most courts rely on the public interest benefits as
reasons for upholding conditional zoning agreements.418 Additionally, it
4'6

Id.; see also AttmanIGlazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 552 A.2d 1277,
1283 (Md. 1989). In Athan/Glazer, the court held that the policy prohibiting a
municipality from contracting away its zoning power applies to special exceptions,
variances, and conditional uses, meaning that the zoning authority must exercise
independentjudgment in deciding requests. Id. at 1283. The court noted that

[clonditional zoning, once roundly condemned, appears to be in the
ascendancy [and] [iln Maryland, the concept has evolved indirectly
through the use of various zoning devices such as planned
developments, and has found [some] favor with the state legislature, [in
Article 66B, 4.01(b), which] perrnit[s] a county or municipal
corporation to impose certain conditions at the time of zoning or
rezoning land, under certain circumstances.
Id. at 1283 n.8.
417
See Ryan, supra note 27, at 356.
418
See, e.g., Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969). The court held that the county had the power to impose conditions even though the
statute was silent and that the "power to impose conditions on rezoning further[ed] the wellbeing of landowners generally, promot[ed] community development and served the general
welfare." Id. at 877. The court further stated that similar to other changes in land use,
though a landowner may be benefited by the rezoning of an individual parcel, the rezoning
may also "generate augmented demands for public services or create deleterious effects in
the neighborhood." Id. Moreover, "[rleasonably conceived conditions harmonize the
landowner's need with the public's interest." Id. The court, therefore, rejected the contract
zoning charge. Id. at 878; see also J-Marion Co., Inc. v. County of Sacramento, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 723 (1977). In J-Marion Co., Inc., the court upheld rezoning upon conditions, finding
the practice of imposing conditions justified as an appropriate exercise of local police
power. Id. at 725. The court pointed out the adherence to the "[s]o-called 'Euclidean'
zoning divides the community into homogenous land use zones." Id. Homogenous land
use zones prevent the imposition of conditions on particular uses of property, but
"[i]ndividual parcels may often be allowed [as] a justified escape from this rigid grouping
without detriment to zoning objectives." Id. at 725. The court pointed out that "California
(continued)
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seems logical to conclude that imposition of conditions results from the
consideration of public interest concerns. To the extent that it involves
promises from the landowner without a reciprocal promise by the
municipality, conditional zoning enables the municipality to retain and
satisfy its police power responsibility to see that the zoning change is
consistent with the public health, safety, and welfare, and amounts to the
exercise of the built-in flexibility in the zoning enabling acts. "The virtue
of allowing private agreements to underlie zoning is the flexibility and
control of the development given to a municipality to meet the everincreasing demands for rezoning in a rapidly changing area.,9419
Later Illinois courts have taken differing positions on the legality of
conditional zoning. In Gofinet v. County of ~ h r i s t i a n ; ~the
~ court
departed from the views expressed in the earlier Illinois decisions,
including Andres v. Village of ~lossrnoor,4~'
which was decided two years
earlier and rejected per se invalidity of conditional zoning.422 The
challenged action there was a zoning ordinance to rezone 236 acres of
elucidations of the local police power recognize that other kinds of application for change
in regulated land use may be granted subject to the landowner's compliance with
reasonable conditions," and the power to impose conditions on rezoning furthers the wellbeing of landowners generally, promotes community development, and serves the general
welfare. Id. "The same police power which supports the imposition of reasonable
conditions upon other kinds of changes in land use sustains the power of California counties
to engage in 'conditional rezoning."' Id.
4'9
State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Wis. 1970); see also
Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960); Hudson Oil Co. v. City of Wichita,
396 P.2d 271, 274 (Kan. 1964) (upholding an agreement granting rezoning only upon the
landowner's agreement to dedicate a ten-foot strip along the highway for an access road,
apparently to conform to the city's comprehensive plan for the remainder of the street
footage); Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, 421 P.2d 213,215 (Kan. 1966) (rejecting a contract
zoning argument and upholding a zoning ordinance adopted on a landowner's promise to
convey a right of way to the city along one of the streets upon which the property fronted);
Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tuscon, 533 P.2d 693, 695 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975)
(stating its agreement with other courts, including California, that have upheld conditional
zoning, as an exercise of the police power); Glendon Civic Ass'n v. Borough of Glendon,
572 A.2d 852, 855 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1990) (stating that "from our review of the record it is
clear that, by enacting [the ordinance], the Borough specifically designated the site for
which the conditional use was authorized. The Borough controlled the use by imposing
requirements in [the ordinance] and the Agreement to prevent the facility from becoming
noxious or offensive by reason of dust, odor, smoke, gas, vibration or noise"); 3 ZIEGLER,
supra note 45, 5 44: 18.
420
333 N.E.2d 731 (Ill. 1975).
42'
304 N.E.2d 700,706 (Ill. 1973).
422
Gofmet, 333 N.E.2d at 735.
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farmland in a rural section of the county from agricultural to heavy
industrial in order to permit the landowner to construct a plant where
synthetic gas would be produced.423 The ordinance was adopted pursuant
to a plan prepared by a consulting firm.424The challengers, owners of land
adjoining the subject property, argued that the ordinance was invalid "for
the reason that it contain[ed] unauthorized restrictions and hence
constitut[ed] conditional rezoning and also because [it] constitut[ed] 'spot
zoning. 9,425
~ I h ecourt pointed out that "there [was] a suitable and proper place for
utilization of the process [as] some conditional rezoning may be in the
public good, subservient to a comprehensive plan in the best interest of the
public health, safety, and welfare and enacted in recognition of changing
circumstances.'*26 In the court's view, "[nlot all conditional rezoning is
onerous, destructive or an abandonment of the power of the zoning agency
nor does it stem from improper motives., 4 2 7 Instead, "[ulnder the proper
circumstances conditional rezoning can be a flexible land use technique of
considerable utility and may constitute a valuable tool in the hands of a
Id. at 732.
424
Id.
425
Id. The disputed ordinance contained four articles. Id. The first, essentially
found that the best interest of the county would be served by permitting the rezoning and
variance requested. Id. at 733. The second limited the use of the premises to "only allow
the storage of naptha, petroleum products, similar hydrocarbon products, and the processing
of the same into pipeline quality gas suitable for distribution, utility, and industrial
purposes." Id. The ordinance also limited the height of structures, required compliance
with local, state, and federal air, water, noise, sewage pollution, and on handling,
processing, and storage of the products, and provided for reversion of the previous zoning if
the property was not used for gasification plant facilities as proposed. Id. at 733-34.
426
Id. at 736. The court noted that "the legal status of so-called 'contract zoning'
appear[ed] not to have been decided" in Illinois, although there was dicta in Treadway v.
City of Rockford, 182 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. 1962) and Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d
791 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969), both indicating disapproval of such ordinances. Gofinet, 333
N.E.2d at 735. The court distinguished Cederberg and Andres, the former finding that the
"City gave no consideration to the statutory standards of public health, safety, comfort,
morals, and welfare," and the latter involving a requirement that the developer enter into a
contract that could be recorded and constituted a covenant running with the land, both
"quite properly" finding the ordinance invalid. Id. (emphasis omitted). The court held that
Treadway did not "compel the conclusion that any and every conditional rezoning
ordinance . . . will be invalid." Id. Instead, without doubt, there is a suitable and proper
place for the utilization of the process of conditional rezoning, that it may be in the interests
of the public health, safety, and welfare and enacted in recognition of changing
circumstances. Id. at 736.
427
Gofinet, 333 N.E.2d at 736.
423
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zoning authority in the proper exercise of their police
The court
approved the rezoning ordinance.429 The conditions permitted the land to
be used "to accomplish a good for the general public but yet preserve the
integrity of the comprehensive plan. The ordinance evidence[d] a real
concern for the public health, safety, and welfare-[indeed] that appear[ed]
to be the rationale for the enactment.'430 Such benefits should not be
denied because the use of the particular tract is restricted unlike other areas
similarly zoned.43' The comprehensive plan already contemplated that
there would eventually be industrial development in the vicinity and under
it, the county held the power, authority, and duty to control special uses
under the zoning classification with the use intended there?32 "The
benefits received from the rezoning ordinance [tlhere far outweigh[ed] any
evil that might be said to flow from conditional rezoning, per se.9,433 In
sum, the conditions were
not onerous to the property owner or incompatible with the
comprehensive plan, . . . [did] not constitute an
abandonment of the zoning power, [were] not contractual
in nature, or limited in their terms and they [did] not
constitute an attempt upon the part of the zoning authority
to control the use of the land. . . ?34
Moreover, the court stated that the ordinance was not enacted as a result of
negotiation of improper conduct by the zoning authority, but instead was
enacted in good faith, and the conditions imposed had a reasonable and
direct relationship to the purpose for which the rezoning was granted.435
428
429

Id.
Id. at 738. It was adopted on the basis of the detailed findings showing
a genuine need for the product to be produced by the plant, [which]
would unquestionably serve the public health, safety and welfare. The
conditions imposed [took] advantage of the unique situation presented
by the near confluence of pipelines which [made] the particular location
highly advantageous for the gas processing plant location.

Id. at 736.
430
Id.
43L
Id.
432
Id.
433
Id.
4"
Id. at 737.
435
Id. Nor was the rezoning ordinance invalid as spot zoning under the five tests for
spot zoning. Id. To anive at this conclusion, the court considered the following questions:
whether the requirements of the comprehensive plan are met by the ordinance; the
(continued)
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However, in Ziemer v. County of ~ e 0 r - i the
~ ; Illinois
~ ~ Appellate Court
reintroduced a degree of uncertainty on the legality of conditional zoning.
There, the plaintiff sought invalidation of a zoning ordinance reclassifying
farmland to agricultural B-3 to permit the landowner to build and operate a
dance hall-tavern on the premises.437 Plaintiff alleged the rezoning as the
product of unlawful contract and conditional zoning.438 Upon defendant's
petition for rezoning, the zoning board of appeals recommended approval,
20041
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particular use for the spot; whether there are changes in conditions in the zoning district;
where the spot is located; and whether a hardship was created by any individual. Id. The
shift toward industry was recognized in the comprehensive plan for the county. Id. The
comprehensive plan "emphasize[d] the shift from agricultural to industry and the
desirability of industry for economic growth and for keeping young people in the
community." Id. Though location of the tract on the fringe between two zones might have
more strongly supported rezoning than a tract not on the fringe, this did not preclude the
validity of rezoning a tract not on the fringe. Id. at 737-38. "[Un making this determination
the condition of the entire region and anticipation of future needs [is to] be considered." Id.
at 738 (citing Duffcon Concrete Prods. Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347 (N.J.
1949)). There was no particular hardship on any individual. Id. The rezoning ordinance at
issue was not out of harmony with the comprehensive planning for the good of the
community. Id.; see also Thornber v. Village of North Barrington, 747 N.E.2d 513 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001). The Thomber court stated that "conditional zoning is not invalid per se."
Thomber, 747 N.E.2d at 522 (citing Goffinet v. County of Christian, 357 N.E.2d 442 (Ill.
1976)). Rather, the focus must be on the application of the traditional zoning factors laid
out in an earlier Illinois Supreme court opinion. Id. Applying those factors to the
ordinance, the court found the trial court's finding was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence; the test is whether the ordinance is consistent with the comprehensive plan for
use of property in the locality. Id. The change here impacted all property zoned residential,
not just the site at issue. Id. at 523. Rezoning is unlawful when the change violates a
zoning pattern that is homogenous, compact, and uniform. Id.; see also Lurie v. Village of
Skokie, 380 N.E.2d 1120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). In Lurie, the challenged ordinance permitted
the sale of certain municipal property to a developer for the construction of low-income
housing for the elderly. Id. at 1122. Negotiations and discussions between the town and
the developer occurred before the ordinance was passed after a sales contract was entered
into, but the sale was offered to public bid, thereby rendering the contract zoning issue
moot. Id. at 1127. The court, in upholding the ordinance, pointed out the developer's
proposal, which was ultimately accepted, was developed over the course of those meetings.
Id. at 1128. Though that the developer's proposal was not submitted for deliberation prior
to the board's public meeting, the town's open meeting law was not violated because
village officials had an opportunity to express their needed and desired requirements for the
project. Id.
436
338 N.E.2d 145 (111. App. Ct. 1975).
437
Id. at 146.
438
Id.
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subject to certain conditions, including that defendant dedicate to the
county land to provide access to a county highway,439restrict the use of the
and waive and prohibit all
land for a dance hall and public entertai~~ment,"~"
' striking down the rezoning, the court
other uses in the d i s t r i ~ t . ~ In
discussed prior cases ruling on the validity of conditional zoning, including
Gofinet, which had upheld conditional rezoning.442 The court noted the
value of conditional rezoning as a flexible zoning tool.443 The court,
however, pointed out that the Gofinet decision rested upon s ecial
circumstances in which the proposed use would benefit the
In
this case, however, no such special circumstances were established, and the
record was devoid of evidence showing that the public interest, health,
safety, or welfare was considered at the time of the rezoning.445Moreover,
it was clear that the covenants restricting the defendant's land were related
in time to the rezoning and contained a recital that it was executed in
consideration of the zoning board's
Therefore, the plaintiff
made out a prima facie case that the rezoning was done in exchange for the
landowner's restrictive covenant and was therefore invalid and the
rezoning amendment void.447
While it seems clear that after Ziemer, contract zoning is invalid, it is
also the case now that conditional zoning, despite its declared benefits, will
be upheld only in the circumstances when it appears the public interest is
benefited or protected by the conditions. But this requirement seems to be
a defining criterion for conditional zoning, such that the decision need not
be viewed as significant retrenchment by the Illinois courts.
In Benton v. ~ h a t t a n o o ~the
a , ~Tennessee
~
Court of Appeals found

Id.
* Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
443
Id.
444
Id.
Id.
446
Id.
447
Id. at 149.
"8
No. 808, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 1988). There, the
plaintiff-appellant, Irene Benton, and the defendant were owners of property in the City of
Chattanooga. Id. at *l.
439

Each of the properties [was] adjacent to Bonny Oaks Drive and they
[were] separated by a jointly used roadway. At the time [defendant]
acquired its property in 1985 both tracts of land were zoned R-1
Residential. Soon after [defendant] acquired its property it filed a
(continued)
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the use of conditional zoning not to be an abrogation of police power, but
an exercise of it.449The court pointed out that it is the use of governmental
request with the Chattanooga Planning Commission to rezone its
property from R-1 Residential to C-2 Commercial.
Id. at *1-2. The Planning Commission recommended the rezoning, and thereafter the Board
of Commissioners for the city passed an ordinance to amend the earlier ordinance to rezone
the defendant's property from R-1 to C-2. Id. at *2. However, the rezoning was subject to
certain conditions. Id. At trial, the chancellor held that it was not necessary to pass on the
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance to make a proper determination of the case. Id. at
*3. Resolving all of the other issues in the defendant's favor, he upheld the ordinance as
being valid. Id. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, but the motion
was overruled. Id. She appealed, arguing, among other things, that the alleged rezoning
was impermissible contract zoning. Id. at *3-4. On appeal, the court determined it not
necessary to rule on the constitutional issue of whether contract zoning is violative of the
Constitution of Tennessee, since there was no contract zoning. Id. at *9. ''The general law,
as the Court has noted, authorizes conditional zoning which was what was done in this
case." Id. at *5.
449
Id. at *7-8. The court, citing Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185,
188 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973), stated the following: "Nothing in this opinion is to be
construed as holding that a planning commission without a covenant cannot prescribe
reasonable conditions for the benefit of the general public." Id. at *7. The court
distinguished the cases on which the appellant relied, including City of Knoxville v.
Arnbrister, 263 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1953) and Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d
185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). Id. at *6-7. The Arnbrister case arose when the City of
Knoxville sought to enforce an agreement it made with a land developer. Ambrister, 263
S.W.2d at 528. The city rezoned single dwelling residential property so a multiple dwelling
unit could be built. Id. at 530. In consideration for the rezoning, the property owner
promised to dedicate part of the rezoned land to the city sometime in the future. Id. The
dedicated property was to be used as a public park. Id. at 529. However, the property
owner reneged on his promise to dedicate. Id. at 530. The city filed suit to enforce the
agreement. Id. at 528. The supreme court held this was an example of contract zoning and
could not be enforced. Id. at 53 1. In Haymon, the property owners agreed to execute a 25year covenant to run with the land to maintain a 200-foot buffer zone of vacant property
between their apartment buildings and adjoining land, which was given in exchange for
rezoning. Haymon, 513 S.W.2d at 186. The court of appeals said this amounted to contract
zoning, which was contrary to public policy and illegal in Tennessee. Id. at 185. It stated,
The same rule with respect to the validity of contracts to influence
zoning seems to prevail in numerous other jurisdictions, the consensus
being that contracts entered into in consideration of concessions made
favoring the applicant are frowned upon as being against public policy
[because] zoning is an instrument of public authority to be used only for
the common welfare of all the people.

(continued)
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power as a bargaining chip that earlier cases criticized as the unsavory
aspect of contract zoning.450 "When a government negotiates in this
manner it agrees to limit its right and duty to act on behalf of the public.'""
"Rezoning is approved, not based upon the merits of the zone change
request nor because it is in the public interest, but because a deal has been
On the other hand, the court stated that
the mere unilateral imposition of conditions for public
In contract zoning the
benefit is quite different.
government entity sacrifices its authority. In conditional
zoning it exercises it. By imposing conditions under
which [defendant's] property could be rezoned,
Chattanooga did not bargain away its authority, but rather
exercised it for public safety reasons.453
The court went on to conclude that the conditions in the ordinance required
that before the property was rezoned, safer access to it had to be
provided.454 The court stated that "[tlhe proof show[ed] no evidence of a
bilateral agreement. [Defendant] followed customary procedure in an
attempt to have its property rezoned. There [was] no evidence of
Id. at 188. In Benton, however, the court found no agreement by the city to rezone.
Benton, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454, at *9.
450
Benton, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS, at *7.
451
Id.
452
Id.
453
Id. at *7-8. The Zoning Administrator for the Regional Planning Commission,
testified that the defendant's proposed use was appropriate. Id. at *8. However, "a blanket
approval without conditions was not. Problems posing a threat to public safety needed to
be rectified before the property could be put to commercial use." Id. The court further
noted the testimony of the Tennessee Department of Transportation Regional Traffic
Engineer, who asserted that the existing access drive was in fact dangerous, irrespective of
the zoning, and a professional engineer from the private sector, agreed with that testimony.
Id.
The existing drive [was] located amidst an interchange area. It directly
[crossed] an exit ramp from a busy highway before connecting into
Bonny Oaks Drive, the public road from which Appellant [ingressed]
and [egressed] her property. This [posed] a danger because vehicles
from two different roads converge onto Bonny Oaks Drive at the same
point.
There [were] visibility or "sight distance" problems.
Commercial traffic would only augment those problems.

4"

Id. at *8-9.
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negotiations between the parties [and] there [was] no quid pro quo. There
[were] only unilateral conditions requiring that necessary improvements be
made."455 Despite the appeal of this purported distinction, the question
remains whether the developer would have offered the conditions absent
the real prospect of a rezoning by the municipality. If not, then the
arrangement fails to differ substantially from what is viewed as contract
zoning.456
The Massachusetts courts also have found conditional zoning valid,
departing from the views expressed by the Connecticut and Maryland
? ~court
~ stated that
courts. In Town of Randolph v. Town of ~ t o u ~ h t o nthe
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

Id. at *9.
Id. at *8-9. The Tennessee Code authorized the city to engage in conditional
zoning. Id. at *9. The court never reached the constitutionality of the provision because
conditional zoning is consistent with Tennessee law. Id.; see also Copeland v. City of
Chattanooga, 866 S.W.2d 565,570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). In Copeland, the court held that
the appellee's conditional zoning was a proper exercise of government police power.
Copeland, 866 S.W.2d at 570. The testimony revealed that the development of appellants'
property would create a problem remedied by the exaction. Id. Moreover, although the
videotapes of the two city counsel meetings revealed a concern by some members that the
city might need the property in the future and therefore be required to purchase it, the
overwhelming evidence supported a finding that it was this particular development that
would create a problem remedied by the construction of an acceleration/deceleration lane.
Id.
457
NO. 97-0197, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 410 (Mass. Super. June 23, 1997).
There, defendant (the Trust), the owner of two parcels of land in the Stoughton Technology
Center in the Town of Stoughton, undertook a project to construct and operate a cinema in
the "Center." Id. at *6.
455
456

The Land owned by the Trust was located in an "Industrial" zoning
district in which the proposed cinema project was a prohibited use.
[Tlhe Stoughton Planning Board convened a public hearing to consider
an amendment to the Zoning Map rezoning the Land to a "Highway
Business" zoning district in which a cinema would be permissible.
Id. The town voted to enact the amendment. Id. Thereafter, the Trust applied to the
Stoughton Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a 13.5-foot variance from the 30-foot height
restriction imposed on all buildings in the "Highway Business" zoning district. Id. "The
ZBA found that in view of conditions and circumstances uniquely affecting the Land, the
Trust was entitled to the requested height variance, but conditioned the variance on, among
other things, the construction of a pedestrian overpass across Technology Center Drive," a
four-lane street separating the proposed cinema building from the cinema parking lot. Id. at
*7. Thereafter, the Town of Randolph filed the present action against the Town of
Stoughton, the ZBA, the Planning Board, and the Trust, alleging that the rezoning of the
(continued)
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"'[c]ontract zoning' is the term given to acts of rezoning granted on the
express condition that owners impose certain restrictions on their land in
order to obtain the desired rezoning."458 An example of invalid contract
zoning would be if the town had conditioned the rezoning of the locus
based on a landowner's dedication of land for public use elsewhere in the
town.459
However, [here, the plaintiffs] allegation that the town
rezoned the Land from "Industrial" to "Business
Highway" on the condition that the [landowner] build a
movie theater there, conferring tax benefits on the town,
simply [did] not constitute the type of extraneous
consideration unrelated to the locus necessary to establish
contract zoning. The proposed use of the particular land
[was] intimately related to the locus and [would] always
be a relevant area of concern for zoning authorities so that
the imposition of conditions on the proposed use of the
locus cannot be considered "extraneous.,460

Land from "Industrial" to "Business Highway" was invalid either as spot zoning or contract
zoning. Id. at *7-8. The Massachusetts Code provided that "any zoning'ordinance or bylaw which divides cities and towns into districts shall be uniform within the district for each
class or kind of structures or uses permitted." Id. at *32-33 (quoting MASS.GEN.LAWSch.
40A, 5 4 (1994)). The court construed this provision as prohibiting "'spot zoning,' defined
as a legislative change to existing zoning restrictions which arbitrarily and unreasonably
singles out one parcel of land for treatment differently from that accorded surrounding
parcels in the same district indistinguishable in character." Id. at *33. Randolph's
allegation of unconstitutional contract zoning "[failed] to state a cognizable claim because it
[did] not allege that the rezoning of the Land was conditioned on extraneous
considerations." Id. at *36. The court held that
although Randolph [was] an abutter to the rezoned parcel at issue,
Randolph clearly [did] not own property in the same zoning district or
even within the same municipality as the Trust's land, and thus had no
standing under [the code], which requires uniformity within each
zoning district of a city or town and to a lesser extent, uniformity
among districts within a single city or town.
Id. at *34.
458
Id. at *36.
459
Id.
Id. at *37; see also Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1969) (upholding conditional zoning where public interest served); Konkel v.
Common Council, 299 N.W.2d 606 (Wis. 1975) (upholding rezoning ordinance contingent
(continued)
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In a well-articulated justification for conditional zoning, the New York
Court of Ap eals upheld such an ordinance in Collard v. Znc. Village of
Flower Hill.El The Court of Appeals began its discussion of the issues by
on landowner's fulfilling certain conditions when the ordinance was otherwise not arbitrary
or capricious).
421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981). In Collard, in 1976, the earlier owners of the
subject premises and appellants' predecessors in title applied to the village board of trustees
to rezone the property from a General Municipal and Public Purposes District to a Business
District. Id. at 819. That year, the village board granted the rezoning application, subject to
various conditions. Id. Previously, the subject premises, then vacant, had been zoned for
single-family dwellings with a minimum lot size of 7,500 square feet. Id. n.1. The court
stated that
[i]n that year the then owners applied to the village board to rezone a
portion of the property and place it in the General Municipal and Public
Purposes District so that a private sanitarium might be constructed.
Concurrently with that application a declaration of covenants restricting
the use of the property to a sanitarium was recorded in the county
clerk's office. The village board then granted the rezoning application,
but limited the property's use to the purposes set forth in the declaration
of covenants.

Id. n.1. Subsequently, appellants' predecessors in title entered into the contemplated
declaration of covenants, which was recorded some twelve years later. Id. at 820.
Consistent with the board's resolution, that declaration provided that "no building or
structure situated on the Subject Premises on the date of this Declaration of Covenants will
be altered, extended, rebuilt, renovated or enlarged without the prior consent of the Board
of Trustees of the Village." Id. "The 1976 rezoning application, which as conditionally
granted [was] the subject of this suit, was made because the private sanitarium had fallen
into disuse and it was asserted that without rezoning the property could neither be sold nor
leased." Id. at 8 19 n. 1.
Appellants, after acquiring title, made application [two years later] to
the village board for approval to enlarge and extend the existing
structure on the premises. Without any reason being given that
application was denied. Appellants then commenced this action to have
the board's determination declared arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable,
and unconstitutional and sought by way of ultimate relief an order
directing the board to issue the necessary building permits.

Id. at 820. The appellants contended that the conditions imposed amounted to invalid spot
zoning and conditional zoning. Id. at 821. Claiming that the board's denial of the
application was beyond review as to reasonableness, respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint. Id. at 820. That motion was denied, that court "equating appellants' allegation
that the board's action was arbitrary and capricious with an allegation that such action was
(continued)
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stating that
[plrior to our decision in Church v Town of lslip, in which
we upheld rezoning of property subject to reasonable
conditions, conditional rezoning had been almost
uniformly condemned by courts of all jurisdictions-a
position to which a majority of States appear to continue
to adhere. Since Church, however, the practice of
conditional zoning has [achieved] widespread [acceptance]
in this State, as well as having gained popularity in other

jurisdiction^.^^^
The court pointed out that "[plrobably the principal objection to
conditional rezoning is that it constitutes illegal spot zoning, thus violating
the legislative mandate requiring that there be a comprehensive plan for,
~~
and that all conditions be uniform within, a given zoning d i s t r i ~ t . 'The
court explained that when courts have considered the issue, "the
assumptions have been made that conditional zoning benefits particular
landowners rather than the community as a whole and that it undermines
the foundation upon which comprehensive zoning depends by destroying
However, these unexamined
uniformity within use districts.'*64
assumptions must be questioned. First, the court said, it is a downward
change to a less restrictive zoning classification that benefits the property
rezoned and not the opposite imposition of greater restrictions on land
Indeed, the imposition of limiting conditions benefits surrounding
properties, but "normal1 adversely affects the premises on which the
conditions are imposed.'& Second, the court ruled that the mere fact that
only a single parcel is involved or benefited does not render the zoning
invalid per se.467Instead,
the real test for spot zoning is whether the change is other
than part of a well-considered and comprehensive plan
calculated to serve the general welfare of the community.
Such a determination, in turn, depends on the
lacking in good faith and fair dealing-an allegation which it found raised triable issues of
fact." Id. The appellate court reversed and dismissed the complaint, "holding that the
allegation of arbitrary and capricious action by the board was not the equivalent of an
allegation that the board breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id.
Id. at 820 (citations omitted).
463
Id.at821.
* Id.
Id.
466
Id.
467
Id.
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reasonableness of the rezoning in relation to neighboring
uses-an
inquiry required regardless of whether the
change in zone is conditional in form. Third, if it is
initially proper to change a zoning classification without
the imposition of restrictive conditions notwithstanding
that such change may depart from uniformity, then no
reason exists why accomplishing that change subject to
condition should automatically be classified as
impermissible spot zoning.468

The court continued by stating that
[bloth conditional and unconditional rezoning involve
essentially the same legislative act-an amendment of the
zoning ordinance. The standards for judging the validity
of conditional rezoning are no different from [those] used
to judge whether unconditional rezoning is illegal. It
stands that [if] modification to a less restrictive zoning
classification is warranted, then a fortiori conditions
imposed by a [zoning authority] to minimize conflicts
among districts should not in and of themselves violate
any prohibition against spot zoning.469
Nor should a conditional zoning ordinance be struck down on the basis
of public policy, that is, that municipal governments lack "the power to
make contracts that control or limit them in the exercise of their legislative
powers and duties.,470 Just as "permitting citizens to be governed by the
best bargain they can strike with a local legislature would not be consonant
with notions of good government, absent proof of a contract purporting to
bind the local legislature in advance to exercise its zoning authority in a
bargained-for manner," so also would "a rule [having] the effect of
forbidding a municipality from trying to protect landowners in the vicinity
of a zoning change by imposing protective condition^."^"
The imposition of conditions on property sought to be
rezoned may not be classified as a prospective
commitment on the part of the municipality to zone as
requested if the conditions are met; nor would the
Id. (citation omitted).
.
469
Id.
470
Id.; see also Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (striking down rezoning
ordinance based upon landowners agreeing to conditions); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148
A.2d 429 (Md. 1959) (same).
471
Collard, 421 N.E.2d at 821.
468
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municipality necessarily be precluded on this account from
later reversing or altering its de~ision.~"
The court concluded as follows:
Conditional rezoning is a means of achieving some degree
of flexibility in land-use control by minimizing the
potentially deleterious effect of a zoning change on
neighboring properties; reasonably conceived conditions
harmonize the landowner's need for rezoning with the
public interest and certainly fall within the spirit of the
enabling legislation.473

472

Id. at 822 (citing Grimpel Assoc. v. Cohalan, 361 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1977)).
Further, the court found that
[wlhile it is accurate to say there exists no explicit authorization that a
legislative body may attach conditions to zoning amendments, neither is
there any language which expressly forbids a local legislature to do so.
Statutory silence is not necessarily a denial of the authority to engage in
such a practice. Where in the face of nonaddress in the enabling
legislation there exists independent justification for the practice as an
appropriate exercise of municipal power, that power will be implied.

Id. (citation omitted).
473
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y.
1960)). The court then stated that
[olne final concern of those reluctant to uphold the practice is that
resort to conditional rezoning carries with it no inherent restrictions
apart from the restrictive agreement itself. This fear, however, is
justifiable only if conditional rezoning is considered a contractual
relationship between municipality and private party, outside the scope
of the zoning power-a view to which we do not subscribe. When
conditions are incorporated in an amending ordinance, the result is as
much a "zoning regulation" as an ordinance, adopted without
conditions. Just as the scope of all zoning regulation is limited by the
police power, and thus local legislative bodies must act reasonably and
in the best interests of public safety, welfare and convenience, the scope
of permissible conditions must of necessity be similarly limited. If,
upon proper proof, the conditions imposed are found unreasonable, the
rezoning amendment as well as the required conditions would have to
be nullified, with the affected property reverting to the pre-amendment
zoning classification.
(continued)
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Id. (citations omitted) (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.365, 387
(1926); New York Inst. of Tech. v. LeBoutillier, 305 N.E.2d 754, 757 (N.Y. 1973);
Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 93 N.E.2d 632, 636 (N.Y. 1950)). The court then
discussed appellant's argument by stating that it
[p]roceed[ed] along two paths: first, that as a matter of construction the
added prescription [that the town not act arbitrarily] should be read into
the provision; second, that because of limitations associated with the
exercise of municipal zoning power the village board would have been
required to include such a prescription.
Id. at 823. The court found this argument to be without merit. Id.
Appellants' construction argument must fail.
The terminology
employed in the declaration is explicit. The concept that appellants
would invoke is not obscure and language to give it effect was readily
available had it been the intention of the parties to include this added
stipulation. Appellants point to no canon of construction in the law of
real property or of contracts which would call for judicial insertion of
the missing clause. Where language has been chosen containing no
inherent ambiguity or uncertainty, courts are properly hesitant, under
the guise of judicial construction, to imply additional requirements to
relieve a party from asserted disadvantage flowing from the terms
actually used. The second path either leads nowhere or else goes too
far. If it is appellants' assertion that the village board was legally
required to insist on inclusion of the desired prescription, there is no
authority in the court to reform the zoning enactment of 1976
retroactively to impose the omitted clause. Whether the village board at
that time would have enacted a different resolution in the form now
desired by appellants is open only to speculation; the certainty is that
they did not then take such legislative action. On the other hand,
acceptance of appellants' proposition would produce as the other
possible consequence the conclusion that the 1976 enactment was
illegal, throwing appellants unhappily back to the pre-1976 zoning of
their premises, a destination which they assuredly wished to sidestep.
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that it agreed with the Appellate Division's
finding
that the allegation of the complaint that the village board in denying
appellants' application acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner is
not an allegation that the board acted in bad faith or its equivalent. For
the reasons stated, the Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of
Flower Hill may not now be compelled to issue its consent to the
proposed enlargement and extension of the existing structure on the
(continued)
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The Collard decision perhaps is not as far-reaching as it might seem at
first. First, the court seems to place great significance on the fact that the
conditions operated to restrict uses of the land otherwise permitted, not to
allow different uses as a true rezoning would produce. Second, that the
standards for judging the validity of conditional rezoning are no different
than the standards used to judge whether unconditional rezoning is illegal
suggests that the rezoning takes place in the abstract without regard to the
petitioning landowner's intended uses, which is not the case because of the
conditions imposed. As a criticism of this reasoning, does not the
imposition of conditions suggest that the municipality would have
refrained from rezoning absent the landowner's agreement to the
conditions? This seems like an inducement to rezone, yet not one that
should be condemned when the conditions serve the public interest.474
premises or in the alternative give an acceptable reason for failing to do
so. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division [was] affirmed
Id.
474

See Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960). In Church, the town
board acted unanimously to rezone a comer lot that was an irregular strip. Id. at 681. The
board's consent to the rezoning was granted under the following conditions: the building
could not be more than 25% of the area; an anchor post fence, or equal, six feet high, was to
be erected five feet within the boundary line of the property; live shrubbery had to be
planted; and these requirements had to occur before carrying on any retail business on the
property. Id. The court explained that "zoning being a legislative act, (not a variance) is
entitled to the strongest possible presumption of validity and must stand if there [is] any
factual basis therefore." Id. at 682. The court rejected the argument that this was contract
zoning; all of the appellants' arguments "revolve[d] about the idea that this [was] illegal as
'contract zoning' because the Town Board, as a condition for rezoning, required the owners
to . . . record restrictive covenants as to maximum area to be occupied by [the] buildings
and as to a fence and shrubbery." Id. at 683. The court reasoned that "[slurely these
conditions were intended to be and are for the benefit of the neighbors. Since the Town
Board could have, presumably, zoned this . . . comer for business without any restrictions,
we fail to see how reasonable conditions invalidate the legislation." Id. The court
explained that "what 'contract zoning' means is unclear and there is really no New York
law on the subject. All legislation 'by contract' is invalid in the sense that a Legislature
cannot bargain away or sell it powers." Id. But, the court would "deal here with actualities
and not phrases." Id.
To meet increasing needs of [the county's] own population explosion,
and at the same time to make as gradual and as little of an annoyance as
possible the change from residence to business on the main highways,
the [tlown . . . imposes conditions.
There [was] nothing
unconstitutional about it. Incidentally, the record [did] not show any
(continued)
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agreement in the sense that the owners made an offer accepted by the
board.

Id.; see also In re Rosedale Ave., 243 N.Y.S.2d 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). In In re
Rosedale Avenue, the city sought and acquired title to five parcels of real estate for street
widening purposes. Id. at 815. The property owners disagreed with the city as to how
much they should be compensated for the taking of their property. Id. at 817. The only
significant issue involved a determination of damages for the parcel of real estate that was
occupied by a bowling alley, which was a nonconforming use to the residential zoning of
the property. Id.
The claimant contend[ed] that the agreement of April 18, 1956, waiving
enhancement of value of the strip taken by reason of the zoning change
for retail use [was] not binding [because, among other things,] if the
waiver was a condition imposed by the Board of Estimate such
condition would be illegal as constituting so-called "contract zoning."

Id. The court rejected plaintiffs argument holding that "[elven assuming that the Board of
Estimate had imposed the waiver agreement as a condition for the change, it does not
necessarily follow that such condition was not validly imposed in the best interests of the
citizens of the City of New York." Id. (citing Church, 168 N.E.2d 680; Point Lookout
Civic Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 200 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960), affd, 207
N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960), affd, 176N.E.2d203 (N.Y. 1961)). Butsee Levine
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 272 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966). In Levine the court
distinguished Church v. Town of Islip. Id. at 173. There, after a public hearing, the town
voted to adopt a resolution amending the building zone ordinance changing a landowner's
approximately fourteen acres from residential to industrial. Id.
One of the four conditions attached to this amendment was that the
grade of the affected piece . . . be reduced to that of [the road] on which
it fronted. The existing grade [was] 15 to 18 feet higher than the road
and [would] require the removal of approximately 267,000 cubic yards
of earth.

Id. Homeowners with adjacent residences or residences near the rezoned parcel challenged
the rezoning. Id. "The . . . amendment was struck down . . . on the ground that the
condition concerning the grade was infuturo." Id. The court stated that Church
teaches that conditions per se do not void zoning amendments.
However, in this case, the condition was proposed by the applicants for
the downzoning and was adopted in roro by the [tlown [bloard. [The]
rezoned parcel [was] the first industrial intrusion in the area and it
seriously upse[t] the use balance that had been advised and maintained
with respect to the zoning on each side of [the road].

(continued)
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Perhaps the court should have explained that carrying out the public
interest requires rezoning in response to market, demographic, and
technological changes affecting land use, and that a municipality can
responsibly adhere to land use policy as identified in comprehensive plans
and at the same time allow for changes in land use through rezoning with
conditions.

-

-

- --

Id. In sum, the rezoning appeared "not made for the general welfare of the Town but for
the personal benefit of [the landowner], who petitioned for precisely the change and
conditions that were adopted." Id. This constituted spot or contract zoning. Id. However,
this case can be criticized for finding contract zoning without finding a reciprocal promise
by the town to rezone. Instead, the better basis for striking down the rezoning should have
been on its merits as not reflecting concern for the public interest. See Hiscox v. Levine,
216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961). In Hiscox, the court distinguished Church on the
facts. There, the town authorized the respondent planning board to make reasonable
changes in zoning regulations, but it required the maintenance of the average population
density and strict conformance with Town Law $ 281. Id. at 804. The developer offered
land for a park in exchange for a variance to develop the rest of the property. Id. at 803.
The court noted that "[iln support of their positions both sides place some reliance on
Church v. Town of lslip," but explained that in that case "the Town Board granted a change
of zoning from residence to business on condition that the owner comply with stated
requirements. As against an argument that the [bloard engaged in 'contract zoning,' the
[clourt upheld the change." Id. at 807 (citation omitted). In Hiscox, the court stated that
[clontrary to the respondents' belief, the Church case does not support
their positions. In the first place, the action . . . reviewed was
legislative action by the Town Board, not administrative action. In the
second place, the [Church clourt specifically noted that the conditions
"were intended to be and are for the benefit of the neighbors" and that
the Town Board "could have, presumably, zoned this Bay Shore Road
comer for business without any restriction." The respondents [in
Hiscox could not] make either claim. Except for the conclusion that the
plans "appropriately and adequately safeguard the use of adjoining
lands" there [was] not one shred of evidence to show benefit or even
regard for the neighbors. Nor have respondents argued that all the
lands zoned " A could have been zoned " B by the board absent the
park element.

Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded that "[tlhere [could] be no doubt that the
Board's sole motivation was the lure of a large park, the dedication of which was not
imposed by the Board as a condition, but offered by the developers as the price for
rezoning." Id.
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In Holrnes v. Planning Board of New

477

the court held in a

lengthy opinion that
[clonditions imposed as an incident of approval in a
developmental permit control system are a major weapon
in a planner's arsenal. Conditions allow flexibility and
fairness in land use and development control decisions,
and provide the ability to deal with problems such as
traffic congestion, something barely contemplated under
zoning schemes . . . . The most common utilizations of
conditions in land use and development decisions occur in
nondiscretionary determinations which are made subject to
conditions publicly specified in advance, e.g., special
permits, or discretionary determinations subject to
stipulated conditions, e.g., variances or site plan
The court then held that "[iln New York, the use of reasonable conditions
as a land control device has been long upheld.'A77

475

433 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). In Holmes, the court upheld the
town's power under the enabling act to approve site plans conditionally to mitigate, among
other things, traffic congestion. Id. at 599.
476
Id. at 596 (citations omitted) (citing Fonoroff & Tenill, Controlling Traffic
Through Zoning, 21 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 857 (1970); Freilich & Quim, Effectiveness of
Flexible and Conditional Zoning Techniques-What They Can not Do for Our Cities, 1979
INST.ON PLAN.ZONING
& EMINENT
DOMAIN167,193)).
477
Id. (citing Matter of Reed v. Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 174 N.E. 301 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1931); Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1960)). The Holmes
court went on to reject the petitioners' claim that the condition that they consent to an
easement as a requisite for the approval of the site plan imposed on them was unreasonable
because it was arbitrary. Id. Petitioners argued "that the condition must be stricken
because it was not 'directly related to and incidental to the proposed use' of their property."
Id. The test for determining whether such a requirement is invalid is derived from the
fundamental rule regarding the exercise of police power-"that there is some evil extant or
reasonably to be apprehended which the police power may be invoked to prevent and that
the remedy proposed must be generally adapted to that purpose." Id. at 596-97 (quoting
Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 275 N.E.2d 585, 589 (N.Y. 1971)). The court went on to
state, "The petitioners contend that no condition may be imposed which alleviates public
needs other than those which are 'uniquely and specifically attributable' to the development
proposed in their application." Id. at 597. The corollary to this rule is "that the benefit
deriving from a condition must accrue to the development rather than the public as a
whole." Id. The court then proceeded to state that
(continued)
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VI. CONDITIONALUSEDISTRICT
ZONING
IN NORTHCAROLINA
UPHELDAS NOT ~ N O L V ICONTRACT
NG
ZONING
In North Carolina, there is a land use device called "conditional use
district zoning."478 With this device, the landowner requests a rezoning to
a conditional use district and a conditional use permit.479After rezoning to
a conditional use district, the local government must issue a conditional
use permit before any desired use will be ~ermitted.~"Conditions are
placed in the permit, not in the zoning ordinance, thereby on its face
avoiding a claim of conditional zoning.48' "Conditional use district
zoning" differs from contract zoning in that the former features merely a
unilateral promise from the landowner regarding future use. No bilateral
contract binds the zoning authority. At the same time, "conditional use
district zoning" allows the local government to consider proposed land use
when evaluating a zoning application.4s2 As originally conceived,
"conditional use district zoning" consisted of two steps: (1) a legislative
process to consider the rezoning request, and (2) a quasi-judicial
proceeding to determine whether a permit is appropriate under the
circumstances presented by the
A lower court held that
without the second step, the zoning decision would be based on the
[tlhese criteria posed great difficulties for municipal authorities
confronted by small residential subdivisions which could not contribute
properly sized recreational facilities but whose presence still generated
need, by industrial subdivisions which caused environmental needs not
within the category of assessment soluble problems, and by the inability
to equate the cost of the exaction with the benefit to or need created by
the development being accessed. As a result of these difficulties,
another approach was generated-the Rational Nexus Test.
Id. at 598 (citations omitted). This test draws support "from the police power in allowing
conditions based on future oriented planning. Thus, a subdivider can 'be compelled only to
bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and
benefits conferred upon, the subdivision."' Id. (quoting Longbridge Builders v. Planning
Bd. of Princeton, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1968)). '"The rational nexus test relieves the
highly constricting uniqueness factor and allows some incidental benefit to the general
public." Id. Here, the condition had a rational nexus in that it was imposed to alleviate
traffic congestion posed by the development. Id. at 599.
478
CHARLOTTE,
N.C., CODEOF ORDINANCES
$5 6.201-6.208 (2000).
479
Id. 6.202.
480
Id.
48 1
See id. 5 6.205.
482
See id. 5 6.204.
483
See id.
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proposed use of the property-a
zoning.484

classic illustration of illegal contract

484

See Massey v. City of Charlotte, No. 99-CVS-18764, 2000 WL 33915844 (N.C.
Super. Apr. 17, 2000), rev'd, 550 S.E.2d 838 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). However, the North
Carolina Legislature amended the zoning laws to authorize conditional zoning in
Mecklenburg County until 2001, thus providing for parallel rules, one set for Mecklenburg
County and another for the rest of the state. See 1999 N.C. Sess. Law. 2000-77. In most of
the state, local governments employ a legislative process to make zoning decisions and may
not consider a specific use in making that zoning decision. See id. Once the rezoning has
occurred, the municipality then holds a quasi-judicial hearing to issue a conditional use
permit for the specific use. See id. $ l(d). Within the county, local governments have the
temporary statutory authority to approve a rezoning using a single-step, a purely legislative
process, subject to a deferential judicial review, and may consider the tract's proposed used
in making the zoning decision. See id. 3 l(e). That is, the new law could be viewed as
authorizing conditional zoning and contract zoning in the county because it enabled a
rezoning based upon a petition including a site plan and supporting information that
specified actual use or uses intended for the property and the rules, regulations, and
conditions that, in addition to predetermined ordinance requirements, would govern the
development and use of the property. Id. 3 l(b). But, conditional zoning decisions must be
made in consideration of the comprehensive plan, strategic plan, district plan, area plan, and
other policy documents. Id. $ l(c); see also Stephen C. Keadey, Recent Developments,
Into the Danger Zone: Massey v. City of Charlotte and the Fate of Conditional Zoning in
North Carolina, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1155 (2001). Bur see Massey v. City of Charlotte, 550
S.E.2d 838 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). In Massey, the court overruled the trial court's
conclusions that the courts and the legislature have limited such approval of conditional use
district zoning to systems that utilize a two step process-a legislative rezoning decision
followed by a quasi-judicial determination of whether to issue a conditional use permit. Id.
at 844. The court found that the ordinance on conditional use permits allowed an applicant
to apply separately for rezoning and a conditional use permit, but that the ordinance
allowed for both to be approved or disapproved in a single public hearing held before the
Board of Commissioners. Id. at 843. The court further held that the Board was within its
powers to create a special use district that would not require a special use permit, and that
the absence of a second quasi-judicial step did not render the rezoning decision contract
zoning when the city made no promise to the landowner regarding the rezoning, but instead
the landowner only promises to limit uses to those in application. Id. at 845.

Developers championed Charlotte's rezoning procedure because it had
the capacity to expedite growth. By condensing the process to one step,
foregoing the potentially time-consuming quasi-judicial requirements,
developers could receive the zoning decision and conditional use permit
quickly. The additional step required by Massey constitute[ed], to some
developers, an "additional procedural hurdle" that merely slow[ed] and
complicat[ed] the process.
(continued)
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The North Carolina Supreme Court in Chrismon v. Guilford
dealt with concept and the question of whether it constitutes illegal
Keadey, supra, at 1171.
485
370 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1988). In Chrismon,
beginning in 1980, [landowner] moved some portion of his business
operation from the 3.18-acre tract north of Gun Shop Road to the 5.06acre tract south of Gun Shop Road, directly adjacent to plaintiffs' lot.
Subsequently, [landowner] constructed some new buildings on this
larger tract, erected several grain bins, and generally enlarged his
operation. Concerned by the increased noise, dust, and traffic caused
by [landowner's] expansion, plaintiffs filed a complaint with the
Guilford County Inspections Department. The Inspections Department
subsequently notified [landowner] by letter dated 22 July 1982, that the
expansion of the agricultural chemical operation to the larger tract
adjacent to plaintiffs' lot constituted an impermissible expansion of a
nonconforming use. The same letter informed [landowner] further that,
though his activity was impermissible under the ordinance, . . . he could
request a rezoning of the property. Shortly thereafter, [landowner]
applied to have both of the tracts in question . . . rezoned from A-1 to
"Conditional Use Industrial District" ("CU-M-2"). He also applied for
a conditional use permit, specifying in the application that he would use
the property as it was then being used and listing those improvements
he would like to make in the next five years. Under the CU-M-2
classification, [landowner's] agricultural chemical operation would
become a permitted use upon the issuance of the conditional use permit.
The Guilford County Planning Board met . . . and voted to approve the
recommendation of the Planning Division that the property be rezoned
consistent with [landowner's] request.
Id. at 581-82 (emphasis omitted). The trial court affirmed the validity of the rezoning in
question. Id. at 582. The court of appeals reversed, holding, first, that the rezoning in
question constituted illegal "spot zoning" and, second, that it also constituted illegal
"contract zoning." Id. The court of appeals found that

[tlhe rezoning was accomplished upon the assurance that [landowner]
would submit an application for a conditional use permit specifying that
he would use the property only in a certain manner. The Court of
Appeals concluded that, in essence, the rezoning here was
accomplished through a bargain between the applicant and the Board
rather than through a proper and valid exercise of [the clounty's
legislative discretion. According to the Court of Appeals, this activity
constituted illegal "contract zoning" and was therefore void.
Id.
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contract zoning or permissible conditional zoning. While the court
recognized that contract zoning and conditional zoning were "two very
different concepts," it did not recognize the distinction between conditional
use district zoning and conditional zoning. The latter had therefore not
been held valid in North Carolina.486In Chrismon, the court conflated the
two, setting up a regime in the state that was ad hoc, with "local
governments employing a wide variety of conditional use district zoning
procedures.'*87
The court held "that the rezoning at issue-namely, the rezoning of
[landowner's] two tracts of land from A-1 [permitting the storage and sale
of grain, but not agricultural chemicals] to CU-M-2 [permitting the storage
and sale of agricultural chemicals]-was, in truth, valid conditional use
zoning and not illegal contract zoning.,7488 The court continued by stating,
"Illegal contract zoning properly connotes a transaction wherein both the
landowner who is seeking a certain zoning action and the zoning authority
itself undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateral
contract.'*89 A city council enters into an agreement with the landowner
and then rezones the property; the agreement includes not merely a
promise by the owner of the property to restrict uses on the land, but the
city council binds itself to enact the zoning amendmenL4" The court noted
that most courts would conclude that by this agreement to curtail its
~ ' contract
legislative power, the city council has acted ultra v i r e ~ . ~Such
zoning is illegal and the rezoning a nullity.492 "[Clontract zoning of this
type is objectionable primarily because it represents an abandonment on
the part of the zoning authority of its duty to exercise independent
judgment in making zoning decisions.'*93 As the court indicated,
20041
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valid conditional use zoning, on the other hand, is an
entirely different matter. Conditional use zoning . . . is an
outgrowth of the need for a compromise between the
interests of the developer who is seeking appropriate
rezoning for his tract and the community on the one hand
and the interests of the neighboring landowners who will
suffer if the most intensive use permitted by the new
See id. at 593.
Keadey, supra note 484, at 1166-67.
488
Chrismon, 370 S.E.2d at 593.
489
Id. (citing Ronald M . Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP.L.Q.
267 (1968); DANIELR. MANDELKER,
LANDUSELAW§ 6.59 (1st ed. 1982)).
490
Id.
491
Id.
492
Id. (citing Shapiro, supra note 489, at 269).
493
Id. (citing Wegner, supra note 40).
486
487
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classification is instituted.494
One commentator has described the mechanics of conditional use zoning
as follows:
An orthodox conditional zoning situation occurs when a
zoning authority, without committing its own power,
secures a property owner's agreement to subject his tract
to certain restrictions as a prerequisite to rezoning. These
restrictions may require that the rezoned property be
limited to just one of the uses permitted in the new
classification; or particular physical improvements and
maintenance requirements may be imposed.495

In the court's view, therefore
the principal differences between valid conditional use
zoning and illegal contract zoning are related and are
essentially two in number. First, valid conditional use
zoning features merely a unilateral promise from the
landowner to the local zoning authority as to the
landowner's intended use of the land in question, while
illegal contract zoning anticipates a bilateral contract in
which the landowner and the zoning authority make
reciprocal promises. Second, in the context of conditional
use zoning, the local zoning authority maintains its
independent decision-making authority, while in the
contract zoning scenario, it abandons that authority by
binding itself contractually with the landowner seeking a

4"

Id. The court found support for this conclusion in the general statutes that
explicitly enabled local governments to employ conditional use zoning. Id. at 585. The
statute expressly empowered local governments to divide their territorial jurisdictions into
districts. Id. Within these districts, a county may regulate and restrict, among other things,
the uses of buildings or land, and such districts may include special use districts or
conditional use districts. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN.STAT.5 153A-342 (1987)). Although that
statute was not in effect at the time the facts arose here, the court found the predecessor
statute, while not specifically mentioning conditional use zoning, provided support since
the statute did provide that local governments could divide up the area into districts. Id. at
585-86. It was on this basis Guilford County enacted the zoning ordinance at issue, and the
absence of reference to conditional zoning alone was not an indication of lack of authority.
Id.
495
Id. at 593-94 (emphasis in original) (quoting Shapiro, supra note 489, at 270-71).
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zoning amendment.496

483

Here, the record revealed no evidence of a bilateral contract.497
Instead, the facts showed that upon learning of the landowner's uses of the
land, the Gilford County Inspections Department advised him of his
options, including petitioning for a rezoning, but not guaranteeing the
rezoning.498It was the landowner who subsequently initiated the rezoning
by a petition for rezoning and application for conditional use district
permit, in which he described his proposed uses and made unilateral
promises in this connection.499 In acting on the landowner's petition and
application, the Board held public hearings and acted independent1
having regard for the impact of the new uses on the surrounding land.Ji
The Board heard from scores of neighboring landowners in support of the
application.501
496

Id. at 594. "The Court of Appeals, in its opinion in this case, determined that 'the
rezoning here was accomplished as a direct consequence of the conditions agreed to by the
applicant rather than as a valid exercise of the county's legislative discretion."' Id. (quoting
Chrismon v. Guilford County, 354 S.E.2d 309, 314 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)). "In so doing, it
concluded, in essence, that the zoning authority here-namely, the Guilford County Board
of Commissioners-entered into a bilateral agreement, thereby abandoning its proper role
as an independent decision-maker and rendering this rezoning action void as illegal contract
zoning." Id. The majority thought the appellate court did not fully grasp the subtle
differences between contract zoning and conditional use zoning. Id. at 593.
497
Id. at 594.
498
Id.
499
Id.
Id. at 595.
Id. The court also ruled that the rezoning was not invalid spot zoning, noting that
not all instances of spot zoning are invalid. Id. at 588. Rather, the determination requires a
consideration of a number of factors, including the degree of public benefit created by the
zoning action and the similarity of the proposed use of the tracts under the new conditional
use zones to uses in the surrounding preexisting zone. Id. at 589. That the landowner is
benefited by the rezoning does not automatically cast the rezoning as an instance of spot
zoning. Id. at 589-90. Rather, the effect on the whole community is the most significant
issue. Id. at 590. Here, while the landowner did reap the benefit of the rezoning, by being
"able to carry on an otherwise illegal storage and sale of agricultural chemicals," id., it was
beyond question that the neighboring landowners had also benefited by being able to
purchase those chemicals. See id. And, the proposed use did not differ substantially from
the uses already present in the surrounding areas. Id. at 591. The landowner could
continue with the very activities conducted under the pre-zoning as a conforming use (the
storage and sale of grain), but was essentially restricted to the very activities (the storage
and sale of agricultural chemicals) in which he was then engaged. No "parcel" was
"wrenched out of a uniform and drastically distinct area. Id.
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The court cautioned that although it was expressly recognizing
conditional use zoning, this land use device, to be valid, must be
determined to be "reasonable, neither arbitrary, nor unduly discriminatory,
and in the public intere~t."~'' However, "it is not necessary that property
rezoned to a conditional use district be available for all of the uses allowed
in the corresponding general use district," since the principle advantage of
conditional zoning is the allowance of suitable uses, at the same time not
allowing uses that are more clearly inconsistent with ongoing uses under
the predecessor zone.'03
In a forceful dissent, one justice pointed out that the effect of the
decision was to ovenule two prior decisions that reached the opposite
and Allred v. City
result on the same facts,'04 Blades v. City of
of
The dissent explained, "[an an attempt to distinguish Blades
and Allred from this case the majority goes to some length in explaining
the difference between what it says is valid conditional use zoning and
illegal contract zoning."507 The dissent further criticized the majority
opinion, asserting that the majority's definitions of conditional use zoning
and contract zoning are not in accordance with the Blades and Allred
opinions.508
The facts in each of those two cases were that a landowner
petitioned the City of Raleigh for a change in the zoning
ordinance. In each case the landowner submitted plans for
the buildings he would construct if the change was made.
The City Council in each case rezoned the property as
requested by the landowner. This Court in each case held
this was illegal contract zoning. There was no more
evidence in either case that there was a bilateral contract
or any reciprocal promises than there is in this case. There
was no more evidence in those cases than there is in this
case that the zoning board abandoned its independent
decision making authority. In my opinion Blades and
Allred are indistinguishable from this case. I believe that
prior to today the rule was that if a person requested a
Id. at 586.
Id. at 587. But see Hall v. City of Durham, 372 S.E.2d 564, 569 (N.C. 1988)
(holding that only zoning changes from a general use district to a conditional use district
allow the limitation on uses within the zone).
Chrismon,370 S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting).
'05
187 S.E.2d 35 (N.C. 1972).
178 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1971).
'07
Chrismon,370 S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting).
'08
Id.
'
0
2
'03
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zoning change and submitted plans of the type building he
would construct if the change were granted, and the
zoning authority made the change based on the promise to
construct such a building, that would be contract zoning.
We have held contrary to this and in doing so have
overruled Blades and Allred. I vote to affirm the Court of
~ ~ ~ e a l s . ~ ' ~

Justice Webb's comparison of the cases points out the impossibility of
meaningfully distinguishing a bilateral agreement from a unilateral one
when it is plain that the agreed to conditions formed the basis for the
rezoning. Yet, it is not clear why rezoning based upon a consideration of
the petitioner's application could not also be in the public interest or why
rezoning absent consideration of petitioner's application is not opposed to
the public interest. Perhaps the better view is not to condemn agreements
per se, but only those that show an abandonment of considerations of the
public interest. The illogic behind the prohibition on contract zoning is
that by precluding any consideration of the landowner's intended uses of
the land, the zoning board must make a rezoning decision that may seem
arbitrary and ~ n i n f o r m e d . ~ 'It~ is not the case that just because the
landowner is benefited, the rezoning should be invalid because it does not
also serve the public intere~t.~"The power to rezone exists in order for the
municipality to make necessary adjustments to its original assignment of
districts as the community evolves and as demographics and industry
changes.512 Adherence to Euclidean zoning in the face of such changes
leads to inefficient land use and unjustifiable burdens on land ownership.

VII. CONCOMITANT
AGREEMENTS
WITHSTANDING
A CHARGE
OF
CONTRACT
ZONING
In the State of Washington, there is the concept of zoning with
concomitant agreemenh5I3 The enactment of a zoning amendment occurs
concurrently with the entering into of an agreement between the developer
Id. at 597.
Before the Chrismon decision, the North Carolina legislature enacted a law
enabling a city council in exercise of the zoning power to require a "development plan
showing the proposed development of property be submitted with any request for rezoning
of such property" and authorizing the city council to consider such development plan in its
deliberations, and enabling the city council to require that any site plans subsequently
submitted be in conformity with any approved development plan. 1975 N.C. SESS.LAWS,
ch. 671.5 92.
Chrismon, 370 S.E.2d at 590.
512
See id. at 583.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 422 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1967).
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and the city, the agreement imposing on the developer requirements in
~
addition to those otherwise contained in the zoning ~ r d i n a n c e . ~ 'In
, ~court
' ~ upheld such an agreement,
Chrobuck v. Shohomish ~ o u n t ~the
finding that
[tlhe indicia of the validity of such agreements include
[whether] [tlhe performance called for is directly related to
public needs which may be expected to result from the
proposed usage of the [subject] property; the [flulfillment
of these needs is an appropriate function of the contracting
governmental body; [p]erformance will [place the burdens
of those needs] directly on the party whose property gives
rise to them; and [tlhe agreement involves no purported
relinquishment of any discretionary zoning power by the
governing body.516
"[C]oncomitant agreement[s] provid[e] a source of flexibility by allowing
an intermediate use permit, between absolute denial and complete approval
of a petition.,7517 In other words, a
zoning ordinance and a concomitant agreement should be
declared invalid only if it can be shown that there was no
valid reason for a [zoning] change and that they are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, and have no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare, or if the city is using the concomitant agreement
for bargaining and sale to the highest bidder or solely for

"4

See, e.g., id. at 794. In State ex rel. Myhre, the city plan commission and the
landowner entered into an agreement that provided for the rezoning of land and included
plans for development, including the deeding over to the city of certain land as necessary
for street widening for the area, as well as the construction of "sidewalks, drainage,
pavement, channelization and street lighting on certain designated streets." Id. at 794-95.
The agreement also contemplated the city condemning land necessary for the traffic safety
measures, with the landowner paying the cost of such condemnation. Id. at 795. The
agreement was forwarded to the city council with a recommendation for rezoning with a
provision that "[ilf after consideration of the Commission's report, the City Council finds
such amendment is of public necessity, benefits the general welfare of the Community, or
constitutes good zoning practices, it may then so amend the ordinance." Id. at 794
(emphasis in original).
'" 480 P.2d 489 (Wash. 1971).
'I6 Id. at 507.
'I7
Id.
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the benefit of private speculators.518
The court explained that its power to review the validity of zoning
accompanied by concomitant agreements was limited to invalidating an
ordinance only if no reason for the change was present or the agreement
~ facts
was in fact for the primary or sole benefit of the d e ~ e l o ~ e r . "The
here showed ample benefits to the city, including fulfilling a need for more
business zoned land and providing for the mitigation of possible adverse
effects from development.520
In City of Redmond v. ~ e v z e r , ~"the
~ ' concomitant agreement
contain[ed] no express promise by the city to rezone."522 Instead, the
agreement was conditioned upon the city rezoning.523 The court pointed
out, however, that the distinction for purposes of the question of validity
was unimportant.524 ccIf there is no promise to rezone, there is no promise
to relinquish legislative power."525 But even "[ilf the city ha[d] made the
promises claimed, they [would not be] illegal under the Mhyre rationale in
which the city promised to rezone.,7526
In Maine, the zoning enabling act permits a municipality to enter into a
contract zoning agreement with a landowner for the rezoning of land that
'I8

State ex re1 Myhre, 422 P.2d at 796. The court found that the concomitant
agreement was not ultra vires for the following reasons: ( I ) the city's requirement that it be
reimbursed for costs related to condemnation proceedings for property needed for right-ofways was within the city's legislative authority, id. at 795-96; and (2) the agreement only
granted the development company its statutory right to file a petition to vacate certain
streets, but did not oblige the city to grant such a petition, id. at 797.
'I9
Id. at 796.
520
Id. at 793.
52L
517 P.2d 625 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). There, the case involved a "street system
agreement" that constituted a concomitant agreement with the rezoning of properties. Id. at
627. The trial court found that
[tlhe rezoning . . . furnished the consideration for the undertakings of
the property owners in the . . . [algreement . . . . The city fully
performed its part of the agreement by the rezoning of the . . .
properties . . . and had the right to require the performance by the
property owners to deed and dedicate the necessary street rights-of-way
when requested to do so by the city.
Id. at 628.
522
Id. at 630.
523
Id. at 628.
524
Id. at 630.
525
Id.
526
Id.
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may contain conditions for final approval.527 Under a town's contract
zoning provisions, the planning board is required to conduct a public
hearing on a developer's proposed contract zoning agreement and to
provide notice of this hearing to the public and the neighboring
landowners.528 The Pennsylvania courts have held that rezoning that is
otherwise valid concomitant with agreements between a developer and the
municipality concerning the use of the land is not invalid merely because
of the existence of an agreement.529

VIII. THEQUESTIONS
EARLIER
POSED
Given the confusion and overlapping nature of the concepts of contract
zoning and conditional zoning, the response to the questions earlier posed
is to say that a fine and superficial distinction exists between the two. The
difference in large measure is semantical. Conditional zoning is upheld
when even though there is no express promise by the municipality to
rezone, but based upon conditions agreed to by the developer, the
municipality does rezone to allow the proposed development based on
those conditions.530 As such, there seems no good reason to outlaw
contract zoning when the promise to rezone is based on express similar
promises by the developer, the promise is otherwise in the public interest,
the consideration offered and received pertains to the property at issue, and
the zoning authority exercises its independent judgment in acting on the
zoning application. That is, a contractual promise is made but is subject to
public comment before the contract becomes final seems not to offend any
of the rules regarding the public trust under which the zoning power exists,
any more than rezoning based on conditions suggested by or to the zoning
authority. It is an unwarranted assumption that merely because the
527

See ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 30-A, Q 4404(9) (West 2003).
Tit. 30-A, Q 4352(8); see also Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 736 A.2d 241
(Me. 1999). The Town of Scarborough's contract zoning ordinance provided the following:
"Contract zoning . . . is authorized for zoning map changes when the
Town Council, exercising its sole and exclusive judgment, . . .
determines that it is appropriate to change the zoning district
classification of a parcel of land [to] allow reasonable uses of the land
. . . which remain consistent with the Town of Scarborough's
Comprehensive Plan."

Id. at 246 (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original).
529

See, e.g., Gladwyne Colony, Inc. v. Township of Lower Merion, 187 A.2d 549
(Pa. 1963) (holding an agreement valid where the owner agreed to grant the town a right of
way, an access road, and to convey a site if demanded by the city).
530
See supra Part V .
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municipality has promised to rezone that it does so without regard to the
public interest.

IX. WHYDEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS
ARE NEITHER
CONTRACT
NOR CONDITIONAL
ZONING
As the cases state, contract zoning refers to an agreement between a
municipality and a developer whereby the developer offers consideration
often, but not necessarily extraneous to the property for zoning ad h o ~ . ~ ~ '
As a general proposition, ad hoc zoning agreements are invalid to the
extent that a municipality promises to re-zone land by bypassing the notice
and hearing requirements of the legislative process, or makes a decision to
rezone before public hearing, or agrees to rezone in exchange for some
benefit having nothing to do with the rezoning.532Ad hoc zoning may also
be invalid when it conflicts with the municipality's comprehensive plan in
a way that results in the discriminatory treatment of persons and projects or
when the rezoning does not further the public interest, safety, or welfare.533
However, the mere act of rezoning is not contract zoning, and it is a
different issue if the zoning regulations and comprehensive plan
specifically contemplate rezoning affecting a specific parcel with the
imposition of conditions. In fact, the cases upholding conditional zoning
hold that rezoning in this fashion, that is, with conditions attached that
limit the use of the rezoned land in a way designed to minimize adverse
impact on the surrounding area, furthers the municipality's interest in
achieving desirable and beneficial land use.534 In the same sense,
development agreements should not be regarded as a form of ad hoc
zoning since they contemplate the developer's compliance with the
existing zoning scheme (although they may involve variances, exceptions,
and rezoning) and are approved by public hearing. They are nonetheless
subject to challenge if the decision to freeze the applicable zoning rules
and regulations to those existing at the time of execution of the agreement
is, based on offers or agreements that inhibit the municipality's police
powers, the municipality promising in the resulting ordinance not to apply
new zoning restrictions to the development.535Courts have recognized the
531

See, e.g., McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020-21
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
532
See 4 ARDENH. RATHKOPF
& DARENA. RATHKOPF,
THELAWOF ZONING AND
PLANNING,
8 7 1:4, at 7 1-8 (2003).
533
See 4 id. 5 44: 16.
See, e.g., Goffinet v. County of Christian, 333 N.E.2d 731, 736-37 (111. App. Ct.
1975); Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 368-69 (Mass. 2003); Cram v.
Town of Geneva, 593 N.Y.S.2d 65 1,652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
535
See Pima Gro Sys., Inc. v. King George County Bd. of Supervisors, 52 Va. Cir.
241, 244 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) (voiding an agreement under which the county agreed to allow
(continued)

'"
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need for land-use agreements between developers and municipalities to
assure stability in permitting large projects. Thus, the trend has been to
allow such agreements unless they constitute an abandonment of the
municipality's zoning authority.536 In fact, as described earlier, "several
states have codified the process for entering into development
agreements.3,537
While these statutes generally authorize local governments
to assure developers that zoning regulations in effect at the
time of an agreement will remain in effect until the project
is completed, they also require provisions in the
agreements that pertain to the duration of the agreement
and the conditions upon which the agreement may be
terminated,538
that is, to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the
However,
the extent to which a local government may validly restrict or limit its
future use of the police power by freezing the zoning under statutorily
authorized development agreements is an issue that has been resolved by a
few C O U ~ ~ S . ~ ~

activity that was prohibited to all others and illegal under a valid zoning ordinance because
it was beyond the county's power and was a surrender of police power); Delucchi v. County
of Santa Cruz, 225 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that an agreement
between a landowner and the county to preserve agricultural land, interpreted to prevent
application of future land use restriction, would be illegal contract zoning); Miller v. City of
Port Angeles, 691 P.2d 229,235 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (finding an agreement between the
city and a developer to limit the city's power to impose a condition on a development in
order to further the health, safety, and welfare of the community was a surrender of police
powers and therefore invalid and unenforceable); 3 ZIEGLER,supra note 45, 5 44.10.
536
See, e.g., Larkin v. City of Burlington, 772 A.2d 553, 557 (Vt. 2001); Giger v.
City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 190-91 (Neb. 1989).
537
Larkin, 772 A.2d at 557.
538
Id.
539
Giger, 442 N.W.2d at 189.
In Morgran Co. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 2002), the court
acknowledged that "[d]evelopment agreements are expressly permitted by the Florida
Statutes." Id. Development agreements are defined as a "contract between a [local
government] and a property owner/developer, which provides the developer with vested
rights by freezing the existing zoning regulations applicable to a property in exchange for
public benefits." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brad K. Schwartz, Development
Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 B.C. E ~ v nAFF.
. L. REV. 719 (2001)). The
court further stated that "Florida law permits local governments to impose 'conditions,
(continued)

*
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If development agreements are distinguished from contract zoning by
the absence of any commitment on the part of the municipality to act in
accordance with the developer's wishes, making them a form of
conditional zoning, then they may be of little benefit to the developer when
the municipality promises nothing in return.541 Yet, as a form of
conditional zoning, they would be upheld, it seems, in the majority of
j u r i s d i ~ t i o n s .On
~~~
the other hand, a binding promise by the municipality,
made before rezoning, to act in a certain way would be regarded as illegal
contract zoning.543 But this would be the case only if the municipality has
by-passed the public hearing procedures because the public interest is not
served, it is disruptive of the comprehensive plan, and the municipality has
surrendered its power to rezone if the public interest so requires.
Development agreements authorized by statute, by their terms, meet all
these provisos. They specifically reserve some governmental control over
the project, such as by provisions that specify the duration and grounds for
unilateral termination in order to protect the public interest, health, and
welfare. By statute, they must be consistent with the comprehensive plan,
and they are approved through public hearing.544
terms, and restrictions' as part of these agreements, where necessary for the public health,
safety or welfare of its citizens." Id. at 643. But, the problem in that case was the city's
agreement to support rezoning as part of that development agreement beforehand, rather
than after hearings on the agreement. See id. at 644. The court did not otherwise
distinguish development agreements where the city agrees to freeze existing regulations
from contract zoning in which the city agrees to rezone based on a developer's promises.
See id. The difference is a subtle one since bilateral promises are precisely at the heart of
development agreements, although the municipality reserves some residual power to act
should the public health, safety, and welfare require it, thereby avoiding the bargaining
away police powers charge.
541
See Schwartz, supra note 540, at 728.
542
Id.
413
Id.
544
Larkin v. City of Burlington, 772 A.2d 553, 558 (Vt. 2001) (deciding the case on
another ground, that plaintiff who purchased the original developer's rights in a foreclosure
sale did not acquire rights under a development agreement with the city); see also Bollech
v. Charles County, 166 F. Supp. 2d 443,454 (D. Md. 2001) (finding that the county did not
illegally abdicate its police powers by entering into an agreement where the agreement
itself stated that the development would be subject to any changes in state or federal law,
and that it did not require absolute deference to the existing zoning); De Paolo v. Town of
Ithaca, 694 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding an "agreement" by a
developer to grant the town a 99-year license to use certain property as a park, conditioned
upon landowner's receipt of all approvals for a development project, did not present a
situation of legislating "pursuant to the terms of a contract," nor one in which town agreed
"in exchange for a predetermined [consideration for] expedited and favorable
(continued)
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In fact, development agreements, not authorized by special legislation
have been specifically
as involving not contract, but conditional
, ~developer
~~
applied to the city for
zoning. In Giger v. City of ~ r n a h athe
a rezoning of property to permit the construction of a mixed-used
development consisting of retail, office, and residential buildings.547 As
part of the application process, the developer submitted several
development plans, the final plan including the construction of a public
park.548 In a new procedure, the developer and the city entered into four
agreements that incorporated the plan.s49 The four agreements were
collectively known as the "development agreement" and were submitted to
the city for approval.550 The city passed an ordinance approving the
"development agreement," incorporating it as part of the ordinance and
passed five separate ordinances rezoning the property.55' Clearly, the
agreements formed the basis of the city's decision to rezone-the parties
had worked out the terms of the rezoning before it occurred. The
agreement could be interpreted as a promise by the city to rezone based
upon the agreed upon conditions.552
The challengers contended that rezoning by agreement was illegal
contract zoning and was therefore invalid per se, that it was an ultra vires
act, and that it fostered the "appearance of evil."5s3 The court found that
determination, as would be illegal," but instead was only an agreement that furthered the
town's longstanding objective stated in the comprehensive plan of ensuring public use and
enjoyment of the donated land); Stephens v. City of Vista, 994 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding no bargaining away of police power where city could exercise discretion over the
site development process).
545
See, e.g, Save Our Springs Alliance v. City of Austin, 149 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App.
2004) (upholding development agreement entered into pursuant to a statute as a validly
enacted amendment to the zoning ordinance, entitling the developer to rely on that change
in requesting a development permit).
546
442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188.
5s0
Id.
5s1
Id.
"*
Neighboring property owners challenged the rezoning on the ground, inter alia,
that the city acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner in adopting the
rezoning ordinance. Id. "Specifically, the [challengers] allege[d] that the city entered into
a development agreement with [the developer], adopted a rezoning ordinance which
incorporated that agreement, and rezoned the . . . property pursuant to that agreement," and
that the city rezoned the property "without giving adequate consideration to the risk of
flood created by the project." Id.
553
Id. at 189.

"'
"*

"'
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distinction between contract zoning and conditional zoning academic
because its scope of review was "limited to determining whether the
conditions imposed by the city for rezoning were reasonably related to the
9,554
interest of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.
"Accordingly, the city should be permitted to condition rezoning
ordinances on the adoption of an agreement between the developer and the
city, or any other means assuring the developer builds the project as
represented."555 Otherwise, "the city would be stripped of the power to act
for the benefit of the general welfare."556 At the risk of confusion, but for
the sake of convenience, the court referred to this zoning arrangement as
conditional zoning.557 Citing a treatise, the court explained that the
purpose of conditional rezoning is to "minimize the negative externalities
caused by land development which otherwise benefits the community.3,558
Under this device, "[tlhe developer [might] agree to restrict development
of its property, make certain improvements, dedicate a portion of land to
the municipality, or make payments to the government" in mitigation of
the negative impacts.559
The court pointed out that "[c]onditional rezoning is valuable as a
planning tool because it permits a municipality greater flexibility in
balancing developing demands against fiscal and environmental
~ o n c e r n s . " ~It~ "provides a municipality with flexibility [in meeting]
specific rezoning requests while preserving the integrity of adjacent
pr~perty,"~~'
and in extracting improvements that bare zoning ordinances
do not provide. For example, an agreement contemplating rezoning could
554

Id. The court gave "great deference to the city's determination of which laws
should be enacted for the welfare of the people." Id. at 190.
Therefore, when the city considers a request for rezoning based upon a
plan or representation by the developer, it is presumed that the city
grant[ed] the request after making the determination that the plan as
represented [was] in the interest of the public health, safety, morals, and
the general welfare
and the developer was not permitted to develop the property in a manner inconsistent with
the plan or representation on which the rezoning was based, despite the fact that
inconsistent uses may be permissible under the new zoning classification. Id.
555
Id.
556
Id.
See id.
558
Id. at 189 (quoting 2 ARDENH. RATHKOPF
& DARENA. RATHKOPF,
RATHKOPF'S
THE LAWOFZONING
AND PLANNING
5 27.05 at 27-46 (rev. ed 1989)).
559
Id. at 190.
560
Id.
Id.

'"
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contain provisions designed to mitigate the harshness of commercial or
industrial rezoning on neighboring residential property by requiring a
buffer zone.'62 In this way, "conditional rezoning allows a municipality to
maintain greater control over the development
and is a device
that "allows the city flexibility . . . and gives the city a remedy to enforce
the developer's plans and representations."564
However, the court cautioned, "Conditional rezoning is a legislative
function and therefore must be within the proper exercise of the police
power, [i.e,] must be reasonably related to the interest of public health,
safety, morals, and the general welfare."565 Here, the development
agreement could not be construed as bargaining away the city's police
power where it was established that the agreement provided more
restrictive ceilings and development regulations than the current
underlying zoning regulation.566 The evidence clearly showed "that the
city's police powers [were] not abridged in any manner and that the
agreement [was] expressly subject to the remedies available to the city
under the Omaha Municipal
Further, the court found that "the
agreement actually enhance[d] the city's regulatory control over the
development rather than limit[ed] it."568
--

562

Id.
Id.
Id. "Theoretically, if the rezoning ordinance adopts the plan, as in this case, the
city could institute legal proceedings if the developer builds a project inconsistent with the
plans without resorting to rezoning the property." Id. For these reasons, the court held
conditional rezoning to be valid. Id.
'65
Id. at 190-91.
566
Id. at 192. For instance, part of the development where office buildings would be
located had been rezoned to a new district. Id. Absent the agreement, the developer would
be free to erect any number of buildings without limitation as to square footage. Id. But,
under the agreement and the rezoning, the developer was limited to three office buildings
and a total of 390,000 square feet of office space. Id.
567
Id.
Id. at 192. The court also rejected the argument that the city engaged in an ultra
vires act because there was no statutory enabling act permitting conditional zoning. Id. at
189-90. In addition to these powers granted by the express words, the city also has those
powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, as well
as those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply
convenient, but indispensable. Id. at 193. Here, the legislature had given the city broad
powers to regulate land use, without specifying what regulations the city was permitted to
use, coupled with a grant of power to implement, amend, supplement, change, modify, and
repeal these regulations, along with the implied grant of power to enact all necessary zoning
regulation including conditional zoning, as long as those regulations are within the proper
exercise of the police power. Id. The final contention made by the challengers was that the
(continued)
563
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The court took great pains to avoid any finding of a restriction on the
government's exercise of its police powers by the agreement, as opposed
to a broadening of such powers.569 This seems to minimize the benefits of
a development agreement, except to the extent that the developer knows
beforehand what rules will apply.
In Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. Sun Luis Obispo
~
appellate court expressly
County Board of ~ u ~ e r v i s o r s a, ' ~California
rejected a challenge to development agreements authorized by statute on
the ground that such agreements amounted to illegal contract zoning.'"
The court ruled that a zoning freeze was not a surrender or abnegation of
political power, but that it in fact advanced the public interest since the
project was still required to be developed in accordance with the county's
general plan, and the agreement did not permit construction until the
county had approved detailed building plans.572 The agreement also
retained the county's discretionary authority in the future and, in any event,
the zoning freeze was only for a period of five years, rather than for an
unlimited duration.573
20041

city fostered "an appearance of evil" by engaging in conditional zoning, and that it could
result in the cormption of officials-that officials would concentrate more on what they
could extract from the developer than on proper rezoning criteria. Id. The court found the
argument lacking in merit. Id. "[Vo evidence of graft or cormption" was present in the
case, and the mere "appearance of evil" was an insufficient basis for striking down an
ordinance. Id. The regulation, by imposing restrictions not generally applicable to other
property within the district, also failed to violate the uniformity requirement of the zoning
laws. Id. at 194. The court pointed out that the uniformity requirement did not preclude
different uses within the same district so long as they are reasonable and based on the
public policy to be served. Id. In fact, the court thought that allowing reasonable
classifications within a district was a good mle, especially in view of the broad delegation
of authority given by the legislature to the city in making zoning regulations. Id.
Accordingly, the uniformity requirement did not prohibit reasonable classification within
districts. Id. Here, there was no evidence that the city acted unreasonably. Id. at 195. Nor
was the zoning ordinance an example of spot zoning. Id. at 197. The challengers failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the rezoning ordinance was violative of the
comprehensive plan as might establish illegal spot zoning, since the evidence was in
conflict as to the range of uses then in existence in the district. Id.
569
Id. at 192.
570
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
57'
Id. at 745.
572
Id. at 748.
573
Id.; see also Warner Co. v. Sutton, 644 A.2d 656, 660 n.2 (N.J.Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994). In Warner, the court distinguished a development agreement from the
proscriptions against contract zoning and held that, "[ulnlike 'contract zoning,' there is no
legal impediment to a development agreement between a municipality and a property owner
(continued)
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X. CONCLUSION
Development agreements are a form of land use bargaining, consistent
with modern land use planning, which is fundamentally an exercise in
bargaining. Yet, they should not be regarded as a form of contract zoning
for the following reasons: (I) while development agreements do involve
an agreement, the city does not bargain away its legislative discretion to
the extent that it reserves the power unilaterally to terminate the agreement
if required by the public safety, health, or welfare; (2) while development
agreements may involve an agreement in advance of rezoning, the
agreements become final only after a public hearing; (3) development
agreements do not involve extraneous considerations since the promises
which provides for rezoning of certain tracts to accommodate a particular residential plan."
Warner, 644 A.2d at 660 n.2. In this case, all negotiations and decisions with respect to the
rezoning amendments were taken at public meetings of the governing body and all statutory
requirements relating to the amendment to the master plan and adoption of amending
ordinances were properly followed. Id.; see also WILLIAM
M . COX,NEWJERSEY
ZONING
AND LANDUSEADMIN~STRA~ON
5 34-8.2, at 522-23 (1994); Terminal Enters., Inc. v.
Jersey City, 258 A.2d 361 (N.J. 1969). Terminal Enterprises, Inc. dealt with a challenge to
the adoption of an ordinance and resolution by the city and county board, whereby the city
and the county entered into certain agreements with the Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corporation (PATH) relating to the construction and operation of a proposed
Transportation Center in the Journal Square area and to entrance improvements at the
Grove-Henderson Street Station. Id. at 363. Appellants, individuals and the board of trade,
challenged the agreement claiming that the agreements with PATH were invalid for several
reasons, including that the defendants had invalidly obligated themselves to legislate and
zone in the future concerning public streets, building codes, and bus and taxi operations;
that the defendants had unlawfully delegated power to PATH, and that the agreements were
invalid on their face since their fulfillment by PATH was optional. Id. at 365. The court
affirmed the lower court. Id. at 367. It stated that "[ilnitially, it should be noted that the
officers of a municipal corporation may limit by contract their own police powers as well as
those of their successors where the agreement is authorized by statute." Id. at 366. The
court then held that "[tlhere can be no doubt that PATH has statutory authority to construct
and operate a Transportation Center at Journal Square. To aid PATH in achieving this
objective, we think it clear that the Legislature authorized the City and County to relinquish
some of their police powers." Id. (citations omitted). The court went on to state that "the
Legislature has given the City and County broad powers to cooperate with PATH in the
construction and operation of the Transportation Center so long as resulting agreements
contain 'reasonable terms."' Id. "We think that the terms of the agreements relating to bus
operations and public streets are fully within the legislative contemplation." Id. "Since
these various guarantees which the City and County gave PATH were authorized by the
statutes, plaintiffs' reliance on cases which prohibit contract zoning and prevent binding the
hands of successors is misplaced." Id.
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made by the developer pertain only to subject property; (4) development
agreements are a valuable land use device, enabling the city to achieve
benefits and to mitigate the effects of the rezoning; and (5) development
agreements must be consistent with the comprehensive plan. They should
also not be considered simply as a form of conditional zoning under which
the municipality imposes restrictions on land use rather than permitting
different uses proposed for development, and where the municipality is
free to rezone at any time during the development. Some binding
obligation on the municipality is necessary if development agreements are
to have their intended benefit. However, a binding obligation having been
fully considered in compliance with the public notice and hearing process,
and undertaken in the public interest, should be upheld as not running afoul
of the basic principle prohibiting the contracting away of police powers.
Rather, the obligation should be regarded as an exercise of those powers.
Development agreements both fit within and advance existing land use
planning by encouraging development through security to developers of
the progression of the development project without fear of subsequent
zoning changes. At the same time, municipalities retain control over the
project and may negotiate for other public benefits. The fact of an
agreement should not act as an impediment to the use of development
agreements any more than conditioning rezoning on promises made by the
developer.
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